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Chapter 1
Does Overconfidence Lead to
Bargaining Failures?
1.1 Introduction
One of the enduring puzzles in bargaining is why there is disagreement in cases where both parties
would appear to be better off reaching an agreement. For example, the “gas wars” between Russia
and Ukraine often lead to breakdowns in transit or supply that are inefficient (Tingle 2015). One
prominent explanation for bargaining failures is asymmetric information (Fudenberg and Tirole
1981, Roth and Murnighan 1982, Sobel and Takahashi 1983, Bebchuk 1984, Kennan and Wilson
1993). Another prominent explanation is optimistic and self-serving biases (Bazerman and Neal
1982, Neal and Bazerman 1983, Neal and Bazerman 1985, Farber and Bazerman 1989, Thompson
and Loewenstein 1992, Babcock et al. 1995, Babcock and Loewenstein 1997). If the parties
involved in a legal dispute are mutually optimistic about their chances of winning in court they
might fail to agree on a settlement (Priest and Klein 1984, Waldfogel 1995 and 1998, Farmer et
al. 2004, Merlo and Tang 2019).1 Yet, another potential explanation for bargaining failures is
1The parties’ excessive optimism about their bargaining power in the future is a prominent explanation for costly de-
lays before reaching an agreement (Hicks 1932, Farber and Katz 1979, Shavell 1982, Yildiz 2011). Yildiz (2003) shows
that under bilateral bargaining over a deterministic surplus, optimism cannot cause bargaining delays. However, Ali
(2006) finds that optimism can lead to costly delays when there are more than two bargainers, the surplus is determinis-
tic, and bargainers are extremely optimistic More recently, Ortner (2013) shows that optimism can lead to costly delays
under bilateral bargaining when the size of the surplus follows a stochastic process. Yildiz (2011) summarizes these
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overconfidence about own performance (Bénabou and Tirole 2009).
Experimental evidence from Psychology and Economics shows that most people are overconfi-
dent, that is, they tend to overestimate their absolute skills, overplace themselves relative to others,
and overestimate the precision of their private information, estimates, and forecasts.2 Overcon-
fidence affects behavior in goods markets (DellaVigna and Malmendier 2006, Grubb 2009) and
in labor markets (Gervais and Goldstein 2007, DellaVigna 2009, Santos-Pinto 2010, Spinnewijn
2013, Kőszegi 2014, Spinnewijn 2015, Santos-Pinto and de la Rosa 2020). Overconfidence also
plays a role in strategic decisions such as market entry (Camerer and Lovallo 1999) and mergers
and acquisitions by CEOs (Malmendier and Tate 2005 ).
Most real-life bargaining situations involve the division of a surplus that is produced by the
bargainers themselves (Karagözoğlu 2004). For example, business partners deciding how to share
the profits of a partnership, labor negotiating with management over wages and states bargaining
with each other over the ownership and sale of strategic resources (e.g., water, gas, oil). A large
body of research shows that overconfidence leads people to overestimate their own contribution to
joint tasks (Ross and Sicoly 1979, Van den Steen 2004). For example, Ross and Sicoly (1979) find
that married couples overestimate their individual contributions to various household tasks they
are responsible for such as making breakfast, cleaning house, shopping for groceries, and caring
for children. Van den Steen (2004) shows that overconfident agents in cooperative venture tend to
attribute success to their own choice of action and failure to the action choice of their associate.
If overconfident bargainers overestimate their individual contributions to a joint project, this might
lead to costly delays and even to disagreement.
This paper uses a laboratory experiment to investigate how overconfidence affects bargaining
with joint production. Does overconfidence lead to bargaining failures? Does it lead to bargain-
ing delays? If so, what are the mechanisms thought which this happens? For example, does
overconfidence lead to disagreement in subjective entitlements and/or in opening proposals? Are
overconfident bargainers less willing to make concessions?
results as follows “(...) optimism plays a subtle role in bargaining, and optimism alone cannot explain the bargaining
delays.”
2Moore and Healy (2008) distinguish between three types of overconfidence: (i) overestimation of one’s absolute
skills or performance, (ii) overestimation of one’s relative skills or performance (overplacement or the “better-than-
average” effect), and (iii) excessive confidence in the precision of one’s private information, estimates, and forecasts
(overprecision or miscalibration). We use the term overconfidence in the sense of overplacement.
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In our experiment subjects start by performing a real-effort task which consists in answering
a general knowledge quiz. We experimentally shift the subjects’ self-confidence (self-placement)
using a between-subjects design that randomly assigns half of the subjects to an easy quiz and the
other half to a hard quiz. The easy and hard quizzes cause subjects to exhibit overconfidence and
underconfidence, respectively. This manipulation uses the empirical finding that subjects tend to
display overplacement in easy tasks and underplacement in hard tasks (Kruger 1999, Kruger and
Dunning 1999, Krueger and Mueller 2002, Moore and Kim 2003, Moore and Healy 2008). Next,
subjects are randomly matched into pairs. A pair’s average rank in the quiz determines that pair’s
joint surplus which can be either low or high. A pair bargains over a low surplus when the pair’s
average rank in the quiz is higher than the average rank of their group, otherwise the pair bargains
over a high surplus. Hence, the experiment has two quiz treatments – easy and hard – and two
surplus size conditions – low and high.
After pairs are informed whether they will bargain over a low or a high surplus, subjects bargain
anonymously with their partners over a computer network by sending proposals that consist of an
amount for themselves and an amount for the partner. If an agreement is reached in 10 minutes
the joint surplus is divided as agreed. If agreement is not reached by the end of the 10 minutes,
bargaining ends with disagreement and subjects receive a zero payoff. This unstructured (or free-
form) bargaining protocol follows Roth and Malouf (1979), Roth and Murnighan (1982), Gächter
and Riedl (2005), and Karagözoğlu and Riedl (2014). Free-form bargaining allows us to analyze
a rich set of layers of the bargaining process: agreements, opening proposals, concessions, and
bargaining duration. Also, most bargaining in the real-life is unstructured, without the cut-and-
dried rules of noncooperative models like Rubinstein (1982).
Our main experimental findings are as follows. First, the self-confidence manipulation is suc-
cessful: subjects who take the easy quiz are, on average, overconfident while subjects who take
the hard quiz are, on average, underconfident. Second, the percentage of bargaining failures when
subjects take the easy quiz – 15% – is more than triple than when they take the hard quiz – 4%.
Third, there is a remarkably high percentage of bargaining failures – 28% – when subjects take the
easy quiz and bargain over a low surplus. Fourth, when subjects take the easy quiz and bargain
over a high surplus, all pairs reach an agreement and most settle on an equal split. These results are
in line with Bénabou and Tirole (2009)’s predictions about the effects of ego utility on bargaining
with joint production. We discuss Bénabou and Tirole (2009) in Section 1.3.
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Besides the main findings, our experiment provides five additional results on bargaining dy-
namics. First, there is more disagreement in subjective entitlements in the easy than in the hard
quiz treatment. Second, we find no significant differences in disagreement in opening proposals
across the two treatments. Third, there is more disagreement in opening proposals in the easy quiz
and high surplus condition than in the hard quiz treatment. Fourth, concessions are the lowest in
the easy quiz and low surplus condition. Fifth, we find no significant differences in bargaining
duration across the two treatments and the two surplus size conditions.
Our experimental results shed light on the conditions and mechanisms under which overcon-
fidence leads to bargaining failures. Overconfident bargainers feel entitled to a larger share of the
surplus regardless of its size. When the surplus being negotiated is low, overconfident bargain-
ers display a relatively low level of disagreement in opening proposals but are reluctant to make
concessions and often fail to reach an agreement. Overconfident bargainers are reluctant to make
concessions when the surplus is low because the utility gain from disagreement – maintaining a
high self-confidence – is greater than monetary loss from disagreement – the share of the low sur-
plus. In contrast, when the surplus being negotiated is high, overconfident bargainers display a high
level of disagreement in opening proposals but are able to make concessions until an agreement is
reached. Overconfident bargainers are able to make concessions when the surplus is high because
the monetary gain from agreement – the share of the high surplus – is greater than the utility loss
from agreement – the drop in self-confidence.
Our study contributes to the experimental literature on how judgement biases affect bargain-
ing behavior. As we have seen, optimistic and self-serving biases are a prominent explanation for
bargaining failures. This literature is composed of experimental studies (Bazerman and Neal 1982,
Neal and Bazerman 1983, Thompson and Loewenstein 1992, Neal and Bazerman 1985, Farber
and Bazerman 1989, Babcock et al. 1995, Babcock and Loewenstein 1997 ) and empirical studies
(Waldfogel 1995 and 1998, Farmer et al. 2004, Merlo and Tang 2019). For example, Neal and
Bazerman (1985) investigate the effects of optimism on labor-management negotiations and find
that optimistic negotiators are less likely to display concessionary behaviors and reach an agree-
ment than realistic negotiators. Thompson and Loewenstein (1992) find that self-serving, biased
attention to available information in a conflict affected the parties’ perceptions of fairness and the
length of a strike in a simulated labor dispute. In Babcock and Loewenstein (1997), subjects are
assigned the role of plaintiff or defendant in a tort case. Subjects need to reach a settlement and
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are asked to make a prediction regarding the judicial awards to the parties involved in the tort case.
Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) find that self-serving judgements of fairness lead to a discrep-
ancy in predictions regarding the judicial award which, in turn, lead to a settlement impediment.
Walfogel (1998) attempts to distinguish one-sided asymmetric information from optimistic bias
explanations using civil litigation data and finds support for the optimistic explanation. Farmer et
al. (2004) analyze the causes of settlement failure using final-offer arbitration data from Major
League Baseball and find that their results more consistent with an optimism model explanation
than with one-sided asymmetric information models of arbitration.
Our study also contributes to the experimental literature on bargaining with joint production.
In most of the experimental studies cited above subjects bargain over a surplus that is exogenously
provided by the experimenter. Yet, bargaining commonly takes place between people who have
produced the surplus they have to share. As Karagözoğlu (2004) points out “From a purely standard
theoretical point of view, whether the surplus is produced by the bargaining parties or not should
not make a difference since the costs incurred by the bargaining parties due to the production of the
pie (e.g., cost of effort, investment, contribution) are sunk at the time when they sit at the bargaining
table and thus should not affect bargaining behavior.” However, experimental evidence shows that
individuals’ valuations and bidding behavior are heavily influenced by sunk costs they previously
incur (Phillips et al. 1991, Hackett 1993). Hence, knowing if overconfidence affects bargaining
with joint production is important for understanding real-life negotiations. Within the experimental
literature on bargaining with joint production, the study that is closest to ours is Karagözoğlu and
Riedl (2014). Karagözoğlu and Riedl (2014) analyze the impact of performance information and
production uncertainties on bargaining over a jointly produced surplus. Karagözoğlu and Riedl
(2014) manipulate performance information by telling subjects who is the best in a pair. The
study finds that without performance information pairs tend to settle on the equal split while with
performance information pairs reach asymmetric agreements in favor of the best in the pair and
there are bargaining delays. Karagözoğlu and Riedl (2014) do not find bargaining failures. In
stark contrast to Karagözoğlu and Riedl (2014), our study manipulates self-confidence and finds a
remarkably high percentage of bargaining failures in the easy quiz and low surplus condition.
Finally, our study contributes to the growing literature on the impact of overconfidence on
strategic interactions. Overconfidence has been shown to have both damaging (Camerer and Lo-
vallo 1999; Malmendier and Tate 2005) and beneficial effects (Bénabou and Tirole 2002; Compte
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and Postlewaite 2004; Gervais and Goldstein 2007; Santos-Pinto 2010). Our study identifies con-
ditions under which overconfidence can lead to bargaining failures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the experimental design.
Section 1.3 presents the research hypotheses. Section 1.4 contains the results. Section 1.5 con-
cludes the paper.
1.2 Experimental Design and Procedures
This section presents the experimental design and procedures.
The experiment is composed of two between subjects treatments which exogenously manipu-
late self-confidence using a general knowledge quiz. Half the subjects perform an easy quiz and
the other half a hard quiz. On average, easy tasks induce overconfidence (overplacement) and hard
tasks induce underconfidence (underplacement) due to the “hard-easy” effect (Kruger and Dunning
1999, Moore and Kim 2003, Moore and Small 2007, Moore and Healy 2008, Dargnies et al. 2019).
Subjects believe to have lower (higher) ranks than their peers in easy (hard) tasks failing to realize
that other subjects are facing the same level of difficulty. We label the two treatments EASY and
HARD.
In each treatment subjects are randomly matched into pairs and each pair bargains over a joint
surplus. The joint surplus is either low or high. If the pair’s average rank in the quiz is smaller
(greater) than the average rank of the group, then the pair bargains over a high (low) surplus. Hence,
the experiment has two surplus size conditions which we label LOW and HIGH. Combining the
two treatments with the surplus size conditions we have a total of four conditions: EASY-LOW,
EASY-HIGH, HARD-LOW and HARD-HIGH.
The timing of the experiment is as follows. First, subjects perform a general knowledge quiz.
Second, the joint surplus of each pair is determined. Third, subjects are informed about the size
of the joint surplus. Fourth, subjects’ beliefs about rank are elicited. Fifth, subjects in each pair
are informed about who did best and worst on the quiz. Sixth, subjects’ subjective entitlements
are elicited. Seventh, subjects bargain over the joint surplus. Eighth, subjects’ risk preferences are
elicited. Ninth, subjects fill in a demographic questionnaire and are paid. We now explain each
part of the experiment in detail.
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1.2.1 Quiz
The quiz is composed of 46 questions which are divided into 6 different general knowledge topics:
Science, Geography, Movies, Music, History, and Switzerland. We use questions from Moore and
Healy (2008), update some of their questions, and add questions about Switzerland as we run the
experiment at the University of Lausanne. Subjects have 20 minutes to complete the quiz. The
number of correct answers in the quiz determines subjects’ ranks. The average of subjects’ ranks
in turn determines a pair’s surplus (and this is common knowledge). Groups are composed of 24
subjects.3
1.2.2 Joint Surplus
After completing the quiz, subjects are randomly and anonymously matched into pairs. The surplus
of each pair is either high or low. The high surplus is worth CHF 39 and the low surplus is worth
CHF 20.4 The joint surplus of pair (i, j), denoted Sij , is obtained as follows:
Sij =
{
39 if ri+rj2 ≤ 12
20 if ri+rj2 > 12
,
where ri and rj are the ranks of subjects i and j, respectively. Note that the average rank of a group
of 24 subjects is equal to 12.5. Hence, if a pair’s average rank in the quiz, (ri + rj)/2, is smaller
(greater) than the average rank of the group, then the pair bargains over a high (low) surplus. This
rule implies that the surplus is high when either both partners’ ranks are above average or one
partner’s rank is above average and the other is not but the average of the partners’ ranks is above
average. The opposite is true for a low surplus. Importantly, the joint surplus is observable to the
pair but exact individual contributions are not.
3In case of a tie, subjects who gave the same number of correct answers were assigned the same rank. Overall our
data set, only two ties among members of the same pair appeared hence the impact of ties is negligible.
4The experimental points for the high and low surpluses, 2710 and 1370, respectively, are identical to those in
Karagözoğlu and Riedl (2014) . However, payments in Karagözoğlu and Riedl (2014) are in Euros (e), while in our
case, payments are in Swiss Francs (CHF). In Karagözoğlu and Riedl (2014) , 2710 and 1370 points correspond to 17.6
e and 9.0 e, respectively. This amounts are lower than the ones in Swiss Francs we pay. Hence, points being constant,
we pay higher amounts to comply with laboratory payments norms at University of Lausanne.
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1.2.3 Elicitation of Beliefs about Rank
After subjects are informed about the surplus size, we ask them to estimate their own rank and their
partner’s rank on the quiz. This allows us to measure self-confidence with respect to the group and
with respect to the partner. Self-placement with respect to the group, bii, is the difference between
a subject’s rank and her estimate of own rank:
bii = ri − Ei(Ri|Sij = s),
where ri is subject i’s rank, Ei(Ri|Sij = s) is i’s estimate of own rank conditional on the pair’s
surplus. Self-placement with respect to the group is zero when a subject correctly estimates her
own rank, is positive (there is overplacement with respect to group) if the estimate is lower than her
real rank, and negative (there is underplacement with respect to the group) if the estimate is higher
than her real rank.
Since partners’ ranks matter for the surplus assignment and for the bargaining stage we mea-
sure how subjects compare themselves with respect to their partners as well. Indeed, beliefs re-
garding relative performance in the pair and hence regarding relative contributions to the jointly
produced surplus are likely to influence bargaining behavior. Following Moore and Healy (2008),
self-placement with respect to the partner, ∆bij , is measured by
∆bij = bii − bij = [ri − Ei(Ri|Sij = s)]− [rj − Ei(Rj |Sij = s)] ,
where rj is subject j’s rank (i’s partner), and Ei(Rj |Sij = s) is i’s estimate of j’s rank conditional
on the pair’s surplus.
The estimates Ei(Ri|Sij = s) and Ei(Rj |Sij = s) are elicited with binarized scoring rules
(Hossain and Okui 2013). The binarized scoring rule induces truth telling irrespective of subject’s
EU risk preference and even if subjects are non-EU maximizers. This is the main advantage of the
binarized scoring rule over other scoring rules (e.g., the quadratic scoring rule) given the substantial
evidence on heterogeneity in risk preferences (Hey and Orme 1994, Harless and Camerer 1994,
Starmer 2000), which suggests that there is a majority of non-EU maximizers and a minority of EU
maximizers (Bruhin et al. 2010, Conte et al. 2011, Bruhin et al. 2019).
Subject i’s payoff for her estimate of her own rank is
Πii =
{
2 if [Ei(Ri|Sij = s)− ri]2 ≤ k
0 if [Ei(Ri|Sij = s)− ri]2 > k
,
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where Ei(Ri|Sij = s) − r2i is i’s prediction error about her own rank, and k is a random number
drawn from the uniform distribution with support on [0, (n−1)2], where n is the number of subjects
in the group. Hence, subject i earns CHF 2 for her estimate of own rank if her prediction error
squared is lower than k and otherwise earns CHF 0.
Subject i’s payoff for her estimate of her partner’s rank is:
Πij =
{
2 if [Ei(Rj |Sij = s)− rj ]2 ≤ k
0 if [Ei(Rj |Sij = s)− rj ]2 > k
,
where Ei(Rj |Sij = s) − r2i is i’s prediction error about her partner’ rank. Hence, subject i earns
CHF 2 for her estimate of her partner’s rank if her prediction error squared is lower than k and
otherwise earns CHF 0.
1.2.4 Information about Who is the Best in a Pair
We inform subjects about who was the best (and the worst) in the pair. Information about who
is the best in a pair is a noisy signal about individual contributions to the joint surplus. We give
this information to subjects for to two reasons. First, Karagözoğlu and Riedl (2014) show that
without it most pairs agree on an equal-split. Second, we want to match the sequence of events in
Karagözoğlu and Riedl (2014).
1.2.5 Elicitation of Subjective Entitlements
We define “subjective entitlement” as the fraction of joint surplus that a subject believes it is fair
to keep for herself. For instance, if a subject believes that is it fair to equally split the joint surplus,
her subjective entitlement is equal to 50%. To elicit subjects’ subjective entitlements we use the
formulation from Gächter and Riedl (2005) and ask subjects: “According to your opinion, what
would be a ‘fair’ distribution of the jointly produced surplus from the vantage point of a non-
involved neutral arbitrator? (Please use exact amounts; no intervals! The amounts have to sum
up to the jointly produced surplus!).” Subjects are asked to enter on the computer screen which
amount they think it is fair to keep for themselves and which amount they think it is fair to give
to their partner. The two amounts need to sum up to the joint surplus. We divide the amount they
think it is fair to keep for themselves by the surplus to have percentage measure and thus be able to
compare subjects who receive high and low surpluses.
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1.2.6 Bargaining
We implement an unstructured (or free-form) bargaining protocol following Roth and Malouf
(1979), Roth and Murnighan (1982), Gächter and Riedl (2005), and Karagözoğlu and Riedl (2014).
An unstructured bargaining protocol has three main advantages compared to a structured bargain-
ing protocol (Nash 1953, Rubinstein 1982). First, it allows us to analyze a rich set of layers of the
bargaining process: agreements, opening proposals, concessions, and bargaining duration. Sec-
ond, most bargaining in the world is unstructured, without the cut-and-dried rules of noncoopera-
tive models like Rubinstein (1982). Third, it avoids exogenous first-mover effects. However, with
free-form bargaining, there is no precise theoretical prediction for what the bargaining dynamics
and outcomes will be. Still, classical cooperative bargaining solutions (e.g. Nash 1950) are of-
ten employed to predict agreements in free-form bargaining. In our free-form bargaining protocol
the disagreement point is symmetric (both players get zero). If bargainers have the same utility
function over money, u(0) = 0, then the bargaining problem is symmetric and the Nash (1950)
bargaining solution predicts an equal split.
1.2.7 Elicitation of Risk Preferences
Risk preferences can play a large role in bargaining (Murnighan et al. 1988). If the randomization
of subjects into treatments is successful there are no systematic differences in risk preferences
across treatments. We believe that the random assignment of subjects to the two treatments was
successful. Still, given the importance of risk preferences, we perform a randomization check. We
use Crosetto and Filippin (2013)’s Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET) to measure risk preferences.
This task has five advantages compared to others. First, it allows to estimate both risk averse
and risk seeking preferences very precisely. Second, it has a good trade-off between precision
and comprehensibility. Third, it is defined on the gain domain and hence it does not suffer from
loss aversion as a potential confound. Fourth, it does not provide endogenous reference points
against which some outcomes could be perceived as losses. Fifth, it imposes a unique choice which
prevents its results from being biased by violations of the Reduction Axiom. Subjects earn up to
2 CHF in the task depending on their choice. The BRET and the payoff allocation are accurately
described in Appendix H.
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1.2.8 Demographic Questionnaire and Payments
At the end of the experiment subjects fill in a demographic questionnaire. Thereafter, subjects are
paid their earnings in cash individually and confidentially.
The experiment was computerized and programmed with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher
2007) and conducted at the LABEX (Laboratory for Behavioral Experiments) in the University of
Lausanne. Subjects were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner 2015).
In total 190 subjects participated in 8 randomized experimental sessions. We had 7 sessions
with 24 participants each and one session with 22 participants.5 94 subjects participated in the
EASY treatment and 96 subjects in the HARD treatment. Sessions lasted on average 70 minutes.
Most of the subjects were undergraduate students from different faculties at University of Lausanne
and EPFL. The average earnings (including a show-up fee of CHF 10) were CHF 28. Experimental
instructions can be found in Appendix J.
1.3 Research Hypotheses
This section presents our hypotheses on how self-confidence affects bargaining outcomes and dy-
namics.
1.3.1 Bargaining Outcomes
Neal and Bazerman (1985) and Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) show that overconfidence can
lead to bargaining failures when subjects negotiate over an exogenous surplus. Similarly, we ex-
pect that overconfidence also leads to bargaining failures when subjects negotiate over a jointly
produced surplus. This implies that we expect more bargaining failures when subjects take the
easy quiz than when they take the hard quiz.
Hypothesis 1: There are more bargaining failures when subjects take the easy quiz than when they
take the hard quiz.
An important feature of our experimental design is that the surplus to be negotiated is jointly
produced and its size depends on the pair’s average rank on the quiz. Our design resembles
5In one section only 22 participants showed up. We informed subjects that only 22 participants were in the room and
explained that ranks would go from 1 to 22 and that neither the surplus assignment nor the payoff for belief elicitation
would not be modified.
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Bénabou and Tirole (2009)’s model of bargaining over a jointly produced surplus. In their model,
two matched agents decide whether to keep or destroy their match. If the match is kept, they bar-
gain over their joint surplus. Each agent has either low or high skill. The joint surplus is high if
both agents have high skill and low otherwise. Importantly, agents are uncertain about their skills
and individual contributions to the joint surplus are imperfectly recalled. Agents’ utility is increas-
ing with the share of the joint surplus and with ego utility (i.e. agents derive utility from having
high beliefs about their skill). Bargaining is a standard Nash demand game (Nash 1953).
Our design is similar to Bénabou and Tirole (2009)’s model in three aspects. First, pairs are
assigned a high or a low surplus depending on partners’ performance in the quiz. Pairs whose
average rank is smaller (greater) than the average rank of their group bargain over a high (low)
surplus. If a pair is assigned a high surplus, it is more likely that both partners are high skilled; if a
pair is assigned a low surplus, it is more likely that both partners are low skilled. Second, subjects
are not informed about individual contributions to the joint surplus: similarly to Bénabou and Tirole
(2009) in which subjects recall imperfectly their own contributions, here subjects only receive a
noisy signal (the surplus size). Third, in Bénabou and Tirole (2009), agents derive utility not only
from monetary gains but also from having high beliefs about their skills (ego utility). In our design,
this translates into deriving utility not only from monetary gains but also from believing to be more
skilled than others. In other words, subjects who are overconfident i.e. overplace themselves may
derive positive utility by believing to be more skilled than others (and thus to have performed better
than others in the quiz).
Bénabou and Tirole (2009) show that in a symmetric, pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium, agents who bargain over a high surplus always reach an agreement and share the surplus
equally. In contrast, agents who bargain over a low surplus only reach an agreement when ego util-
ity concerns are low. If ego utility concerns are important, agents who bargain over a low surplus
fail to reach an agreement. The intuition behind this result is as follows. Agreeing to inferior terms
in a low surplus pair entails a loss in ego utility since it implies that at least one of the agents has
low skill. When the surplus is low and ego utility concerns are important, the ego utility benefit
from refusing to settle – maintaining a high self-confidence – is greater than the monetary cost of
disagreement – the lost share of the low surplus.
In our design, in the easy treatment there is on average higher overplacement whereas in the
hard treatment there is on average higher underplacement. Following Bénabou and Tirole (2009)’s
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predictions, we expect that bargaining failures are highest when subjects take the easy quiz and
bargain over a low surplus. In addition, we expect that most pairs agree on the equal split when
subjects take the easy quiz and bargain over a high surplus. Similarly to the intuition for the
theoretical predictions in Bénabou and Tirole (2009), agreeing to inferior terms in a low surplus
pair entails a loss in utility since it implies that at least one of the agents is less skilled than others
(and has not performed as well as estimated in the quiz). Thus, when the surplus is low and
overplacement is high, the utility of refusing to settle – thus maintain a high self-confidence – is
greater than the monetary cost of disagreement – the lost share of the low surplus.
Hypothesis 2: Bargaining failures are highest when subjects take the easy quiz and bargain over
a low surplus.
Hypothesis 3: Most pairs agree on the equal split when subjects take the easy quiz and bargain
over a high surplus.
1.3.2 Bargaining Dynamics
At the beginning of the bargaining stage, when subjects exchange their first proposals, we can ob-
serve initial disagreement. We use two measures of initial disagreement: subjective entitlements
and opening proposals. We expect subjects to be more likely to disagree at the start of the bargain-
ing stage when they are overconfident. In other words, we expect more disagreement in subjective
entitlements and opening proposals when subjects take the easy quiz than when they take the hard
quiz.
Hypothesis 4: Disagreement in subjective entitlements is higher when subjects take the easy quiz
than when they take the hard quiz.
Hypothesis 5: Disagreement in opening proposals is higher when subjects take the easy quiz than
in when they take the hard quiz.
During the bargaining stage, subjects may overcome initial disagreement by making conces-
sions. We expect overconfident subjects to concede less than underconfident ones. Hence, we
expect to observe less concessionary behavior in the EASY than in the HARD treatment.
Hypothesis 6: Concessions are lower when subjects take the easy quiz than when they take the
hard quiz.
As we have seen, Bénabou and Tirole (2009) predict that bargaining failures can arise when
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subjects bargain over a low surplus and ego utility concerns are important. We expect the interac-
tion between overconfidence and surplus size to affect bargaining outcomes through concessions.
Moreover, we expect overconfident subjects who bargain over a low surplus to be more reluctant
to make concessions. In other words, we expect concessions to be the lowest in the EASY-LOW
condition than in the other three conditions.
Hypothesis 7: Concessions are the lowest when subjects take the easy quiz and bargain over a low
surplus.
Considering the existence of initial disagreement and the reluctance to concede part of the
surplus in order to reach an agreement, we expect the bargaining duration to be longer when there
is overconfidence.
Hypothesis 8: Bargaining duration is longer when subjects take the easy quiz than when they take
the hard quiz.
We also expect the interaction between self-confidence and surplus size to affect bargaining
duration. Moreover, we expect overconfident subjects who bargain over a low surplus to spend
more time bargaining. In other words, we expect bargaining duration to be the longest in the
EASY-LOW condition than in the other three conditions.
Hypothesis 9: Bargaining duration is the longest when subjects take the easy quiz and bargain
over a low surplus.
1.4 Results
This section presents our results and is organized as follows. Section 1.4.1 reports the confidence
manipulation. Section 1.4.2 presents results on bargaining outcomes: bargaining failures and sur-
plus split. Section 1.4.3 presents results on bargaining dynamics: disagreement in subjective enti-
tlements, disagreement in opening proposals, concessions, and bargaining duration.
1.4.1 Confidence Manipulation
As expected, the easy quiz resulted in higher scores (M = 30.7 out of 46, SD = 7.15) than did
the hard quiz (M = 8.4 out of 46, SD = 4.95). The mean percentage of correct answers in the
easy quiz, 64%, is highly significant greater than in the hard quiz, 17.5% (p-value < 0.01, 1-sided,
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t-test).6 As mentioned above, we measure overconfidence as self-placement with respect to the
group and self-placement with respect to the partner.
Self-Placement with Respect to the Group
The top panel of Figure 1.1 depicts the means of self-placement with respect to the group in the two
treatments. It shows that there is overplacement with respect to the group in the EASY treatment
and underplacement in the HARD treatment.
The mean self-placement with respect to the group in the EASY treatment is equal to 2.04 and
to −1.61 in the HARD treatment.7
The distributions of self-placement with respect to the group are highly significant different
between the two treatments (p-value < 0.01, 1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test).8
Result i: There is overplacement with respect to the group when subjects take the easy quiz and
underplacement when subjects take the hard quiz.
Being informed whether they will bargain over a high or a low surplus is a signal that subjects
may use to update beliefs about their ranks. Knowing the surplus is high, a subject might revise
her estimate of own rank towards higher relative performance on the quiz (towards the top ranks).
Knowing the surplus is low, a subject might revise her estimate of own rank towards lower relative
performance on the quiz (towards the bottom ranks). This leads us to expect higher overplacement
with respect to the group in the EASY-HIGH condition than in the EASY-LOW condition and lower
underplacement with respect to the group in the HARD-HIGH condition than in the HARD-LOW
condition. However, low skill (bottom rank) subjects tend to overplace themselves whereas high
6From now on “highly significant” means with a p-value less than 1%, “significant” means with a p-value less than
5%, and “weakly significant” means with a p-value less than 10%.
7The mean estimated rank in the EASY treatment is equal to 10 and the mean estimated rank in the HARD treatment
is equal to 14. The mean estimated rank in the EASY treatment is highly significant lower than the mean estimated rank
in the HARD treatment (p-value < 0.01, 1-sided, t-test). We find a highly significant differences in the distributions
of estimated ranks in the two treatments ( p-value < 0.01, 1-sided Kruskal-Wallis test). The mean rank in the EASY
treatment is equal to 12.04 and the mean rank in the HARD treatment is equal to 12.39. A 1-sided t-test and a 1-sided
Kruskal-Wallist test highlight no differences in means nor in distributions in ranks.
8Note that self-placement with respect to the group can be compatible with Bayesian updating (Benoı̂t and Dubra
2011). Appendix A shows that overplacement with respect to the group in the EASY treatment is incompatible with
Bayesian updating whereas underplacement with respect to the group in the HARD treatment is compatible with
Bayesian updating.
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Figure 1.1: Mean self-placement with respect to the group
Notes: The top panel shows the means of self-placement with respect to the group in the EASY and HARD
treatments; the bottom panel shows the means of self-placement with respect to the group in the EASY and
HARD treatments and across LOW and HIGH surpluses. Spikes depict 95% confidence intervals.
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skill (top rank) subjects tend to underplace themselves (Kruger and Dunning 1999). The way the
joint surplus is determined implies that pairs that did worse on the quiz are more likely to bargain
over a low surplus than pairs that did better on the quiz. Hence, a pair that bargains over a low
surplus is more likely to be composed of partners who overplace themselves whereas a pair that
bargains over a high surplus is more likely to be composed of partners who underplace themselves.
Since this effect works in the opposite direction to the first it might well be that surplus size does
not affect the self-confidence manipulation.
The bottom panel of Figure 1.1 depicts the means of self-placement with respect to the group
in the four conditions. Self-placement with respect to the group is, on average, equal to 2.80 in
the EASY-LOW condition, to 1.18 in the EASY-HIGH condition, to −0.67 in the HARD-LOW
condition, and to −2.28 in the HARD-HIGH condition.9,10 Hence, we observe overplacement
with respect to the group in the EASY treatment and underplacement in the HARD treatment
independently of the surplus size.
Self-Placement with Respect to the Partner
The top panel of Figure 1.2 depicts the means of self-placement with respect to the partner in
the two treatments. It shows that there is overplacement with respect to the partner in the EASY
treatment and underplacement in the HARD treatment. The mean self-placement with respect to
the partner is equal to 2.01 in the EASY treatment and to −2.29 in the HARD treatment. The
distributions of self-placement with respect to the partner are highly significant different between
the two treatments (p-value < 0.01, 1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test).
Result ii: There is overplacement with respect to the partner when subjects take the easy quiz and
9The mean estimated rank is equal to 12.48 in the EASY-LOW condition, to 7.18 in the EASY-HIGH condition,
to 18.23 in the HARD-LOW condition, and to 10.98 in the HARD-HIGH condition. There are highly significant dif-
ferences in means and distributions among all conditions (p-value < 0.01, 1-sided, t-test; p-value < 0.01, 1-sided,
Kruskal-Wallis test in all cases besides the comparison among EASY-LOW and HARD-HIGH for which we find sig-
nificant differences: p-value= 0.029 , 1-sided, t-test; p-value = 0.031, 1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test). The mean rank
is equal to 15.28 in the EASY-LOW condition, to 8.36 in the EASY-HIGH condition, to 17.55 in the HARD-LOW
condition, and to 8.69 in the HARD-HIGH condition. Further information on individual rank and pair composition can
be found in Appendix F.
10There are highly significant differences among EASY-LOW and HARD-LOW, EASY-HIGH and HARD-HIGH,
EASY-LOW and HARD-HIGH (p-value< 0.01, 1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test). The difference among HARD-LOW and
HARD-HIGH is weakly significant (p-value = 0.09, 1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test).
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underplacement with respect to the partner when subjects take the hard quiz.
Figure 1.2, bottom panel, depicts the means of self-placement with respect to the partner in
the four conditions. Self-placement with respect to the partner is equal to 2.08 in the EASY-LOW
condition, to 1.93 in the EASY-HIGH condition, to −3.7 in the HARD-LOW condition, and to
−1.28 in the HARD-HIGH condition.11
Taken together, Results i and ii indicate that our manipulation worked: we observe overconfi-
dence in the EASY treatment and underconfidence in the HARD treatment.
1.4.2 Bargaining Outcomes
This section reports results on how self-confidence and surplus size affect bargaining outcomes.
Bargaining Failures
To measure the percentage of pairs that failed to reach an agreement we use the variable “bargaining
failures”. The variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a pair failed to reached an agreement within 10
minutes and equal to 0 otherwise. We have one observation per pair and a total of 95 observations.
The top panel of Figure 1.3 displays the percentage of bargaining failures in the EASY and
HARD treatments. In the EASY treatment 15% of pairs fails to reach an agreement. This is highly
significant greater than zero (p-value < 0.01, 1-sided, t-test). In the HARD treatment only 4%
of pairs fail to reach an agreement; this is weakly significant greater than zero (p-value = 0.08,
1-sided, t-test). Hence, the percentage of bargaining failures in the EASY treatment is more than
the triple that in the HARD treatment. The percentage of bargaining failures in EASY treatment
is highly significant greater than in the HARD treatment (p-value = 0.01, 1-sided, Fisher’s exact
test).
Result 1: The percentage of bargaining failures when subjects take the easy quiz (15%) is more
than the triple than when they take the hard quiz (4%).
Result 1 suggests that overconfidence leads to bargaining failures when there is joint produc-
tion. Result 1 is in line with our first hypothesis.
11There are highly significant differences in distributions among EASY-LOW and HARD-LOW (p-value < 0.01,
1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test) and among EASY-HIGH and HARD-LOW (p-value < 0.01, 1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test)
while the difference among EASY-HIGH and HARD-LOW is weakly significant (p-value = 0.08, 1-sided, Kruskal-
Wallis test).
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Figure 1.2: Mean of self-placement with respect to the partner
Notes: The top panel shows the means of self-placement with respect to the partner in the EASY and HARD
treatments; the bottom panel shows the means of self-placement with respect to the partner in the EASY and
HARD treatments and across LOW and HIGH surpluses. Spikes depict 95% confidence intervals.
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Let us now analyze how surplus size affects bargaining failures. The bottom panel of Figure
1.3 displays the percentage of bargaining failures in the four conditions. In line with our second
hypothesis, the percentage of bargaining failures in the EASY-LOW condition (28%) is remarkably
higher than the percentage of bargaining failures in the other three conditions. Indeed, there are
no bargaining failures in the EASY-HIGH condition while the percentage of bargaining failures
is equal to 5% in the HARD-LOW condition and to 3.6% in the HARD-HIGH condition. The
percentage of bargaining failures in the EASY-LOW condition is highly significant greater than
zero (p-value < 0.01, 1-sided, t-test) while this is not the case in the other three conditions (p-
value > 0.3, 1-sided, t-test). In addition, the distribution of the percentage of bargaining failures
in the EASY-LOW condition differs significantly from the other three conditions (p-value < 0.05,
1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test).
Result 2: There is a remarkably high percentage of bargaining failures (28%) when subjects take
the easy quiz and bargain over a low surplus.
Result 2 suggests that overconfident individuals who bargain over a low surplus often fail to
agree. Result 2 is in line with our second hypothesis and the theory predictions in Bénabou and
Tirole (2009). Appendix B shows that Result 2 is robust to demographic controls using an OLS
regression of bargaining failures on condition dummies and demographic controls.
Surplus Splits
Here we analyze how pairs split the surplus across treatments. To avoid surplus size confounds
we refer to percentages of the jointly produced surplus. Hence, the sum of the surplus splits of
subject i and subject j in a pair is equal to 1. We have one observation per subject and a total of
190 observations.
Figure 1.4 shows the distributions of surplus splits in the four conditions. We observe more
unequal splits in the EASY-LOW condition then in the other three conditions. In the EASY-LOW
condition the distribution of surplus splits is bimodal with the 28% of pairs not being able to
reach an agreement (as shown in section 1.4.2) and 28% of pairs settling on the equal split. The
other three conditions show a unimodal distribution of surplus splits around the equal split.12 The
12There are significant differences in distributions among the EASY-LOW and the EASY-HIGH condition (p-value
< 0.05, 1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test) and among the EASY-HIGH and the HARD-HIGH condition (p-value < 0.05,
1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test); the difference in distributions of surplus splits in the EASY-HIGH and the HARD-LOW
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Figure 1.3: Percentage of bargaining failures
Notes: The top panel shows the percentage of bargaining failures in the EASY and HARD treatments; the
bottom panel shows the percentage of bargaining failures in the EASY and HARD treatments and across
LOW and HIGH surpluses. Spikes depict 95% confidence intervals with standard errors clustered at pair
level.
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Figure 1.4: Surplus splits
Notes: The graph shows the distribution of surplus splits in the EASY and HARD treatments across LOW
and HIGH surpluses. Each band has 0.05 width.
percentage of pairs who settled for the equal split is equal to 54.5% in the EASY-HIGH condition,
to 35% in the HARD-LOW condition and 28.5% in the HARD-HIGH condition.13 Hence, in line
with our third hypothesis, most of the agreements in the EASY-HIGH condition are on the equal
split.
Result 3: When subjects take the easy quiz and bargain over a high surplus, all pairs reach an
agreement and most settle on an equal split.
Result 3 suggests that overconfident individuals who bargain over a high surplus are always
able to reach an agreement and most pairs settle on an equal split. Result 3 is in line with our third
hypothesis and the theory predictions in Bénabou and Tirole (2009).
condition is weakly significant (p-value = 0.074, 1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test).
13Since subjects were bargaining over values and not percentages, it is possible that many pairs did not precisely settle
on the equal split but in a neighborhood of it. Hence we intend for equal split the 5% neighborhood around the 50-50
split. For instance, in the EASY-HIGH condition the 7% of pairs settles exactly on the equal split but almost the 30%
of pairs settles on a 5% neighborhood of the equal split. To take this into consideration, in figure 1.4 each band has 0.05
width.
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Recall that subjects are informed about who is the best and the worst in their pair. Conditional
on agreement, partners who are the best in a pair get on average the 56% of the jointly produced
surplus while subjects who are the worst in the pair get on average the 44% of the jointly produced
surplus. There is a highly significant differences in the distribution of surplus splits for participants
who are the best or the worst in a pair (p-value < 0.01, 1-sided, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). This
result is in line with Karagözoğlu and Riedl (2014). Appendix C reports an OLS regression with
surplus splits as the dependent variable and condition dummies as well as demographic controls as
explanatory variables. The regression show that subjects who are the best in a pair get on average
higher surplus splits than subjects who are the worst in a pair.
Results 1, 2, and 3 could be due to differences in pair composition in terms of ranks. For exam-
ple, there could have been more equal splits in pairs in which partners’ ranks are closer together and
more bargaining failures in pairs in which partners’ ranks are further apart. Appendix F shows that
this is not the case. In addition, Appendix G shows that Results 1, 2 and 3 are not driven by gender
differences. However, we find two gender differences. First, males perform better in the quiz and
are (marginally) more underconfident than females in the HARD quiz (underplacement of males
but no underplacement of females). Second, females are more risk averse than males. Finally, Ap-
pendix H shows that there are no significant differences in attitude towards risk among conditions
and Appendix I shows that the randomization of subjects across treatments was successful.
1.4.3 Bargaining Dynamics
This section reports results on how self-confidence and surplus size affect bargaining dynamics.
Disagreement in Subjective Entitlements
To measure disagreement in subjective entitlements we sum the fraction of the joint surplus each
partner believes it is fair to keep for herself. The sum goes from 0, when each partner believes it
is fair to give the full joint surplus to the partner, to 2, when each partner believes it is fair to keep
the full joint surplus for herself. When the sum is greater than 1 there is disagreement in subjective
entitlements. When the sum is equal to 1 there is agreement.14 We have one observation per pair
and a total of 95 observations.
14We sum fractions and not to amounts in order to avoid a surplus size confound.
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Table 1.1: Disagreement in subjective entitlements
LOW HIGH
EASY
m 1.15 1.16 1.16
sd (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
n 25 22 47
HARD
m 1.06 1.09 1.08
sd (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
n 20 28 48
Table 1.1 reports the means and standard deviations of disagreement in subjective entitlements
in the EASY and HARD treatments and across HIGH and LOW surpluses as well as the number
of observations in each condition. The mean disagreement in subjective entitlements is highly
significant greater than 1 in the EASY and HARD treatments (p-value < 0.01, 1-sided, t-test). The
mean disagreement in subjective entitlements is highly significant greater in the EASY than in the
HARD treatment (p-value < 0.01, 1-sided, t-test) and the distribution in the EASY and HARD
treatments are differ significantly (p-value = 0.012, 1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test).
Result 4: Disagreement in subjective entitlements is higher when subjects take the easy quiz than
when they take the hard quiz.
Result 4 suggests that overconfidence leads to disagreement in subjective entitlements. Over-
confident bargainers feel entitled to a larger share of the surplus than underconfident bargainers.
Result 4 is in line with our fourth hypothesis.
Next, we analyze whether surplus size affects disagreement in subjective entitlements. The
mean disagreement in subjective entitlements is significantly greater than 1 in each of the four
conditions (p-value < 0.05, 1-sided, t-test). The distributions of disagreement in subjective en-
titlements in the EASY-HIGH and EASY-LOW conditions are not significantly different (p-value
= 0.88, 1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test). The distributions of disagreement in subjective entitle-
ments in the HARD-HIGH and HARD-LOW conditions are also not significantly different (p-
value = 0.19, 1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test). Hence, we conclude that surplus size has no effect on
disagreements in subjective entitlements.
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Table 1.2: Disagreement in opening proposals
LOW HIGH
EASY
m 1.24 1.31 1.27
sd (.29) (.25) (.27)
n 25 22 47
HARD
m 1.18 1.18 1.18
sd (.21) (.15) (.18)
n 20 28 48
Appendix D performs additional analysis on subjective entitlements. It discusses how being the
best or the worst in a pair affects subjective entitlements. It reports a Tobit regression with surplus
splits as a dependent variable and condition dummies as explanatory variables (and demographic
controls). The regression shows that subjects who are the best in a pair are more likely to have
higher subjective entitlements than subjects who are the worst in a pair.
Disagreement in Opening Proposals
At the beginning of the bargaining stage, each subject sends an opening proposal indicating which
part of the surplus she is willing to keep for herself and which part of the surplus she is willing
to give to her partner. To measure disagreement in opening proposals we sum the fraction of the
joint surplus each partner wants to keep for herself in her opening proposal. The sum goes from 0,
when each partner wants to give the full joint surplus to her partner, to 2, when each partner wants
to keep the full joint surplus for herself. When the sum is higher than 1, there is disagreement in
opening proposals. When the sum is equal to 1 there is agreement.15 We have one observation per
pair and a total of 95 observations.
Table 1.2 reports the means and standard deviations of disagreement in opening proposals in
the EASY and HARD treatments and across HIGH and LOW surpluses as well as the number of
observations in each condition. The mean disagreement in opening proposals is statistically greater
than 1 in the EASY and HARD treatments (p-value < 0.01, 1-sided, t-test). However, contrary
15Again, we refer to fractions and not to amounts in order to avoid surplus size confounds.
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to our fifth hypothesis, the distributions of disagreement in opening proposals in the EASY and
HARD treatments are not significantly different (p-value = 0.13, 1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test).
Result 5: There are no significant differences in disagreement in opening proposals across easy
and hard quizzes.
Next, we analyze whether surplus size affects disagreement in opening proposals. The mean
disagreement in opening proposals is highly significant greater than 1 in each of the four condi-
tions (p-value < 0.01, 1-sided, t-test). The distributions of disagreement in opening proposals
in the EASY-HIGH and EASY-LOW conditions are not significantly different (p-value = 0.14,
1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test). Similarly, the distributions of disagreement in opening proposals
in the HARD-HIGH and HARD-LOW conditions are not significantly different (p-value = 0.66,
1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test). However, the distributions of disagreement in opening proposals in
the EASY-HIGH and HARD-LOW conditions are significantly different (p-value < 0.05, 1-sided,
Kruskal-Wallis test) and weakly significant different in the EASY-HIGH and HARD-HIGH condi-
tions (p-value = 0.06, 1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test).
Result 6: Disagreement in opening proposals is higher when subjects take the easy quiz and bar-
gain over a high surplus then when they take the hard quiz and bargain over either a low or a high
surplus.
The differences among disagreement in subjective entitlements and disagreement in opening
proposals may stem from the fact that subjective entitlements are non-binding verbal statements
while opening proposals can be binding if the partners accept them.
Concessions
We define as concession the difference between the fraction of the surplus a subject demands for
herself in her opening proposal (independently of who was the first mover in a pair) and the fraction
of the surplus the subject obtains. A concession is positive if a subject has to give up on part of
her opening proposal in order to reach an agreement. A concession is negative if a subject obtains
a higher fraction of the surplus than her opening proposal in order to reach an agreement. A
concession is equal to zero if a subject belongs to a pair that did not reach an agreement. We
have one observation per subject and a total of 178 observations since 12 subjects accepted their
partner’s opening proposal (for their partners the concession is equal to zero since they obtained





m 6% 16% 11%
sd (16%) (16%) (17%)
n 47 42 89
HARD
m 8% 9% 9%
sd (11%) (11%) (11%)
n 38 51 89
Table 1.3 reports the means and standard deviations of concessions in the EASY and HARD
treatments and across HIGH and LOW surpluses as well as the number of observations in each
condition. Mean concessions are highly significant greater than zero in the EASY and HARD
treatments (p-value < 0.01, 1-sided, t-test). However, contrary to our sixth hypothesis, the distri-
butions of concessions in the EASY and HARD treatments are not significantly different (p-value
= 0.71, 1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test).
Result 7: There are no significant differences in concessions across easy and hard quizzes.
Next, we analyze whether surplus size affects concessions. Mean concessions are highly sig-
nificant greater than zero in each of the four conditions (p-value < 0.01, 1-sided, t-test). Table
1.3 shows, in line with our seventh hypothesis, that concessions are the lowest in the EASY-LOW
condition. There are significant differences in distributions among the EASY-LOW condition and
the other three conditions (p-value < 0.05, 1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test). There are significant dif-
ferences in distributions among the EASY-HIGH condition and the other three conditions (p-value
< 0.05, 1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test).16
Result 8: Concessions are the lowest (6%) when subjects take the easy quiz and bargain over a
low surplus. Concessions are the highest (16%) when subjects take the easy quiz and bargain over
a high surplus.
Results 2, 6, and 8 can be explained as follows. When overconfident subjects bargain over a
16We do not find significant differences among the HARD-LOW and HARD-HIGH condition (p-value = 0.89, 1-
sided, Kruskal-Wallis test).
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Table 1.4: Mean bargaining duration
LOW HIGH
EASY
m 304 347 325
sd (249) (216) (232)
n 25 22 47
HARD
m 302 301 301
sd (230) (227) (226)
n 20 28 48
low surplus, disagreement in opening proposals is not remarkable but many subjects do not display
concessionary behavior which often leads to bargaining failures. When overconfident subjects
bargain over a high surplus, disagreement in opening proposals is substantial but subjects display
concessionary behavior which allows all pairs to reach an agreement.
Bargaining Duration
We define as bargaining duration the time that each pair takes to reach an agreement. One obser-
vation refers to one pair and we have 95 observations. Pairs bargain on average for 313 seconds,
approximately 5 minutes. Table 1.4 reports the means and standard deviations of bargaining du-
ration in the EASY and HARD treatments and across LOW and HIGH surpluses as well as the
number of observations in each condition. Contrary to our eighth and ninth hypotheses, the mean
bargaining duration is not significantly different across the four conditions (in all comparisons we
observe p-value > 0.3, 1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test).
Result 9: There are no significant differences in bargaining duration across the four conditions.
Result 9 is surprising given the remarkably high percentage of bargaining failures observed in
the EASY-LOW condition (28%) and the absence of bargaining failures in the EASY-HIGH con-
dition. To try to make sense of this result we analyze bargaining duration across three bargaining
outcomes: bargaining failure, agreement on the equal split, and agreement on other splits. Table 1.5
reports the percentage of pairs and the mean bargaining duration for each of the three bargaining
outcomes.
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Table 1.5: Percentage of pairs and mean bargaining duration depending on bargaining outcome
Mean Barg. Failure Equal Split Other Split
t % t % t % t
EASY-LOW 304 28 600 28 190 44 188
EASY-HIGH 347 0 - 54.5 333 45.5 364
EASY 325 15 600 40 280 45 272
HARD-LOW 301 5 600 35 264 60 299
HARD-HIGH 302 3.6 600 28.5 262 68 301
HARD 301 4 600 31 263 65 300
Table 1.5 shows that pairs in the EASY-LOW condition who settle on the equal split bargain
on average 190 seconds whereas pairs in the EASY-HIGH condition who settle on the equal split
bargain on average 333 seconds. Similarly, pairs in the EASY-LOW condition who settle on an
unequal split bargain on average 188 seconds whereas pairs in the EASY-HIGH condition who
settle on an unequal split bargain on average 364 seconds. Hence, in the EASY treatment, subjects
are faster reaching an agreement when they bargain over a low surplus than when they bargain over
a high surplus.17 The shorter bargaining time of pairs in the EASY-LOW condition who reach an
agreement compensates for the longer bargaining time of pairs in the EASY-LOW condition who
fail to reach an agreement. This is the reason why the mean bargaining duration in the EASY-LOW
and EASY-HIGH conditions is not significantly different.
For a better understanding of the dynamics that turned disagreement in opening proposals into
bargaining failures in the EASY-LOW condition, we analyze how disagreement has evolved over
time. Figure 1.5 reports disagreement dynamics for the pairs who failed to reach an agreement. In
total, 7 pairs failed to reach an agreement in the EASY-LOW condition.
Similarly to disagreement in opening proposals, we measure disagreement at each point in
time as the sum of partners’ standing proposals at that time divided by the jointly produced surplus
of the pair. We refer to fractions and not to amounts in order to avoid surplus size confounds.
Disagreement is equal to one if partners agree on how to split the surplus and higher than one if
partners disagree on how to split the surplus. The maximum value of disagreement is 2: in this
17This is not the case in the HARD treatment.
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Figure 1.5: Disagreement over time
Notes: The graph shows the dynamics of disagreement for those pairs who failed to reach an agreement.
Each line refers to one pair.
case both partners want to keep the whole surplus per se.18
As we can see from the graph, only one pair (in red) started with the maximum possible level of
disagreement: this pair smoothed disagreement over time but was nevertheless not able to reach an
agreement. Overall disagreement follows a decreasing pattern in the first half of the bargaining dy-
namics. However, none of the seven pairs was able to reach an agreement even when disagreement
is reduced and some other pairs seem to strongly disagree at the end.
18Note that a few assumptions were needed to realize this graph. First, since we implement free-form bargaining,
one partner can send to the other multiple proposals without waiting for a counter offer. Whenever this happened, we
computed disagreement as the sum of the current standing proposal of one partner and the former proposal of the other
one. In practice, we interpret the absence of a new proposal as standing by the very same proposal (while the other
partner is sending new offers). Second, we failed to record the exact timing of each single proposal. However, we
could precisely record bargaining duration and the number of proposals sent. Hence we approximate the timing of each
proposal simply dividing the bargaining duration (600 seconds in case of disagreement) by the number of proposals sent
by each partner. The second assumption also implies a third one: that proposals were sent at regular time intervals.
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1.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we explore the effect of self-confidence on bargaining with joint production. To do
that we exogenously manipulate self-confidence using easy and hard quizzes. The manipulation is
successful: we find overconfidence in the easy quiz and underconfidence in the hard quiz (Results
i and ii). Self-confidence affects bargaining outcomes. There are three times as many bargaining
failures when subjects take the easy quiz than when they take the hard quiz (Result 1). There is a
remarkably high number of bargaining failures when subjects take the easy quiz and bargain over
a low surplus (Result 2). In contrast, when subjects take the easy quiz and bargain over a high
surplus, all pairs reach an agreement and most pairs agree on the equal split (Result 3). These three
results are in line with the theory predictions in Bénabou and Tirole (2009).
Self-confidence also affects bargaining dynamics. There is higher disagreement in subjective
entitlements in the easy quiz than in the hard quiz (Result 4). This suggests that overconfident
bargainers feel entitled to a larger share of the surplus than underconfident ones. In contrast, dis-
agreement in opening proposal is similar across easy and hard quizzes (Result 5). However, dis-
agreement in opening proposals is higher when subjects take the easy quiz and bargain over a high
surplus then when they take the hard quiz and bargain over either a low or a high surplus (Result
6). There are no significant differences in concession across the easy and hard quizzes (Result 7),
However, concessions are the lowest in the EASY-LOW condition and the highest in the EASY-
HIGH condition (Result 8). These results show that overconfident subjects who bargain over a
high surplus are willing to make concessions and reach an agreement. In contrast, overconfident
subjects who bargain over a low surplus are reluctant to make concessions and, as a consequence,
often fail to reach an agreement. Surprisingly, bargaining duration is not significantly different
across the four conditions (Result 9).
We contribute to the literature on bargaining with joint production by showing that overconfi-
dence can lead to inefficient bargaining outcomes when the surplus under negotiation is low. The
remarkable high level of bargaining failures we find when subjects take the easy quiz and bar-
gain over a low surplus stands in stark contrast with previous experiments on bargaining with joint
production which do not find such high levels of bargaining failures.
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Appendix
A. Self-Placement and Bayesian Updating
Self-placement with respect to the group can be compatible with Bayesian updating (Benoı̂t and
Dubra 2011). Burks et al.(2013) propose a simple rule to test whether overplacement (and under-
placement) are compatible with Bayesian updating. This rule is called the “allocation function.”
According to the allocation function, when subjects are asked to estimate the skill level they most
likely belong to, the largest (modal) group of subjects believing they belong to a certain skill level
should be included in that skill level. When this allocation function is violated, Bayesian updat-
ing is rejected. In Burks et at. (2013) subjects are asked to indicate the most likely skill level
(or the mode of their distribution of beliefs about skill). However, in our experiment, subjects are
asked to estimate their mean rank not their modal rank. The allocation function is valid under the
assumption that subjects have belief distributions where the mean and mode are not very far apart.
Tables 1.6 and 1.7 show how estimates of own ranks are related to the actual ranks in the EASY
and HARD treatments, respectively (see also Figure 1.6). Subjects who display overplacement are
below the diagonal since they estimate to have a higher rank than their actual rank. Subjects who
display underplacement are above the diagonal since they estimate to have a lower rank than their
actual rank. Table 1.6 shows that there is overplacement in the EASY treatment: 39 observation
are on the diagonal, 41 observations are below the diagonal, and 14 observations are above the
diagonal. Table 1.7 shows that there is underplacement in the HARD treatment: 44 observation
are on the diagonal, 20 observations are below the diagonal, and 32 observations are above the
diagonal.
Tables 1.6 and 1.7 allow us to investigate whether self-placement with respect to the group is
compatible with Bayesian updating. If this is the case, then the largest number of subjects who
estimate their rank to be in the first quartile should belong to the first quartile of actual ranks, the
largest number of subjects who estimate their rank to be in the second quartile should belong to
the second quartile of actual ranks, and so on. Table 1.6 shows that overplacement in the EASY
treatment is incompatible with Bayesian updating. The allocation function in the EASY treatment
is violated by subjects who believe their ranks belong to the third quartile. Among the 27 subjects
who believe to be in the third quartile, only 8 belong to that quartile. This is less than the 14
subjects who belong to fourth quartile. In contrast, Table 1.7 shows that underplacement in the
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Table 1.6: Relations among estimates and actual ranks, EASY treatment
EASY estimates
BEST WORST
actual {1; 6} {7; 12} {13; 18} {19; 24} n
BEST {1; 6} 15 8 1 0 24
{7; 12} 4 16 4 0 24
{13; 18} 2 13 8 1 24
WORST {19; 24} 1 7 14 0 22
n 22 44 27 1 94
Table 1.7: Relations among estimates and actual ranks, HARD treatment
HARD estimates
BEST WORST
actual {1; 6} {7; 12} {13; 18} {19; 24} n
BEST {1; 6} 6 10 8 0 24
{7; 12} 3 13 6 2 24
{13; 18} 0 8 11 6 25
WORST {19; 24} 0 3 6 14 23
n 9 34 31 22 96
HARD treatment is compatible with Bayesian updating. The allocation function in the HARD
treatment is not violated by subjects who believe their ranks belong to the first, second, third, and
fourth quartiles.
B. Bargaining Failures
Table 1.8 presents an OLS model regression with bargaining failures as dependent variable. Bar-
gaining failures is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the pair did not reach an agreement, and 0
otherwise. The explanatory variables are three dummies, one for condition EASY-LOW, another
one for condition HARD-LOW, and the third one for condition. The variable BEST equals 1 if a
subject is the best in the pair, and 0 otherwise. We add demographic controls which are described
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Figure 1.6: Real Rank vs Estimates - EASY and HARD
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in Appendix I. Robust standard errors are clustered at pair level. We have 95 observations, one
observation per pair.
Table 1.8 shows that the estimated coefficient for the EASY-LOW dummy is positive which
provides support for Result 2: The percentage of bargaining failures is higher in the EASY-LOW
condition than in the other conditions.19
C. Surplus Splits
Table 1.9 presents a Tobit regression with surplus splits as shares of the jointly produced surplus as
dependent variable. The explanatory variables are three dummies, one for condition EASY-LOW,
another one for condition HARD-LOW, and the third one for condition. The variable BEST equals
1 if a subject is the best in the pair, and 0 otherwise. We add demographic controls which are
described in Appendix I. Robust standard errors are clustered at pair level. We exclude bargaining
failures from the analysis and thus have 172 observations.
Table 1.9 shows that the dummy BEST plays a significant role: subjects who are the best in a
pair obtain on average higher surplus splits than subjects who are the worst in a pair.20 as mentioned
in 1.4.2. Figure 1.7 reports the distributions of surplus splits for best and worst partner in the pair:
the distribution of surplus splits is asymmetric in favor of the best in the pair.
This result is in line with Karagözoğlu and Riedl (2014) since they find that subjects who are
the best in a pair display higher subjective entitlements than subjects who are the worst in a pair.
This in turn implies that subjects who are the best in a pair get higher surplus splits than subjects
who are the worst in the pair. We discuss subjective entitlements in Appendix D.
D. Subjective Entitlements
As mentioned, the paper closest to ours is Karagözoğlu and Riedl (2014). Karagözoğlu and Riedl
(2014) study the impact of performance information and production uncertainties on bargaining
with joint production. Karagözoğlu and Riedl (2014) show that performance information affects
bargaining outcomes through subjective entitlements. When subjects are informed about their rel-
19A LOGIT regression would have been a suitable model for bargaining failures, however we are unable to implement
it since the dummy variable for the EASY-HIGH condition only assumes the value zero given that all pairs reached an
agreement.
20Equivalent results are found running OLS regressions instead of Tobit regressions.
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Risk Averse 0.0382 (0.0557)
Gender −0.0278 (0.0563)





Grad. Parents 0.0129 (0.0771)
onlychild 0.00117 (0.0940)
Big Town 0.0685 (0.0932)





∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Risk Averse −0.0270 (0.0189)
BEST 0.125∗∗∗ (0.0189)
Gender −0.0163 (0.0126)





Grad. Parents −0.000654 (0.0188)
onlychild −0.0182 (0.0259)
Big Town 0.0258 (0.0213)





∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 1.7: Surplus splits
Each band has 0.05 width.
ative contributions to the joint surplus, they feel entitled to split the surplus accordingly. Hence,
subjects who are the best in a pair have higher subjective entitlements than subjects who are the
worst in a pair. As a consequence, surplus splits are in favor of the best in a pair.
In line with Karagözoğlu and Riedl (2014), we find that the average subjective entitlement for
subjects who are the best in a pair is higher and equal to 63% and the average subjective entitlement
for subjects who are the worst in a pair is lower and equal to 49%. Figure 3.4.4 shows that the
distribution of subjective entitlements is highly significant different across subjects who are the
best and the worst in a pair (p-value < 0.01, 1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test).
Table 1.10 presents a Tobit regression with subjective entitlements as shares of the jointly
produced surplus as dependent variable. The explanatory variables are three dummies, one for
condition EASY-LOW, another one for condition HARD-LOW, and the third one for condition.
The variable BEST equals 1 if a subject is the best in the pair, and 0 otherwise. We add demographic
controls which are described in Appendix I.Robust standard errors are clustered at pair level. We
have 190 observations.
Table 1.10 shows that hat the dummy BEST plays a significant role: subjects who are the
best in a pair have on average higher subjective entitlements than subjects who are the worst in
a pair, confirming that information about who is the best in a pair has an impact on subjective
entitlements. Neither the self-confidence manipulation nor the surplus size have an impact on
subjective entitlements.
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Risk Averse 0.00922 (0.0171)
BEST 0.150∗∗∗ (0.0173)
Gender 0.00597 (0.0167)





Grad. Parents −0.0196 (0.0195)
onlychild 0.00557 (0.0235)
Big Town 0.0255 (0.0190)





∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 1.8: Subjective entitlements
Notes: the graph shows the distribution of subjective entitlements distinguishing among subjects who are
the worst (left panel) and subjects who are the best (right panel) in a pair. Each band has 0.05 width.
Karagözoğlu and Riedl (2014) run a treatment where subjects do not receive information about
who is the best and worst in a pair. They find that in this case most subjective entitlements are equal
to the 50%. As a consequence, bargaining often leads to equal splits. In Appendix E we report the
results of introducing this performance information manipulation in our design.
E. Performance Information
To investigate whether the absence of performance information may have an impact in our design,
we run an additional treatment in which we do not provide information about who is the best or
the worst in a pair (without any further design modifications). We now discuss how performance
information affects bargaining outcomes and bargaining dynamics.
We observe a lower percentage of bargaining failures without performance information. Sim-
ilarly to Result 2, the highest number of bargaining failures is in the EASY-LOW condition, 9%
, while in the other three conditions it is below 5%. The percentage of bargaining failures in the
EASY-LOW condition is weakly significant greater than zero (p-value = 0.08, 1-sided, t-test).
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Figure 1.9: Surplus splits
Notes: The graph shows the distribution of surplus splits in the EASY and HARD treatments when there is
no information about who is the best in a pair across LOW and HIGH surpluses. Each band has 0.05 width.
Figure 1.9 shows the distribution of surplus splits without performance information across the
four conditions.21 Figure 1.9 shows clearly that without performance information 69.5% of pairs
settle on the equal split whereas with performance information only 37% of pairs settles on the
equal split. Hence, when there is no performance information, fairness concerns are predominant
with respect to self-confidence.
Without performance information 60% of subjective entitlements are the equal split whereas
with performance information only 30% of subjective entitlements coincide with the equal split. In
line with Karagözoğlu and Riedl (2014), disagreement in subjective entitlements is highly signif-
icant greater with performance information than without (1.11 and 1.06 on average, respectively;
p-value < 0.01, 1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test). Without performance information, there are neither
significant differences in disagreement in opening proposals among EASY and HARD treatment
nor among the four conditions. In all treatments and conditions disagreement in subjective entitle-
ments is significantly greater than 1 (p-value < 0.05, 1-sided, t-test). We do not find significant
differences in disagreement in opening proposals, concessions, and bargaining duration across the
21As mentioned in 1.4.2, since subjects were bargaining over values and not percentages, it is possible that many pairs
did not precisely settle on the equal split but in a neighborhood of it. In figure 1.9 each band has 0.05 width so that the
equal split bin includes the 5% neighborhood around the equal split.
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Table 1.11: Subjects ranks in the four conditions
LOW HIGH
EASY
m 15.28 8.36 12.04
sd (5.92) (6.10) (6.91)
n 50 44 94
HARD
m 17.55 8.70 12.38
sd (5.12) (5.66) (6.97)
n 40 56 96
m 16.29 8.55
sd (5.67) (5.83)
n 90 100 190
two performance information treatments. Moreover, results for disagreement in opening proposals,
concessions, and bargaining duration are similar but hold without significance.
F. Relative Performance: Individual Ranks and Pair Composition
Differences in rank distributions may generate biases both at the individual and at the pair level.
At the individual level, for instance, the presence of more ties in one condition than in another may
generate confounds in the observed levels of overplacement. At the pair level, differences in rank
variations across pairs may lead to different bargaining outcomes; for instance, we may observe
more disagreement when there is high variation in partners’ ranks and more equal split when there
is low variation in partners’ ranks.
In what follows, we investigate whether there are significant differences in ranks among the
EASY and the HARD treatment and among conditions to exclude biases at the individual level;
next we introduce a variation measure to exclude biases in ranks composition at the pair level.
Table 1.11 reports means and standard deviations of ranks as well as the number of observations in
the two treatments and in the four conditions. There are no significant differences in mean ranks
(2-sided, t-test), standard deviations of ranks (2-sided sd-test), and ranks distributions (Kruskal-
Wallis test) across the EASY and HARD treatments. There are no significant differences in ranks
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standard deviations across LOW and HIGH (2-sided sd-test). Since the surplus size depends on
partners’ mean relative performance, there must be differences in ranks means and distributions by
construction. Indeed, we find highly significant differences in mean ranks and ranks distributions
across surplus size (p-value < 0.01, 2-sided, t-test; p-value < 0.01, 1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test).
Finally, there are no significant differences in ranks standard deviations across the four conditions
(2-sided, sd-test). There are highly significant differences in means and distribution across all the
four conditions (p-value < 0.01, 2-sided, t-test; p-value < 0.01, 1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test) with
the exception of the difference among EASY-LOW and HARD-LOW that is weakly significant
different (p-value = 0.06, 2-sided, t-test; p-value = 0.07, 1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test) and of
EASY-HIGH and HARD-HIGH condition that do not differ significantly (p-value = 0.77, 2-sided,
t-test; p-value = 0.63, 1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test). However, since there are differences among
LOW and HIGH by construction, what matters to exclude a ranking bias across conditions is the
absence of differences in variation (i.e. in standard deviations) that has been verified.
To make sure that there is no pair composition bias across treatments and conditions, it is
important to exclude differences in ranks variation across pairs. To measure ranks variation we






where ri is the rank of partner i, rj is the rank of partner j, N is the number of pairs ij, (ri − rj)2
is the difference of partners’ ranks squared. There are in total 95 pairs out of which 48 took part to
the EASY and 47 in the HARD treatment. In the EASY treatment V is equal to 112.5 and in the
HARD treatment V is equal to 88. Given that V takes only one value per treatment, we test whether
there are significant differences in the differences of partners’ ranks squared, (ri− rj)2, among the
EASY and the HARD treatment. There are no significant differences in means nor in distributions
among EASY and HARD (p-value = 0.2, 2-sided t-test; p = 0.089 1-sided Kruskal-Wallis test).
Out of 95 pairs, 45 pairs were assigned a LOW jointly produced surplus and 50 pairs were
assigned a HIGH jointly produced surplus. V is equal to 98 for pairs that were assigned a LOW
surplus and to 104 for pairs that were assigned a HIGH surplus. Again, given that V takes only
one value per condition, we test whether there are significant differences in the difference of ranks
squared ((ri − rj)2) among LOW and HIGH. There are no significant differences in means nor in
distributions among LOW and HIGH (2-sided t-test, 1-sided Kruskal-Wallis test).
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To complete, Graph 1.10 shows the distribution of the difference of partners’ ranks squared in
the EASY and in the HARD treatment (top panel) and the distribution of difference of partners’
ranks squared in the four conditions (bottom panel).
The distribution of the difference of ranks squared ((ri − rj)2) does not differ significantly
across the four conditions (however note that the difference in distributions among EASY-HIGH
and HARD-LOW is weakly significant (p-value = 0.09, 1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test).
Regarding ties in pairs, we only had a tie in two pairs overall the experiment. Regarding
ties among all participants in EASY and HARD, note that the distributions of ranks do not differ
significantly hence ties should not play a role.
Finally, we want to exclude that bargaining failures are due to differences in sophistication
among subjects. We investigate whether beliefs about own and partner ranks are consistent with
the information about the surplus. A pair is assigned a high surplus if the average of partners’
ranks is lower or equal to 12 (as shown in section 1.2.2). Beliefs about own rank and partner rank
are consistent with the information about the surplus if the average of the estimations is lower or
equal to than 12 and the surplus is high or if the average of the estimations is greater than 12 and
the surplus is low. Out of 190 observations, 172 subjects hold beliefs that are consistent with the
information about the surplus. In other words, the 90.5% of subjects make consistent estimations.
Among 18 subjects who belong to a pair that failed to reach an agreement, only 3 subjects show
inconsistency. Note that the 3 subjects belong to a pair who was assigned a low surplus. For 2 of
the subjects the average of the estimations is equal to 12 (hence, the threshold) and for one subjects
the average of estimations is equal to 11 (close to the threshold). Thus we can conclude that
overall subjects make consistent estimations and bargaining failures do not stem from differences
in sophistication among subjects.
G. Gender Differences
Out of 190 subjects, 100 males and 90 females participated to the experiment. Out of 95 pairs,
26 were composed of males, 21 of females, and in 48 pairs one partner was male and the other
female. In what follows we analyze whether there are gender differences in bargaining outcomes,
bargaining dynamics, overconfidence and in risk attitudes.
We find no significant differences in bargaining failures nor in surplus splits among males
and females. We find no significant differences in disagreement and subjective entitlements, dis-
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Figure 1.10: Difference of ranks squared
Notes: the top panel shows the distributions of the difference of partners’ ranks squared in the EASY and
HARD treatments; the bottom panel shows the distribution of the difference of partners’ ranks squared in
the EASY and HARD treatments and distinguishes among LOW and HIGH surplus.
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agreement in opening proposals, and in concessions. Finally, there are no significant differences
in bargaining duration among male and female. Thus we can conclude that there are no gender
differences in either bargaining outcomes or dynamics.
The literature finds conflicting results on overconfidence and gender. Some paper find that men
are more overconfident than women (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007, Pulford and Colman 1997, Soll
and Klayman 2004) while other find that there are no gender differences in overconfidence (Moore
and Healy 2008, Johansson Stenman and Nordblom 2010). We do not find significant differences
in overconfidence when we refer to self-placement with respect to the partner (p-value = 0.21, 1-
sided, Kruskal-Wallis test; overplacement with respect to a partner is equal to −0.97 for males and
to 0.73 for females). However, when we refer to self-placement with respect to the group, we find
that on average females are more overconfidence than males. Overplacement is on average equal
to −0.47 for males and to 0.93 for females and the difference in distributions is weakly significant
(p-value = 0.062, 1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test).
A difference in performance among male and females may explain this result. Indeed, we
find that males perform better than females both in the EASY and in the HARD quiz. In the
EASY quiz males replied correctly to 32 questions on average while females replies correctly to 29
questions on average (the difference is weakly significant, p-value = 0.054, 1-sided, t-test). Both
males and females are overconfident and females are slightly more overconfident (overplacement
is equal to 2.3 for female and 1.8 for male and the difference is not significant, p-value = 0.68, 1-
sided, t-test). In the HARD quiz males replied correctly to 10 questions on average while females
replies correctly to 6.5 questions on average (the difference is highly significant, p-value <0.01, 1-
sided, t-test). Both males and females are underconfident and males are more underconfident than
females (overplacement is equal to -.46 for female and -2.6 for male, the difference is significant,
p-value = 0.024, 1-sided, t-test). Hence if we distinguish across EASY and HARD, we do not find
gender differences in overconfidence in the EASY treatment but we do find that males are more
underconfident than females in the HARD treatment.
Even if Filippin and Crosetto (2016) show that the gender differences in risk aversion are task
related, in many experimental studies women show more risk aversion than men (Eckel and Gross-
man 2008) and this is the case in our data. We find that the 77% of females and the 55% of males
is risk averse and the difference is highly significant (p-value< 0.01, 1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test).
For the definition of risk aversion we follow Crosetto and Filippin (2013). Moreover, we introduce
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a continuous measure of risk preferences, “risk attitude” (described in details in Appendix G). The
average risk attitude is equal to −13.2 for females and to −7.9 for males; the difference in risk
attitude is highly significant (p-value < 0.01, 1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test).
H. Risk Attitudes and the BRET
As mentioned in Section 1.2.7 we measure risk attitudes with the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task
(BRET, Crosetto and Filippin 2013). The task is as follows. We display a 10x10 matrix (i.e. a
square composed of 100 boxes) on the computer screen. Subjects can earn points for each box
they decide to collect.The box collection process is automatic: for each second elapsed, a box
is collected (during the experiment, boxes pass from dark gray to light gray). Subjects have the
possibility to interrupt the collection process at any time pressing a STOP button. Behind one of
the 100 boxes hides a “bomb” that destroys everything that has been collected. The bomb can
be hidden in any box with the same probability (equal to 1/100). However, subjects do not know
which box hides the bomb.
If a subject collects the box hiding the bomb her payoff for the task is equal to zero. If not,
her payoff for the task is positive and proportional to the number of boxes collected. Participants
learn where the bomb is (and hence if they collected it) only at the end of the task. To make sure
that everyone has understood this task, we run a practice round that does not pay the points that
participants may have accumulated.
The BRET is so that with 100 boxes subjects choosing to collect 50 boxes are risk neutral,
subjects collecting less than 50 boxes are risk averse, and those collecting more than 50 boxes are
risk seekers. The minimum possible number of boxes that one can collect is 0, the maximum is
100, and the probability of collecting the bomb increases with the number of boxes collected.
We find that 64% of subjects are risk averse in the EASY-LOW, 59% in the EASY-HIGH, 77%
in the HARD-LOW, and 62.5% in the HARD-HIGH condition. We also find that 16% of subjects
are risk seekers in the EASY-LOW, 20% in the EASY-HIGH, 12.5% in the HARD-LOW, and 16%
in the HARD-HIGH condition. The remaining subjects in each condition are risk neutral. There are
no significant differences in the proportions of risk adverse, risk seeker, and risk neutral subjects
across the four conditions.
In addition to referring to discrete risk attitude measures suggested in Crosetto and Filippin
(2013), we introduce a continuous measure, “risk attitude”, of risk attitudes. We define this vari-
47
able as the difference among the number of boxes collected minus 50 (the variable is included
among −49, absolute risk aversion, and +49, absolute risk seeking behavior). The average risk
attitude is equal to −12 in the EASY-LOW condition, to −7 in the EASY-HIGH condition, −15
in the HARD-LOW condition and to −9 in the HARD-HIGH condition. There are weakly sig-
nificant differences in means and distributions between EASY-HIGH and HARD-LOW (p-value
= 0.0516, 2-sided, t-test; p = 0.058, 1-sided, Kruskal-Wallis test) and significant differences be-
tween HARD-LOW and HARD-HIGH (p-value < 0.05, 2-sided, t-test; p-value < 0.05, 1-sided,
Kruskal-Wallis test). Further investigation regarding risk preferences is carried on with the ran-
domization check in Appendix I.
I. Randomization Check
To make sure that the randomization over the EASY and HARD treatment was successful, we
run a multinomial logit regression (table 1.12). The multinomial regression includes the variable
“Risk averse ” defined in G and the demographic controls. Demographic controls include: Gender
(dummy equal to 1 if male, 0 if female), Swiss Nationality (dummy equal to 1 if Swiss, 0 oth-
erwise), Age, Unil (dummy equal to 1 if the student is affiliated to UNIL, 0 otherwise), Grades,
Bachelor (dummy equal to 1 if bachelor student, 0 otherwise), Grad. Parents (dummy equal to 1 if
both parents have a degree, 0 otherwise), Only Child (dummy equal to 1 if only child, 0 otherwise),
Big Town (dummy equal to 1 if resident in a big town, 0 otherwise), People Known (number of
people known during the lab section). The EASY treatment is the base outcome in the model.
As table 1.12 shows, there are no significant differences EASY and HARD treatment and thus
we can conclude that our randomization worked.
J. Experimental Instructions
In this session we report the English translation of experimental instructions that were distributed
in French.
General Explanations of the Experiment
You are about to participate in an economic experiment. The experiment is conducted by the De-
partement d’Econometrie et Economie Politique (DEEP) of the University of Lausanne and funded
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∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF). It aims at better understanding bargaining be-
havior.
For your participation in the experiment you will earn a lump sum payment of 10 CHF for sure.
You can earn more during the experiment. The experiment consists of six parts. In some parts of
the experiment you can earn points that depend on your decisions. During the experiment, we will
consider points instead of CHF.
Thus it is to your own benefit to read these explanations carefully.
The total number of points you have earned during the experiment will be exchanged into CHF
at the end of the experiment. The exchange rate is
70 points = 1 CHF
In other words, each point corresponds to approximately 1.43 cents.
You can take your decisions at your own speed.
It is prohibited to communicate with the other participants during the whole course of
the experiment. It is also prohibited to use your mobile phone during the whole course of the
experiment. If you do not abide by these rules you will be excluded from the experiment and
all payments. However, if you have questions you can always ask one of the experimenters by
raising your hand.
Your anonymity is guaranteed
At the end of the experiment, one of the experimenters will give you a payment sheet reporting the
amount you will receive. You have to take it with you and bring it to the experimenter outside of
the LABEX.
The experimenter outside of the LABEX is not informed about the decisions you have taken
during the experiment. The experimenter will pay you in accordance to your payment sheet. After
that, you will sign a payment receipt. Given that the receipt does not include your participant
number, no experimenter will be able to determine your identity.
The backside of these explanations gives you an overview of the experiment. If you have any
questions right now, please raise your hand. Otherwise, you can now proceed with the explanations
on the first part of the experiment.
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The backside of these explanations gives you an overview of the experiment. If you have
any questions right now, please raise your hand. Otherwise, you can now proceed with the
explanations on the first part of the experiment.
Overview of the Experiment
• Part 1:
Answering General Knowledge Quiz
• Part 2:




Bargaining over the Joint Surplus
• Part 5:
Making a Choice under Risk
• Part 6:
Questionnaire and Payment
If you have questions please raise your hand.
Part 1: Answering a General Knowledge Quiz
In this part of the experiment you will have 20 minutes to answer a general knowledge quiz. There
is a timer to the top right of the screen that indicates the remaining time (in seconds). Note that 20
minutes are equal to 1200 seconds.
The quiz is composed of 46 questions. The greater the number of questions you answer
correctly, the more likely is that you will earn more in the bargaining part of the experiment.
Hence, it is in your best interest to provide the correct answers to as many questions as you can.
Note that the correct answers to some questions involve providing the first and last names of
famous people. You can only get full credit for your answers to these questions if you provide us
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both with the first and the last name of that famous person. If you only provide us with the first
name or the last name we will only give you half credit for your answer.
Unanswered questions count as wrong answers.
Part 2: Receiving Information about the Joint Surplus
During the rest of the experiment you will be randomly paired with another participant in this
session but you will not know who that participant is. Neither during nor after the experiment will
anybody be informed about who has been paired with whom.
In the experiment, you and the person you are paired with (your partner) will bargain over a
joint surplus. Depending on your performance and the performance of your partner on the general
knowledge quiz, the size of the joint surplus over which you will bargain in the fourth part of the
experiment will be either small (1390 points) or large (2710 points).
We will now explain how the size of the joint surplus is determined. All 24 participants, includ-
ing you and your partner, have completed the general knowledge quiz. According to the perfor-
mance of all participants, each of them is attributed a rank. Rank 1 corresponds to the participant
whose performance was the best (or, the participant who answered correctly the highest number of
questions), rank 2 to the participant whose performance was the second best, and so on.
The size of the joint surplus is determined by your performance and your partner’s perfor-
mance on the general knowledge quiz. More precisely, the size of the joint surplus depends on
the sum of your rank and your partner’s rank in the general knowledge quiz, as follows:
1. If the sum of your rank and your partner’s rank is from 2 to 24, then the joint surplus will be
2710 points.
2. If the sum of your rank and your partner’s rank is from 25 to 47, then the joint surplus will
be 1390 points.
The four examples that follow illustrate how the size of the joint surplus is determined.
Example 1: Suppose that your rank is 1 and that your partner’s rank is 1 as well (you both
performed the best). In this case, the sum of the ranks is 2. Since 2 is greater than 2 and less than
24, then the joint surplus would be 2710 points.
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Example 2: Suppose that your rank is 5 and that your partner’s rank is 10. In this case, the
sum of the ranks is 15. Since 15 is greater than 2 and less than 24, then the joint surplus would be
2710 points.
Example 3: Suppose that your rank is 12 and that your partner’s rank is 23. In this case, the
sum of the ranks is 35. Since 35 is greater than 25 and less than 47, then the joint surplus would
be1390 points.
Example 4: Suppose that your rank is 23 and that your partner’s rank is 23 as well (you both
performed the worst). In this case, the sum of the ranks is 46. Since 46 is greater than 25 and less
than 47, then the joint surplus would be 1390 points.
Part 3: Making Two Estimations
In this part of the experiment you will be asked to provide us with two estimates. The first one is
the estimate of your rank in the quiz. The second one is the estimate of your partner’s rank in the
quiz. We will now explain in detail how you should indicate your estimate of your rank in the
quiz and how this estimate influences your earnings.
a) How to indicate your estimate of your rank?
All 24 participants, including you and your partner, have completed the quiz. According to
the performance of all participants, each of them is attributed a rank. Rank 1 corresponds to
the participant whose performance was the best (or, the participant who answered correctly
the highest number of questions), rank 2 to the participant whose performance was the second
best, and so on.
We want you to tell us your estimate of your rank as an integer between 1 and 24.
b) How does your estimate of your rank influence your earnings?
The more precise your estimate of your rank is, the higher is the probability that you
will earn 140 points. In other words, the likelihood of earning the 140 points is higher, the
closer your estimate of your rank is to your true rank in the quiz.
Your earnings are obtained as follows:
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– First, the computer randomly draws a number between 0 and 529. Every number be-
tween 0 and 529 is equally likely.
– Second, the difference between your estimate of your rank and your true rank is the
prediction error. If the prediction error, multiplied by itself, is not larger than the ran-
dom number drawn by the computer, then you will earn 140 points. Otherwise, you
will earn 0 points.
Important: You may wonder why we have chosen this payment rule. The reason is that this
payment rule makes it optimal - for you - to state precisely your estimate of your rank.
Example: Your estimate of your rank is 13, however given your performance in the quiz, your
true rank is 10. Thus in this case the prediction error is (13-10) = 3. The prediction error multiplied
by itself is 9. If the random number drawn by the computer is greater than or equal to 9, for exam-
ple 26, then you will earn 140 points. If the random number drawn by the computer is smaller than
9, for example 8, then you will earn 0 points.
We will now explain in detail how you should indicate your estimate of your partner’s rank
in the quiz and how this estimate influences your earnings.
a) How to indicate your estimate of your partner’s rank?
All 24 participants, including you and your partner, have completed the quiz. According to
the performance of all participants, each of them is attributed a rank. Rank 1 corresponds to
the participant whose performance was the best (or, the participant who answered correctly
the highest number of questions), rank 2 to the participant whose performance was the second
best, and so on.
We want you to tell us your estimate of your partner’s rank as an integer between 1 and 24.
b) How does your estimate of your partner’s rank influence your earnings?
The more precise your estimate of your partner’s rank is, the higher is the probability
that you will earn 140 points. In other words, the likelihood of earning the 140 points is
higher, the closer your estimate of your partner’s rank is to your partner’s true rank in the
quiz.
Your earnings are obtained as follows:
54
– First, the computer randomly draws a number between 0 and 529. Every number be-
tween 0 and 529 is equally likely.
– Second, the difference between your estimate of your partner’s rank and your partner’s
true rank is the prediction error. If the prediction error, multiplied by itself, is not
larger than the random number drawn by the computer, then you will earn 140 points.
Otherwise, you will earn 0 points.
Important: You may wonder why we have chosen this payment rule. The reason is that this
payment rule makes it optimal - for you - to state precisely your estimate of your partner’s
rank.
Example: Your estimate of your partner’s rank is 3, however, given his/her performance in the
quiz your partner’s true rank is 14. Thus, in this case, the prediction error is (3-14) = -11. The
prediction error multiplied by itself is 121. If the random number drawn by the computer is greater
than or equal to 121, for example 200, then you will earn 140 points. If the random number drawn
by the computer is smaller than 121, for example 75, then you will earn 0 points.
Before providing us with your estimations, we will ask you to answer a few comprehension
question. Your answers to these questions will have no consequences on the experiment nor on
your final payment. The experiment will continue as soon as all the participants will have answered
the questions correctly.
Part 4: Bargaining over the Joint Surplus
Information about relative performance in the quiz.
Remark: the following part is used only in the INFO treatments.
Next, you will receive information on your screen about who was the best performer in the
general knowledge quiz among you and your partner.
If you have answered correctly more questions in the general knowledge quiz than your partner,
then you are the best in the pair and your partner is the worst in the pair.
If you have answered correctly less questions in the general knowledge quiz than your partner, then
you are the worst in the pair and your partner is the best in the pair.
55
If you and your partner have the same number of correct answers in the general knowledge quiz,
then you and your partner are equally performing.
Bargaining
You will have a maximum of 10 minutes to reach an agreement on the distribution of the joint sur-
plus. You do not have to use up all the bargaining time but must not exceed it. If you do not agree
on a distribution of the joint surplus within 10 minutes, then you will earn nothing from this
bargaining stage! If you do agree on a distribution of the joint surplus then you will earn the
points you and your partner agreed on.
The bargaining takes place via computer. During bargaining you will work with a screen that
consists of four parts, which we will explain in what follows. Hereby a screen-shot.
In the upper-right part of the screen the joint surplus you are bargaining over is displayed.
The timer right on the top shows how much bargaining time (in seconds) is still remaining. Note
that 10 minutes are equal to 600 seconds.
In the lower-left part of the screen you can enter a new proposal. You will need to enter the
points you want to keep for yourself and the points you want to give to your partner. There is a
SEND button to confirm and send proposals.
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In the upper-left part of the screen a table shows all previous proposals and the identity of
proposers (you or your partner). Each proposal is listed in the table in chronological order. Every
time you make a proposal, the table will show that you have made the proposal and display the
proposal you have made. Every time your partner makes a proposal, the table will show that he/she
has made the proposal and display the proposal he/she has made.
In the lower-right part of the screen you see your partner’s currently valid proposal. The AC-
CEPT button allows you to accept your partner’s currently valid proposal. If your partner has not
made any proposal to you yet, this part of the screen is empty. Similarly, if you have not made
any proposal, this part of the screen in your partner’s computer is empty. To make a first (or new)
proposal you have to fill in two boxes in the lower-left part of the screen with corresponding points
of the joint surplus for yourself and for your partner. The points you fill in have to add up to the
joint surplus. Thereafter, you need to press the SEND button to send your proposal. The following
rules apply:
1. The sum of points for yourself and for your partner cannot be exceed the joint surplus nor be
lower than the joint surplus.
2. Only offers with integer points are allowed.
3. A sent offer is binding, that is, if your partner accepts your proposal, bargaining is finished
and both of you earn the points on which you have agreed upon. The same holds if you accept
a proposal of your partner. You can only accept the current proposal; earlier proposals are
not valid any more.
Hence, as long as you have not pressed the SEND button you can still change the offer. A
sent proposal is binding. You can always make a new proposal, provided that neither you nor your
partner have accepted a proposal and provided that there is still time left.
If you want to accept a currently valid proposal, you have to press the ACCEPT button. Once you
or your partner accept a proposal, bargaining is over and each of you will receive the agreed share
of the joint surplus.
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Part 5: Making a Choice under Risk
On your computer screen you will see a square composed of 100 boxes.
You earn 1.4 points for every box that you decide to collect. The box collecting process is auto-
matic: for every second that elapses, a box changes color. The boxes start disappearing from the
top-left corner of the screen and number of boxes collected is updated accordingly.
Behind one of these boxes hides a “bomb” that destroys everything that has been col-
lected.
The bomb can be in any box with equal probability (the probability the bomb is in one particular
box is equal to 1/100). However, you do not know behind which box the bomb is.
Your task for this stage is to choose when to stop the box collecting process. You can do it by
hitting the STOP button at any time.
If you collect the box that contains the bomb, the bomb will explode and you will earn zero
points. If you stop the box collecting process before collecting the box that contains the bomb, the
bomb will not explode and you will earn the points accumulated that far.
Note that you will only know if one of the boxes you collected contains the bomb at the
end of the task; indeed if you collect the box that contains the bomb, the bomb only explodes at
the end of the task: this means that you can collect the box that contains the bomb without knowing
it.
We will start this stage with a practice round. The goal of the practice round is to show you
how this task works. After the practice round is over, the task starts. The practice round is just an
example: you will not earn the points accumulated in this part.
Part 6: Questionnaire and Payment
At the end of the experience we will ask you to answer a questionnaire. Next, we will proceed with
your payment.
Your final payment includes your gains for each part of the experiment in CHF and the
lump sum payment22. The amount you will be paid will be shown to you at the end of the
experiment.
22Show up fee of 10 CHF
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Note that 70 points in the experiment correspond to 1 CHF.




Overconfidence and Effort Provision in
an Asymmetric Tournament
2.1 Introduction
Firms and corporations make a wide use of tournaments as incentive schemes. Common examples
are hierarchical promotions (Baker et al. 1994; Lazear and Rosen 1981), relative compensation
of managers (Gibbons and Murphy 1990) or sales personnel rewards (Murphy et al. 2004). In a
rank-order tournament, agents are rewarded based on relative and not on absolute performance:
the best performer receives a higher, fixed, compensation compared to the worst performer. This
is an advantage to incentivize effort provisions in situations in which effort is not contractible
(Malcomson 1986) or to classify individuals when skills are not observable (Harbring and Lünser
2008).
While relative performance is fundamental to determine workers rewards in tournaments, be-
havioral biases such as overconfidence can affect the self-assessment of individual performance
compared to others. The literature shows that most people believe to be better than average (Myers
1996): drivers (Svenson 1910), poker and chess players (Parker and Santos-Pinto 2010), currency
traders (Oberlechner and Osler 2008), as well as fund managers (Brozynski et al. 2006) overesti-
mate their performance. Moreover, people tend to overestimate their ranking when performing a
skill test (Camerer and Lovallo 1999, Moore and Healy 2008).
This paper investigates theoretically the impact of overconfidence on effort provision in an
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asymmetric tournament with heterogeneous agents. The impact of overconfidence on effort provi-
sion in a symmetric tournament with homogeneous agents has been studied in Santos-Pinto (2010).
In the latter, two workers compete in a rank-order tournament in which a firm sets a winner/loser
prize to be rewarded to the best/worst performer. While the firm assesses workers’ productivity cor-
rectly, workers assess their opponents’ productivity correctly but are overconfident about their own.
They overestimate their effort productivity and thus their probability of winning the tournament.
Santos-Pinto (2010) shows that, under a set of circumstances, two overconfident workers who com-
pete in a rank-order tournament exert more effort than the effort they would have exerted if they had
a correct self-assessment of their own performance.1 Yet, in the real world, agents are rarely homo-
geneous. To have a closer look at reality, I build on and extend the theoretical model in Santos-Pinto
(2010) to include heterogeneity in workers’ self-assessment. Similarly to Santos-Pinto (2010), a
firm sets a winner/loser prize to be rewarded to the best/worst performer and correctly assesses
workers’ productivity. However, differently from Santos-Pinto (2010), while workers assess their
opponents’ productivity correctly, there is heterogeneity in workers’ self-assessment biases: some
workers are rational and correctly assess their own productivity while others are overconfident and
overestimate their productivity and thus their probability of winning the tournament. For simplicity,
the analysis is restricted to an asymmetric tournament with two workers, an overconfident and an
unbiased worker. To be able to obtain tractable results, the model is specialized for quadratic costs
of effort and uniform distribution of individual output. Finally, in the model, the relation among
overconfidence and effort provision is non-monotonic. This feature allows for an inclusive model
that studies whether overconfidence increases or decreases the effort provision of heterogeneous
agents.
The main finding of the paper is that the overconfidence of worker 1 impacts the level of effort
exerted by both workers shifting the Nash Equilibrium away from the symmetric equilibrium with
two unbiased workers. Interestingly, different degrees of overconfidence lead to different outcomes.
When overconfidence is small, the level of effort exerted by the overconfident worker is higher than
the level of effort exerted by the unbiased worker. Indeed, while the level of effort exerted by the
overconfident worker is higher than the level of effort that would have been exerted in a symmetric
1Overconfidence raises effort provision when workers are risk neutral and when workers are risk averse and over-
confidence and effort are complements. When workers are risk averse and overconfidence and effort are substitutes
or the relationship among overconfidence and effort is non monotonic, overconfidence may or may not increase effort
provision.
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tournament with two unbiased workers, the level of effort exerted by the unbiased worker is lower
than the level of effort that would have been exerted in a symmetric tournament with two unbiased
workers. For a given prize spread, the firm is better off when overconfidence is small since effort
provision and thus expected profit increases on average. When overconfidence is large, the levels
of effort exerted by an overconfident and an unbiased worker in an asymmetric tournament is lower
than the level of effort that would have been exerted in a symmetric tournament with two unbiased
workers. For a given prize spread, the firm is worse off when overconfidence is large, since effort
provision and thus expected profit decreases.
This paper contributes to the literature on tournaments. Rank-order tournaments can be di-
vided into symmetric tournaments in which homogeneous agents compete (Nalebuff and Stiglitz
1983, Santos-Pinto 2010) and asymmetric tournaments in which heterogeneous agents compete
(Shotter and Weigelt 1992, Gürtler and Kräkel 2010, Harbrig and Lünser 2008). Heterogeneity
is more suitable to capture the complexity of the environment that firms and workers inhabit. In
the asymmetric tournament literature, heterogeneity of agents has been studied as a difference in
workers’ ability or effort costs. In this context Lazear and Rosen (1981) show theoretically that
heterogeneity in effort costs leads to inefficient outcomes. Gürtler and Kräkel (2010) show that in-
efficiencies rise if firms set uniform prizes (i.e., prizes that are independent from workers’ identity)
while efficient effort levels are induced if firms set individual prizes. Shotter and Weigelt (1992)
study the impact of equal opportunity laws and affirmative actions on effort provision. They find
that policies that increase the probability of winning for disadvantaged (high cost) players reduce
the effort they exert when heterogeneity is small but increase the effort exerted by both advantaged
and disadvantaged players when heterogeneity is large. Finally, Harbring and Lünser (2008) show
that an increase in the price spread increase effort provision in symmetric2 as well as asymmetric
tournaments. Moreover, for large prize spread, weaker players in an asymmetric tournament exert
a higher effort than players in a symmetric tournament. I extend the symmetric settings of Santos
Pinto (2010) to allow for heterogeneity in agents’ self-assessment. Differently from the previous
papers, in this paper workers have identical costs of effort, but different perceptions of their own
productivity. The overconfident worker overestimates her productivity and thus her probability of
winning the tournament while the rational worker has an unbiased self-assessment. Importantly, in
2It is a well know theoretical result that an increase in the price spread increases effort provision in tournaments
(Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983).
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contrast with Shotter and Weigelt (1992), the difference in the probability of winning the tourna-
ment does not stem from the introduction of policies, but it is a behavioral bias of the overconfident
worker. I find that, for a given prize spread, low degrees of overconfidence increase, on average, the
effort exerted by both overconfident and unbiased workers leading to an increase in expected profits
while high degrees of overconfidence decrease, on average, the effort exerted by both overconfident
and unbiased workers leading to inefficiencies.
This paper also contributes to the literature on economic contests that include all situations
in which agents’ payoff depends on relative performance such as in the rank-order tournament
modeled here. Tournaments are a particular subset of contests in which two or more players com-
pete in one or more rounds until a winner is left (however, most contests can be considered as
a tournament). Traditionally, authors have investigated theoretically the optimal design of con-
tests to allow the principal to give agents appropriate incentives (Lazear and Rosen 1981, Nalebuff
and Stiglitz 1983, O’Keeffe et al. 1984). More recently, Singh and Wittman (2001) have shown
that when agents differ in marginal productivity of effort, output increases in ability, and effort
provision decreases in effort costs. Krähmer (2007), Ludwig et al. (2011) and Ando (2004) intro-
duce behavioral biases in economic contests. Krähmer (2007) shows that when ability and effort
are complements, favorable beliefs about one’s ability increase effort provision. Ludwig et al.
(2011) interpret overconfidence as the underestimation of individual effort costs and demonstrate
that effort provision is higher when some agents are overconfident with respect to the case with
unbiased agents. Finally, Ando (2004) looks at overconfidence from two different points of view:
the overestimation of one’s type and the underestimation of a rival’s type. Both cases induce an
overestimation of the perceived probability of winning. However, when agents overestimate their
own type, effort provision increases. When agents underestimate their rival’s type, the impact of
overconfidence is ambiguous. In this paper overconfidence is modeled as the overestimation of
one’s probability of winning, instead of the underestimation of one’s effort costs (as in Ludwig et
al. 2011). While it seems natural that the underestimation of effort costs enhances effort provi-
sion (Singh and Wittman (2001) show that effort and effort costs move in opposite directions in
the absence of behavioral biases) the impact of the overestimation of the probability of winning
may be ambiguous as shown in Ando (2004). When workers overestimate their probability of win-
ning they may either increase effort (higher probability of winning increases the expected utility
of winning) or decrease effort (workers believe that a lower level of effort is enough to win). Dif-
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ferently from Ando (2004), I find that overconfidence, as the overestimation of the probability of
winning, increases or decreases effort provision depending on the magnitude of the bias. When
overconfidence is small, overconfidence increases effort provision. When overconfidence is large,
it decreases effort provision.
The main implication of this paper is that a small overconfidence bias can lead to better
outcomes compared to large overconfidence. In the presence of heterogeneity in workers’ self-
assessment bias, firms should refrain from hiring extremely overconfident workers since their bias
negatively affects the effort provision of all workers. Given that a lower effort provision implies a
lower expected profit, the firm is on average worse off when overconfidence is large.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the generalized model; Section 3
presents a specialization the model for uniform distribution and quadratic effort costs; Section
4 discusses the implications of overconfidence for the firm and Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Generalized Model
I build on and modify Santos-Pinto’s (2010) rank-order tournament model with overconfidence to
introduce heterogeneity in the self-assessment bias of agents. For convenience, I restrict the anal-
ysis to two workers, worker 1 and worker 2, competing in the tournament. The winner receives
a wage yw while the loser receives a wage yl, with yw > yl > 0. Winning or losing the tourna-
ment, and thus individual wages, depends on the relative ranks of workers and not on the absolute
quantities they produce.
The two workers have the same preferences, the same cost of effort, the same outside option and
the same productivity. However, they differ from one another in terms of the perception of their
own productivity. Worker 1 is overconfident that is, she overestimates her productivity of effort
while worker 2 is unbiased that is, she has an accurate assessment of her own productivity of effort.
Since worker 1 overestimates her own productivity of effort, she also overestimates her probability
of winning the tournament. Worker 2, on the contrary, can correctly estimate the probability of
winning the tournament. Both workers observe each others biases or accuracy but worker 1 is not
aware of being overconfident while worker 2 is aware of being accurate. Finally, both workers
correctly assess their cost of effort and their outside options.
The firm correctly assesses workers’ productivity and self-beliefs. The firm is a risk neutral
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monopolist that sets the tournament prizes in order to maximize profits, subject to the incentive
and participation constraints of workers.
The timing of the model is the following. After the firm sets the optimal prizes, workers
observe the realization of a common shock; after observing the prizes and the common shock,
workers simultaneously choose the optimal effort level. The firm then observes worker rankings
and finally workers are awarded prizes depending on their rank.
In what follows, I present the workers’ problem. Both workers are weakly risk averse and are
expected utility maximisers: they have identical von Neuman-Morgenstern utility functions that
are separable in income (yi) and effort (ai).
Ui(yi, ai) = U(yi)− C(ai)
for i=1,2 and where u and c are twice differentiable with U ′ > 0, U ′′ ≤ 0, C ′i > 0, C ′′i > 0,
C(0) = 0 and C ′(0) = 0. yi is equal to yw if the worker wins the tournament or yl, yw > yl > 0,
if the worker loses the tournament. Intuitively, the individual level of effort exerted cannot be
negative i.e., ai ≥ 0.
Individual output (qi) is a stochastic function of a worker’s effort: each level of effort induces
a distribution over output
Gi(qi|ei(ai, ω))
for i=1,2. ei(ai, ω) defines individual productivity as a function of individual effort ai and a com-
mon shock ω. Individual productivity strictly increases in effort i.e., e′i > 0, and marginal produc-
tivity is subject to diminishing returns to effort.
As mentioned, worker 1 is overconfident and overestimates her productivity while worker 2
has an accurate self-assessment of her productivity. Worker 1’s perceived productivity of effort is
e1 = e1(a1, ω, λ)
where λ > 1 is a parameter that captures overconfidence.3 Given the perceived productivity of
effort, the perceived distribution over output is
G1(q1|e1(a1, ω, λ))
3For λ = 1, worker 1 is unbiased and identical to worker 2.
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In the case of worker 1, who is overconfident, G1(q1|e1(a1, ω, λ)) first order stochastically domi-
nates G1(q1|e1(a1, ω)) for all levels of effort a1: for each level of effort exerted, worker 1 believes
that she is more likely to produce a higher level of output than he actually does.
Worker 2 has an accurate perception of his own productivity:
e2 = e2(a2, ω)
and thus the perceived and actual distribution over output coincide:
G2 = G2(q2|e2(a2, ω))
Given that perceived and actual distribution of over output of worker 2 coincide, it must be the
case that G1(q1|e1(a1, ω, λ)) first order stochastically dominates G2(q2|e2(a2, ω)) for all levels of
effort ai: for each level of effort exerted, worker 1 believes that she is more likely to produce a
higher level of output than worker 2.
In what follows I specify workers’ stochastic production functions. I will now suppose that the
common shock is additive. Moreover, there is a shock εi that can affect the individual productivity
of workers:
Qi = ei(ai) + ω + εi
where Gi is the continuous distribution function of εi, εi ∼ g, E(εi) = 0 and g′() > 0.
For worker 1 the stochastic production function is equal to
Q1 = e1(a1) + ω + ε1
while the perceived stochastic production function is equal to
Q1 = e1(a1, λ) + ω + ε1
For worker 2 the perceived and actual stochastic production function coincide:
Q2 = e2(a2) + ω + ε2
The perceived probability of winning the tournament for worker 1 is
P1(Q1 ≥ q2) = 1− P1(Q1 ≤ q2) = 1−G1(q2|e1)
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the unconditional probability of winning the tournament for worker 1 is
P1(a1, a2, λ) =
∫
[1−G1(q2|e1(a1, λ))]g2(q2|e2(a2))dq2
For worker 2, the probability of winning the tournament is
P2(Q2 ≥ q1) = 1− P2(Q2 ≤ q1) = 1−G2(q1|e2)




Given the workers’ perceived probabilities of winning the tournament, the perceived utilities
for worker 1 and 2 are
V1(a1, a2, λ, yl, yw) = u(yl) + P1(a1, a2, λ)∆u− C(a1)
and
V2(a1, a2, yl, yw) = u(yl) + P2(a1, a2)∆u− C(a2)
where ∆u = u(yw)− u(yl).








∆u = C ′(a2) (2.2)









Expression 2.3 indicates how the optimal effort choice of worker 1, the optimal effort choice of
worker 2 and the self-image bias of worker 1 are related.
In Appendix A I derive a simplified version of the model for any distribution for a better under-
standing of the impact of overconfidence on effort provision. Appendix A shows that the impact
of overconfidence on effort provision depends on the characteristics of the distribution of output.
When the distribution of output is monotonic and non-decreasing, the overconfident worker exerts
more effort than the unbiased worker; when the distribution of output is non-monotonic, the impact
of overconfidence on effort provision is ambiguous.
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2.3 Uniform Distribution and Quadratic Effort Costs
In what follows, I will specialize the model for the case in which individual output follows a
uniform distribution and effort costs are quadratic. This specification allows to derive closed form
solutions and tractable results. Moreover, the hypothesis that individual output follows a uniform
distribution implies that the joint distribution4 is non-monotonic, and allows to study the case in
which the overconfident worker exerts more, and the case in which the overconfident worker exerts
less, effort than the unbiased worker, making the model inclusive and suitable to describe reality.5
Thus, the results found with uniform distribution and quadratic effort cost could be extended to
more general cases.
I assume that the (actual) productivity function of workers is linear in effort
ei = (ei(ai)) = ai
Knowing that worker 2 has an unbiased self-assessment, her actual and perceived productivity will
be identical and equal to
e2 = e2(a2) = a2
Worker 1 overestimates her productivity by λ and her perceived productivity is
e1 = (e1(a1, λ)) = λ ∗ a1
with λ > 1. I assume that overconfidence enters the definition of perceived productivity in a multi-
plicative way as in Santos-Pinto (2010). Note that overconfidence could also enter productivity in
an additive way (e1 = λ+ a1). However in this case overconfidence may be identical to optimism.
To avoid any confounds, I chose the multiplicative assumption.
4Given that individual shocks follow a uniform distribution, individual output follows a uniform distribution. How-
ever, what is relevant for the solution of the model is the distribution of the difference of workers’ individual shocks
εi − εj . Indeed, the difference of individual shocks enters the definition of perceived probabilities and expected utility
of workers, as shown below. A similar specification is used in Shotter and Weigelt (1992).
5A common example of non-monotonic distribution is the normal distribution. However, when individual output
distributes as a normal, it is extremely hard to derive tractable solutions. To show that when the distribution of output is
non-monotonic, and in particular when individual output distributes as a normal, overconfidence can have an ambiguous
impact on effort provision, Appendix A.1 investigates briefly the impact of overconfidence on effort provision when
individual output follows a normal distribution and costs of effort are quadratic.
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Each worker chooses the optimal effort level in order to maximize her (perceived) expected
utility. To simplify the derivation, I will now assume that workers are risk neutral. Worker 1
maximizes
V1(a1, a2, λ, yl, yw) = yl + Pr(Q1 > q2)∆y − c(a1)
= yl + Pr(a1λ− a2 − Y > 0)∆y − c(a1)
= yl + Pr(Y < λa1 − a2)∆y − c(a1)
= yl +G(λa1 − a2)∆y − c(a1).
where ∆y = yw − yl. Worker 2 maximizes
V2(a1, a2, yl, yw) = yl + Pr(Q2 > q1)∆y − c(a2)
= yl + Pr(a2 − a1 + Y > 0)∆y − c(a1)
= yl + Pr(Y > a1 − a2)∆y − c(a2)
= yl + [1− Pr(Y < a1 − a2)] ∆y − c(a2)
= yl + [1−G(a1 − a2)]∆y − c(a2).




, for i = 1, 2. (2.4)
The individual shocks follow a uniform distribution: ε1 ∼ U [−u, u] and ε2 ∼ U [−u, u], with
u > 0. Thus, letting Y = ε2 − ε16, I have





























0 < y < 2u
.
For worker 1















0 < λa1 − a2 < 2u
, (2.5)
6Y = ε2 + ω − ε1 − ω
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0 < λa1 − a2 < 2u
.
For worker 2















0 < a1 − a2 < 2u
, (2.6)
and











0 < a1 − a2 < 2u
.
Making use of (2.5) worker 1 maximizes


























2 0 < λa1 − a2 < 2u
.
Making use of (2.6) worker 2 maximizes
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.
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∆y = a1 0 < λa1 − a2 < 2u







∆y = a2 − 2u < a1 − a2 < 0(
1
2u
− a1 − a2
4u2
)
∆y = a2 0 < a1 − a2 < 2u






4u2−λ2∆ya2 − 2u < λa1 − a2 < 0
λ∆y













λ∆y a1 − 2u < λa1 − a2 < 0
λ2 ∆y2u λa1 = a2
−2u+ 4u
2+λ2∆y
λ∆y a1 0 < λa1 − a2 < 2u
.







a1 − 2u < a1 − a2 < 0
∆y




4u2−∆ya1 0 < a1 − a2 < 2u
.








0 < λa1 − a2 < 2u
The second order condition (SOC) for worker 2 is
4u2
∆y
> −1 − 2u < a1 − a2 < 0
4u2
∆y
> 1 0 < a1 − a2 < 2u
To solve the model, I analyze two cases: a∗1 > a
∗
2 i.e., worker 1 who is overconfident exerts
more effort than worker 2 who is unbiased, and a∗2 > a
∗
1 i.e., worker 1 who is overconfident exerts
less effort than worker 2 who is unbiased. I will also compare the effort level exerted in the asym-
metric equilibrium to the effort levels that would be exerted in a symmetric equilibrium with two
unbiased workers (λ = 1). From now on, I will refer to this case as “symmetric equilibrium ”for
brevity. In the symmetric equilibrium, the effort levels exerted by both workers coincide and are
equal to aR = ∆y/2u. Proposition 1 describes the impact of overconfidence on effort provision,
the proof of Proposition 1 is reported in Appendix B.
Proposition 1 Overconfidence affects the effort provision of workers 1 and 2 by shifting the Nash
Equilibrium away from the symmetric equilibrium (aR). The impact of overconfidence on effort
provision depends on the degree of overconfidence of worker 1: (i) when overconfidence is small
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i.e., λ < 4u2/∆y, the Nash Equilibrium effort levels are
a∗1 =
8u3λ∆y
(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 −∆y) + λ(∆y)2
a∗2 =
8u3∆y + 2u(λ− 1)λ(∆y)2
(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 −∆y) + λ(∆y)2
with a∗1 > aR > a
∗
2: the effort level exerted by the overconfident worker is higher and the effort
level exerted by the unbiased worker is lower than the effort level exerted in the symmetric equi-




(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 + ∆y)− λ(∆y)2
a∗2 =
8u3∆y + 2u(λ2 + λ)(∆y)2
(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 + ∆y)− λ(∆y)2
with aR > a∗2 > a
∗
1: the effort level exerted by the overconfident worker is lower than the effort
level exerted by the unbiased worker which in turn is lower than the effort level exerted in the sym-
metric equilibrium.
Compared to effort provision in the symmetric equilibrium, the effort exerted by the overcon-
fident worker is the highest when overconfidence is small and the lowest when overconfidence
is large. When overconfidence is small i.e., λ < 4u2/∆y7, worker 1 exerts more effort than
worker 2 and the effort that would be exerted in the symmetric equilibrium. This may happen
since the overestimation of one’s productivity and thus probability of winning the tournament leads
to an overestimation of the expected utility gain (compared to the disutility of exerting more ef-
fort). As a consequence, worker 1 to increases effort provision. When overconfidence is large i.e.,
λ > 4u2/∆y8, worker 1 exerts less effort than worker 2 and the effort that would be exerted in
the symmetric equilibrium. In this case worker 1 overestimates her productivity and probability of
winning so much that she believes she is able to win the tournament exerting little effort and thus
decreases effort provision.
It is interesting to note that, no matter the degree of overconfidence, worker 1 overestimates
her probability of winning the tournament. However, when lambda is small, the actual probability
7The Nash Equilibrium solution for small lambda satisfies workers’ SOC, as shown in Appendix B.
8The Nash Equilibrium solution for large lambda satisfies workers’ SOC, as shown in Appendix B.
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of winning the tournament for worker 1 increases (the higher the effort, the higher the expected
output). When lambda is large, the actual probability of winning the tournament for worker 1
decreases (the lower the effort, the lower the expected output). Appendix C shows analytically that
this is the case.
As mentioned in Proposition 1, overconfidence shifts the effort provision of both workers away
from the symmetric equilibrium. This happens since, while the overconfidence of worker 1 does
not affect the best reply function of worker 2, it does shift the best reply function of worker 1. The
shift in the best reply of worker 1 in turn implies that the equilibrium moves away from the bisector
where the symmetric equilibrium lies.9 Moreover, different degrees of overconfidence affect the
equilibrium in different directions. Small overconfidence (lambda) shifts the equilibrium below
the bisector while large overconfidence (lambda) shifts the equilibrium above the bisector. Hence,
when overconfidence is small, worker 1 exerts more effort than worker 2 and when overconfidence
is large worker 1 exerts less effort than worker 2. For a better understanding of these dynamics, in
what follows I represent graphically the symmetric equilibrium (Figure 2.1) as well as the solutions
for small and large lambda in the asymmetric equilibrium (Figures 2.2 and 2.3). The parametriza-
tion used and the mathematical expressions of the best reply functions represented are reported in
Appendix D.
Figure (2.1) represents the symmetric equilibrium i.e., λ = 1. The effort level of worker 1
is represented on the x-axis and the effort level of worker 2 is represented on the y-axis. The
symmetric equilibrium is indicated as “R”, in black. The best reply function of worker 1 is indicated
as “BR1,R”(the best reply function of worker 1 if worker 1 is rational i.e., λ = 1), dashed black
line. The best reply function of worker 2 is indicated as “BR2”, continuous black line. When both
workers are unbiased, the symmetric equilibrium lies on the bisector and both workers exert the
same level of effort (a∗1 = a
∗
2 = aR).
Figure (2.2) represents the small lambda case i.e., λ < 4u
2
∆y . The effort level of worker 1 is
represented on the x-axis and the effort level of worker 2 is represented on the y-axis. The Nash
Equilibrium is indicated as “NE”, in red, while the symmetric equilibrium is indicated as “R”, in
black. The overconfidence of worker 1 shifts the best reply function from “BR1,R”(the best reply
function of worker 1 if worker 1 was rational i.e., λ = 1), dashed black line, to “BR1”(the best reply
9Recall that at the symmetric equilibrium both workers exert the same effort level thus the equilibrium lies on the
bisector.
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function of worker 1 given that worker 1 is overconfident i.e., λ > 1), dashed red line. The best
reply function of worker 2 is indicated as “BR2”, continuous red line, and it is not affected from
overconfidence since worker 2 is unbiased10. When overconfidence is small, the Nash Equilibrium
lies below the bisector and the effort exerted by the overconfident worker is higher than the effort
exerted by the unbiased worker. In this case, the overconfident worker exerts more effort than in
the symmetric equilibrium (a∗1 > aR > a
∗
2) and the unbiased worker exerts less effort than in the
symmetric equilibrium.









Figure (2.3) represents the large lambda case i.e., λ > 4u
2
∆y . The effort level of worker 1 is
10Note that the best reply function of worker 2 remains unchanged from Figure (2.1) to Figure (2.2). However, in
Figure (2.2), it is represented in red, and not in black, to underline that the equilibrium is now the Nash equilibrium and
not the symmetric one.
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represented on the x-axis and the effort level of worker 2 is represented on the y-axis. The Nash
Equilibrium is indicated as “NE”, in red, while the symmetric equilibrium is indicated as “R”, in
black. The overconfidence of worker 1 shifts the best reply function from “BR1,R”(the best reply
function of worker 1 if worker 1 was rational i.e., λ = 1), dashed black line, to “BR1”(the best
reply function of worker 1 given that worker 1 is overconfident i.e., λ > 1), dashed red line. The
best reply function of worker 2 is indicated as “BR2”, continuous red line, and it is not affected















from overconfidence since worker 2 is unbiased11. When overconfidence is large, the Nash Equi-
librium lies above the bisector and the effort exerted by the overconfident worker is lower than
11Note that the best reply function of worker 2 remains unchanged from Figure (2.1) to Figure (2.3). However, in
Figure (2.3), it is represented in red, and not in black, to underline that the equilibrium is now the Nash equilibrium and
not the symmetric one.
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the effort exerted by the unbiased worker. In this case, both workers exert less effort than in the
symmetric equilibrium (aR > a∗2 > a
∗
1).
















2.4 Overconfidence Implications for the Firm
This section discusses the implications of overconfidence for the firm. In what follows, I will
compare the firm’s expected profit for a given prize spread in the symmetric and asymmetric equi-
librium.
As discussed above, the overconfidence of worker 1 has an impact on the effort provisions of
both workers and this impact is different depending on the degree of overconfidence of worker 1
(small or large lambda). In both cases, as well as in the case of a symmetric equilibrium, individual
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effort at optimum increases in the prize spread12. However, when the degree of overconfidence of
worker 1 is small, worker 1 exerts more effort than in the symmetric equilibrium while worker 2
exerts less effort than in the symmetric equilibrium. When the degree of overconfidence of worker
1 is large, both workers exert less effort than in the symmetric equilibrium. To disentangle whether
the firm would be better off hiring an overconfident worker and an unbiased worker or two unbiased
workers, I compare the expected profit in both cases.
The expected profit is equal to the expected total output minus the firm’s cost or
E[Π] = E[Q1(a1) +Q2(a2)]− (yw + yl)
When output distributes as a uniform and costs of effort are quadratic, the firm’s expected profit is
equal to
E[Π] = E[Q1(a1)] + E[Q2(a2)]− (yw + yl)
E[Π] = E[a1 + ω + ε1] + E[a2 + ω + ε2]− (yw + yl)
E[Π] = E[a1] + E[ω] + E[ε1] + E[a2] + E[ω] + E[ε2]− (yw + yl)
E[Π] = a∗1 + a
∗
2 + 2E[ω]− (yw + yl)
Given that, for a given prize spread ∆y, the firm’s cost, (yw+yl), is the same in both the asym-
metric and symmetric equilibrium, and that in both cases the expected value of the common shock
E[ω] is the same, to compare the expected profits and disentangle in which case the firm is better
off, it is sufficient to compare the expected total output i.e., E[Q1(a1)+E[Q2(a2)]. Following this
reasoning, for a given prize spread, the higher the expected total output, the higher the expected
profit and thus the better off the firm is. Proposition 2 describes the implications of overconfidence
for the firm for a given prize spread. The proof of Proposition 2 is reported in Appendix E.
Proposition 2 For a given prize spread ∆y = yw − yl, (i) when lambda is small, the firm is better
off in the asymmetric equilibrium compared to the symmetric equilibrium if and only if 2u2 > ∆y.
(ii) when lambda is large, the firm is always worse off in the asymmetric equilibrium compared to
12This is a well known result in the tournament literature as incentive schemes (Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983).
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the symmetric equilibrium.
The reason behind Proposition 2 is as follows. When overconfidence is small effort provision is
affected in opposite directions: the effort provision of worker 1 increases while the effort provision
of worker 2 decreases. If the combined effort provision is higher than in the symmetric equilib-
rium, expected output and thus expected profit increases. The expected profit is higher when the
increase in effort provision of worker 1 more than compensates the decrease in effort provision of
worker 2. This the case if and only if 2u2 > ∆y. The last condition links the price spread to output
volatility.13 If volatility is relatively high, for a given prize spread, the firm is better off hiring an
overconfident and an unbiased worker since effort provision and thus expected output and profit
increase. If volatility is relatively low, for a given prize spread, the firm is better off hiring two
unbiased workers since effort provision and thus expected output and profit decrease. When over-
confidence is large instead, effort provision always decreases. As a consequence, expected output
and thus expected profit are on average lower compared to the symmetric equilibrium. Hence, the
firm is always worse off when the overconfident worker is significantly overconfident.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper studies theoretically the impact of overconfidence on effort provision in an asymmet-
ric tournament. The model extends Santos-Pinto (2010) to allow for workers’ heterogeneity. In
the model, the worker with the highest relative rank receives a winner wage and the worker with
the lowest relative rank receives a loser wage, regardless of the absolute quantities they produce.
Agents have identical preferences and cost of effort but are heterogeneous in the self-assessment
of their own performance: worker 1 is overconfident and overestimates her own productivity and
thus his probability of winning the tournament while worker 2 has an unbiased self assessment.
The main findings are as follows: the overconfidence of worker 1 shifts the Nash Equilibrium
away from the symmetric tournament equilibrium, affecting the effort provision of both workers.
However, different degrees of overconfidence impact effort provision in different directions. A
small degree of overconfidence increases the effort provision of worker 1 and decreases the effort
provision of worker 2 compared to the effort provision in a symmetric tournament in which both
13Note that the variance of the joint distribution of individual outputs, the triangular distribution, is equal to 1/6 ∗ u2.
Thus, 2u2 can be interpreted as a measure of output volatility.
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workers are unbiased. A large degree of overconfidence decreases the effort provision of both
workers compared to the effort provision in a symmetric tournament in which both workers are
unbiased. The decrease in effort provision that follows from a large degree of overconfidence
lowers the expected output and thus the expected profits for the firm. The firm is better off when




In what follows I derive a simplified model. A monopolistic, risk neutral firm, rewards employees
using a tournament incentive scheme. With two workers, the worker who produces the highest
quantity is ranked first and receives a winner wage yw and the worker who produces the lowest
quantity is ranked last and receives the loser wage yl,with yw > yl > 0. One worker, worker 1,
is overconfident: she overestimates the probability of winning the tournament for a given level of
effort exerted. The other worker, worker 2, has a correct self-assessment: she can correctly estimate
the chances of winning the tournament for a given effort level. The bias of worker 1 is explained as
follows: worker 1 believes she is more productive than what she is and thus she overestimates her
probability of winning the tournament. Apart from the self-image bias of worker 1, both workers
are identical.
The simplified model is as follows. Assume that the (actual) productivity function of workers
is linear in effort
ei = (ei(ai)) = ai
Knowing that worker 2 has an unbiased self-assessment, her actual and perceived productivity will
be identical and equal to
e2 = e2(a2) = a2
worker 1 overestimates her productivity by λ and her perceived productivity is
e1 = (e1(a1, λ)) = λ ∗ a1
with λ > 1.
Each worker chooses the optimal effort level in order to maximize her (perceived) expected
utility. To simplify the derivation, I will now assume that both workers are risk neutral. Worker 1
maximizes
V1(a1, a2, λ, yl, yw) = yl + Pr(Q1 > q2)∆y − c(a1)
= yl + Pr(a1λ− a2 − Y > 0)∆y − c(a1)
= yl + Pr(Y < λa1 − a2)∆y − c(a1)
= yl +G(λa1 − a2)∆y − c(a1).
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where ∆y = yw − yl. Worker 2 maximizes
V2(a1, a2, yl, yw) = yl + Pr(Q2 > q1)∆y − c(a2)
= yl + Pr(a2 − a1 + Y > 0)∆y − c(a1)
= yl + Pr(Y > a1 − a2)∆y − c(a2)
= yl + [1− Pr(Y < a1 − a2)] ∆y − c(a2)
= yl + [1−G(a1 − a2)]∆y − c(a2).
The first order conditions for workers 1 and 2 are
λg(λa1 − a2)∆y = c′(a1) (2.7)








Similarly to (2.3), expression (2.9) indicates how the optimal effort level of worker 1, the
optimal level of effort of worker 2 and the overconfidence of worker 1 are related. The probability
of winning the tournament increases in the level of effort exerted for both workers: ∂G(a1,a2,λ)∂a1 =
λg(λa1 − a2) > 0 for worker 1 and ∂G(a1,a2)∂a2 = g(a1 − a2) > 0 for worker 2.
14 Intuitively,
the higher the effort, the higher the output and thus the higher the probability of winning the
tournament.
To study the impact of overconfidence on the perceived probability of winning the tournament






= g(a1λ− a2) + λ2g′(a1λ− a2) (2.10)
Knowing that g(a1λ − a2) > 0 and that λ ∈> 1, the term g′(a1λ − a2) determines the sign of
(2.10). When (2.10) is positive, the perceived probability of winning the tournament increases in λ
while when (2.10) is negative, the perceived probability of winning the tournament decreases in λ.
14In both cases the first derivative is positive given that g() is a probability distribution function that is positively
defined, and in the case of worker 1, g() is multiplied by λ that is positive (λ > 1).
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Moreover, when (2.10) is equal to zero, the perceived probability of winning the tournament does
not depend on λ.







⇔ c′(a1) = c′(a2)
⇔ a∗1 = a∗2
However, when worker 1 is overconfident, this may not be the case. When λg(a1λ − a2) >






At optimum, worker 1 who is overconfident exerts more effort than worker 2 who is unbiased.






At optimum, worker 1 who is overconfident exerts less effort than worker 2 who is unbiased.
Whether λg(a1λ − a2) is higher or lower than g(a1 − a2) depends on the characteristics of
the probability distribution g(). When g() is monotonic and non-decreasing, for instance if εi
distributes as a uniform, then it is always the case that λ2g(a1λ−a2) > g(a1−a2). However, when
g() is non monotonic, for instance if εi distributes as a normal, then λg(a1λ− a2) > g(a1 − a2)or
λg(a1λ− a2) < g(a1 − a2) depending on λ, a1 and a2.
Now I will study the impact of λ on the optimal effort levels exerted by workers 1 and 2. Going
back to the first order conditions I had:
λg(λa1 − a2)∆y = c′(a1)
g(a1 − a2)∆y = c′(a2)
15Note that g(0) > 0.
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The second order conditions are
λ2g′(λa1 − a2)∆y − c′′(a1) < 0 (2.11)
g′(a1 − a2)∆y + c′′(a2) > 0 (2.12)
Differentiating the FOCs with respect to a1, a2, and λ I have
λg′(λa1 − a2)∆y(a1dλ+ λda1 − da2) + g(λa1 − a2)∆ydλ = c′′(a1)da1 (2.13)
g′(a1 − a2)∆y(da1 − da2) = c′′(a2)da2 (2.14)
Solving (2.14) with respect to da2
da2 =
g′(a1 − a2)∆y
g′(a1 − a2)∆y + c′′(a2)
da1. (2.15)





g′(a1 − a2)∆y + c′′(a2)
.
The sign of the denominator of da2da1 is positive due to (2.12), the second order condition of worker
2. Hence, the sign of da2da1 only depends on the sign of the numerator. Knowing that ∆y is positive,
the sign of the numerator is given by the sign of g′() which in turn depends on the characteristics
of the cumulative distribution G. Let us assume that G is such that g′(x) > 0 for x < 0, g′(0) = 0,
and g′(x) < 0 for x > 0. This includes the normal distribution. For a1 < a2 the sign of the
numerator is positive and therefore da2da1 > 0. This shows that if worker 1 exerts less effort than
worker 2, then an increase in the effort of worker 1 increases the effort of worker 2. For a1 > a2
the sign of the numerator is negative and therefore da2da1 < 0. This shows that if worker 1 exerts
more effort than worker 2, then an increase in the effort of worker 1 lowers the effort of worker 2.





g′(a1 − a2)∆y + c′′(a2)
da1
]
+ g(λa1 − a2)∆ydλ = c′′(a1)da1.




λg′(λa1 − a2)a1 + g(λa1 − a2)
λg′(λa1−a2)g′(a1−a2)
g′(a1−a2)∆y+c′′(a2) − [λ
2g′(λa1 − a2)∆y − c′′(a1)]
∆y. (2.16)
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From the SOCs (2.11) and (2.12) and the assumptions on the cumulative distribution G, it follows
that the sign of the denominator of (2.16) is strictly positive. Hence, the sign of da1daλ only depends on
the sign of the numerator. The sign of the first term in the numerator of (2.16) is non-negative when
λa1− a2 ≤ 0. The sign of the first term in the numerator of (2.16) is negative when λa1− a2 > 0.
The sign of the second term in the numerator of (2.16) is always positive given that g is a density
function. Hence, we know that:
da1
daλ
> 0 when λa1 − a2 ≤ 0
For the sign of da1daλ to be positive when λa1 − a2 > 0 it must be that
λg′(λa1 − a2)a1 + g(λa1 − a2) > 0 (2.17)












In words, if (2.17) holds and worker 1 exerts more effort than worker 2, then an increase in the
overconfidence of worker 1 raises the effort of worker 1 and lowers the effort of worker 2.
For completeness, Appendix A.1 studies effort provision when workers’ output follows a nor-
mal distribution and effort costs are quadratic.
A.1 Normal Distribution






If εi ∼ N(0, σ2), worker 1 maximizes
V1(a1, a2, λ, yl, yw) = yl + P (Q1 > q2)∆y − c(a1)
= yl + P (a1λ− a2 − ε > 0)∆y − c(a1)
= yl + P (ε < λa1 − a2)∆y − c(a1)




and worker 2 maximizes
V2(a1, a2, yl, yw) = yl + P (Q2 > q1)∆y − c(a2)
= yl + P (a1 − a2 − ε < 0)∆y − c(a2)
= yl + P (ε > a1 − a2)∆y − c(a2)
= yl + [1− Φ(a1 − a2)]∆y −
a22
2
where Φ ∼ N(0, 2σ2).16









































Worker 1’s overconfidence may increase or decrease the perceived probability of winning the
tournament. To study the impact of overconfidence on the perceived probability of winning the




























. This term is positive when 2σ2 > (λa1−a2)λa1 and negative
16
























when 2σ2 < (λa1 − a2)λa1. In the first case, the perceived probability of winning the tournament
increases in λ (the higher the λ, the higher the perceived probability of winning the tournament).
In the second case, the perceived probability of winning the tournament decreases in λ (the higher
λ, the lower the perceived probability of winning the tournament).
Following the reasoning in Appendix A, I will study the impact of λ on the optimal effort level
exerted by workers 1 and 2. I have shown that the effect of λ on the effort level exerted by worker
1 is given by expression (2.16). Knowing that λ > 1, a1 ≥ 0 and that g(λa1 − a2) > 0 (because g
is a probability distribution function), the sign of (2.16) is determined by the sign of g′(λa1 − a2).
The sign of (2.16) is positive in two cases. First, when λa1 − a2 ≤ 0 for the characteristics of a
normal distribution.17 Second, when λa1 − a2 > 0 ( and thus g′(λa1 − a2) < 0 ) and condition















which is positive for 2σ2 > (λa1 − a2)λ2a1.












In words, if (2.17) holds and worker 1 exerts more effort than worker 2, then an increase in the
overconfidence of worker 1 raises the effort of worker 1 and lowers the effort of worker 2.
B. Proof of Proposition 1
Small Lambda
Assume the solution satisfies a1 > a2. If that is the case, then the relevant FOC of worker 2 is(
1
2u













17G is such that g′(x) > 0 for x < 0, g′(0) = 0 , and g′(x) < 0 for x > 0.
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(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 −∆y) + λ(∆y)2
.




















(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 −∆y) + λ(∆y)2 − 4u2λ∆y






(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 −∆y)− λ∆y(4u2 −∆y)
(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 −∆y) + λ(∆y)2
]
=
2u∆y(4u2 + λ2∆y − λ∆y)
(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 −∆y) + λ(∆y)2
=
8u3∆y + 2u(λ− 1)λ(∆y)2
(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 −∆y) + λ(∆y)2
.




(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 −∆y) + λ(∆y)2
>
8u3∆y + 2u(λ− 1)λ(∆y)2




8u3λ∆y > 8u3∆y + 2u(λ− 1)λ(∆y)2,
or
8u3(λ− 1)∆y > 2u(λ− 1)λ(∆y)2,
or
4u2 > λ∆y.
Hence, this solution is feasible as long as 4u2 > λ∆y (note that this condition also implies that the
SOC of worker 2 is satisfied). The Nash Equilibrium effort levels when 4u2 > λ∆y are given by
a∗1 =
8u3λ∆y
(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 −∆y) + λ(∆y)2
a∗2 =
8u3∆y + 2u(λ− 1)λ(∆y)2
(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 −∆y) + λ(∆y)2





(4u2 + ∆y)(4u2 −∆y) + (∆y)2
=
8u3∆y








I now show that worker 1 exerts more effort in the asymmetric tournament:
8u3λ∆y





16u4λ > (4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 −∆y) + λ(∆y)2,
or
16u4λ > 16u4 + 4u2λ2∆y − λ2(∆y)2 − 4u2∆y + λ(∆y)2,
or
16u4(λ− 1) + λ(λ− 1)(∆y)2 > 4u2∆y(λ2 − 1),
or
16u4 + λ(∆y)2 > 4u2∆y(λ+ 1),
or




which is the same condition found before. I now show that worker 2 exerts less effort in the
asymmetric tournament:
8u3∆y + 2u(λ− 1)λ(∆y)2






[8u3 + 2u(λ− 1)λ∆y]2u < (4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 −∆y) + λ(∆y)2,
or
16u4 + 4u2(λ− 1)λ∆y < 16u4 + 4u2λ2∆y − λ2(∆y)2 − 4u2∆y + λ(∆y)2,
or
4u2λ2∆y − 4u2λ∆y < 4u2λ2∆y − λ2(∆y)2 − 4u2∆y + λ(∆y)2,
or
λ2(∆y)2 − λ(∆y)2 < 4u2λ∆y − 4u2∆y,
or












and the SOC of worker 2 is satisfied.
I need to consider two separate cases for the relevant FOC of worker 1: λa1 > a2 > a1 (large
lambda) and a2 > λa1 > a1 (small lambda).



























































2uλ∆y(4u2 + ∆y) + 2uλ(∆y)2
(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 + ∆y)− λ(∆y)2
=
8u3λ∆y + 4uλ(∆y)2
(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 + ∆y)− λ(∆y)2
.





















(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 + ∆y)− λ(∆y)2 + 4u2λ∆y + 2λ(∆y)2






(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 + ∆y) + 4u2λ∆y + λ(∆y)2






(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 + ∆y) + λ∆y(4u2 + ∆y)
(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 + ∆y)− λ(∆y)2
]
=
2u∆y(4u2 + λ2∆y + λ∆y)
(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 + ∆y)− λ(∆y)2
=
8u3∆y + 2u(λ2 + λ)(∆y)2
(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 + ∆y)− λ(∆y)2
.
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I check if this solution satisfies a∗2 > a
∗
1 or equivalently
8u3∆y + 2u(λ2 + λ)(∆y)2
(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 + ∆y)− λ(∆y)2
>
8u3λ∆y + 4uλ(∆y)2
(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 + ∆y)− λ(∆y)2
,
or
8u3∆y + 2u(λ2 + λ)(∆y)2 > 8u3λ∆y + 4uλ(∆y)2,
or
(λ2 − λ)(∆y)2 > 4u2(λ− 1)∆y,
or
λ∆y > 4u2.
If this inequality holds, then a∗2 > a
∗





inequality is equivalent to
λ
8u3λ∆y + 4uλ(∆y)2
(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 + ∆y)− λ(∆y)2
>
8u3∆y + 2u(λ2 + λ)(∆y)2
(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 + ∆y)− λ(∆y)2
,
or
8u3λ2∆y + 4uλ2(∆y)2 > 8u3∆y + 2u(λ2 + λ)(∆y)2,
or
4u2λ2 + 2λ2∆y > 4u2 + (λ2 + λ)∆y,
or
4u2(λ2 − 1) > λ(−λ+ 1)∆y,
which is true since λ > 1. Hence this solution is feasible provided that λ∆y > 4u2.































































(4u2 − λ2∆y)(4u2 + ∆y) + λ(∆y)2
.




















(4u2 − λ2∆y)(4u2 + ∆y) + λ(∆y)2 + 4u2λ∆y




(4u2 − λ2∆y)(4u2 + ∆y) + λ∆y(4u2 + ∆y)
(4u2 − λ2∆y)(4u2 + ∆y) + λ(∆y)2
=
2u∆y(4u2 − λ2∆y + λ∆y)
(4u2 − λ2∆y)(4u2 + ∆y) + λ(∆y)2
=
8u3∆y − (λ− 1)2uλ(∆y)2
(4u2 − λ2∆y)(4u2 + ∆y) + λ(∆y)2
It is clear that for this solution it is not the case that a∗2 > a
∗
1. This solution is not feasible.




(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 + ∆y)− λ(∆y)2
a∗2 =
8u3∆y + 2u(λ2 + λ)(∆y)2
(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 + ∆y)− λ(∆y)2
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(4u2 + ∆y)2 − (∆y)2
=
8u3∆y + 4u(∆y)2











I now show that worker 2 exerts less effort in the asymmetric tournament:
8u3∆y + 2u(λ2 + λ)(∆y)2






[8u3 + 2u(λ2 + λ)∆y]2u < (4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 + ∆y)− λ(∆y)2,
or
16u4 + 4u2(λ2 + λ)∆y < 16u4 + 4u2λ2∆y + 4u2∆y + λ2(∆y)2 − λ(∆y)2,
or
4u2λ∆y < 4u2∆y + λ2(∆y)2 − λ(∆y)2,
or




C. Actual Probabilities of Winning the Tournament at the Nash Equilibrium
In this section I prove that when overconfidence is small, the actual probability of winning the
tournament for worker 1 increases. When overconfidence is large the actual probability of winning
the tournament for worker 1 decreases. To do so, I will compare the actual probability of winning
the tournament for workers 1 and 2 in the small and large lambda case. Note that in the case of a
symmetric equilibrium, the actual probability of winning for workers 1 and 2 is identical and equal
to 1/2, given that both workers exert the same level of effort a∗R.
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Small Lambda
When overconfidence (lambda) is small, the actual probability of winning the tournament for






































− (a1 − a2)
2
8u2





8u(a1 − a2)− 2(a1 − a2)2 > 0
4u(a1 − a2)− (a1 − a2)2 > 0
(a1 − a2) ∗ (4u− a1 + a2) > 0




1−a∗2) is positive. To make sure that the actual probability
of winning of worker 1 is higher than the actual probability of winning for worker 2, I verify that
(4u− a∗1 + a∗2) > 0 or
4u− 8u
3λ∆y
(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 −∆y) + λ(∆y)2
+
8u3∆y + 2u(λ− 1)λ(∆y)2




(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 −∆y) + λ(∆y)2
]
− 8u3λ∆y + 8u3∆y + 2u(λ− 1)λ(∆y)2 > 0
4u
[
16u4 − 4u2∆y + 4u2λ2∆y − λ2∆y2 + λ∆y2
]
− 8u3λ∆y + 8u3∆y + 2u(λ− 1)λ(∆y)2 > 0




























From the SOC of worker 2 4u2 > ∆y hence this expression is positive. I can conclude that when
lambda is small, the actual probability of winning the tournament for worker 1 is higher than the
actual probability of winning for worker 2.
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Large Lambda
When overconfidence (lambda) is large, the actual probability of winning the tournament for































− a1 − a2
2u
− (a1 − a2)
2
8u2
8u(a1 − a2) + 2(a1 − a2)2 < 0
4u(a1 − a2) + (a1 − a2)2 < 0
(a1 − a2) ∗ (4u+ a1 − a2) < 0




1 − a∗2) is negative. To make sure that the actual proba-
bility of winning of worker 1 is lower than the actual probability of winning for worker 2, I verify
that (4u+ a∗1 − a∗2) > 0 or
4u+
8u3λ∆y + 4uλ(∆y)2
(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 + ∆y)− λ(∆y)2
− 8u
3∆y + 2u(λ2 + λ)(∆y)2




(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 + ∆y)− λ(∆y)2
]
+ 8u3λ∆y + 4uλ(∆y)2 − 8u3∆y − 2u(λ2 + λ)(∆y)2 > 0
4u
[
16u4 + 4u2∆y + 4u2λ2∆y + λ2∆y2 − λ∆y2
]
+ 8u3λ∆y + 4uλ(∆y)2 − 8u3∆y − 2u(λ2 + λ)(∆y)2 > 0



















Given that λ > 1, I can conclude that this expression is positive. Hence, when lambda is large, the
actual probability of winning the tournament for worker 1 is lower than the actual probability of
winning for worker 2.
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D. Mathematical Expressions for Figures (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3)
This section reports the mathematical expressions for the graphical representation of the symmetric
and asymmetric (small and large lambda case) equilibrium in Figures (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3).
To represent the symmetric equilibrium, in Figure (2.1), I use the following set of parameters:
λ = 1, u = 2, ∆y = 6; the best reply function of worker 1 (if worker 1 was rational) is
a2 =

−4 + 3.66a1, if a1 > a2
1.5, if a1 = a2
4− 1.66a1, if a1 < a2
and the best reply function for worker 2 is
a2 =

2.4− 0.6a1, if a1 > a2
1.5, if a1 = a2
1.0909 + 0.2727a1, if a1 < a2
In this case a∗1 = a
∗
2 = aR = 1.5. Note that the best reply function of worker 1 (if worker 1 was
rational) and the best reply function of worker 2 are the same in all figures.
To represent the small lambda case, in Figure (2.2), I use the following set of parameters:
λ = 2, u = 2, ∆y = 6. The best reply function of worker 1 is
a2 =

−4 + 3.333a1, if λa1 > a2
6, if λa1 = a2
4 + 0.67a1, if λa1 < a2
In this case a∗1 = 1.63, a
∗
2 = 1.42 and aR = 1.5.
To represent the large lambda case, in Figure (2.3), I use the following set of parameters: λ = 8,
u = 2, ∆y = 6; the best reply function of worker 1 is
a2 =

−4 + 8.33a1, if λa1 > a2
216, if λa1 = a2
4 + 7.66a1, if λa1 < a2
In this case a∗1 = 0.63, a
∗






E. Proof of Proposition 2
To disentangle the effect of the overconfidence worker on the firm’s problem for a given prize
spread, first note that the expected total output in the symmetric equilibrium is simplyE[Q1(a1)]+




When overconfidence (lambda) is small, the expected total output is equal toE[Q1(a1)+E[Q2(a2)] =
a∗1 + a
∗
2 or, using the Nash Equilibrium expressions:
8u3λ∆y
(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 −∆y) + λ(∆y)2
+
8u3∆y + 2u(λ− 1)λ(∆y)2
(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 −∆y) + λ(∆y)2
The expected total output when lambda is small is greater than the expected total output in the
symmetric equilibrium when
8u3λ∆y
(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 −∆y) + λ(∆y)2
+
8u3∆y + 2u(λ− 1)λ(∆y)2





8u4λ∆y + 8u4∆y + 2u2(λ− 1)λ(∆y)2 > ∆y[(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 −∆y) + λ(∆y)2]
8u4λ+ 8u4 + 2u2(λ− 1)λ∆y > [(4u2 + λ2∆y)(4u2 −∆y) + λ(∆y)2]
8u4λ+ 8u4 + 2u2(λ− 1)λ∆y > 16u4 − 4u2∆y + 4u2λ2∆y − λ2∆y2 + λ(∆y)2
8u4(λ+ 1− 2) + 2u2(λ− 1)λ∆y > 4u2∆y(λ2 − 1) + λ∆y2(1− λ)
8u4(λ− 1) + 2u2(λ− 1)λ∆y > 4u2∆y(λ− 1)(λ+ 1)− λ∆y2(λ− 1)
8u4 + 2u2λ∆y > 4u2∆y(λ+ 1)− λ∆y2
8u4 + 2u2λ∆y − 4u2λ∆y − 4u2∆y + λ∆y2 > 0
8u4 − 2u2λ∆y − 4u2∆y + λ∆y2 > 0
(2u2 −∆y)(4u2 −∆yλ) > 0
With small lambda ∆yλ < 4u2 so 4u2 − ∆yλ > 0. Thus when 2u2 − ∆y is positive, or when
2u2 > ∆y the expected total output for the firm is higher in the asymmetric equilibrium compared
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to the symmetric equilibrium. When 2u2 < ∆y the expected total output for the firm is lower in
the asymmetric equilibrium compared to the symmetric equilibrium. Finally for 2u2 = ∆y the
output is the same in both cases. Hence the firm is better off when the degree of overconfidence of
worker 1 is small and 2u2 > ∆y given that, for a fixed prize spread, the expected total output (and
thus the expected profit) is higher.
Large Lambda
When overconfidence (lambda) is large, worker 1 and worker 2 always provide less effort than the
effort provided in the symmetric equilibrium. This implies that the firm is worse off since, for any





Are People Conditional Liars?
3.1 Introduction
The observation of peers’ behavior in moral dilemmas can have an important impact on individ-
ual choices. The 2015 so-called Diesel gate, consisting on the violation of the Clear Air Act by
the Volkswagen group, brought up awareness that diesel-powered cars produced not only by the
Volkswagen group but also from other producers, may escape legal emission constraints. This
suggests that being exposed to lying, misconduct and wrongdoing by colleagues or team members
can contribute to the spreading of dishonesty within firms and across markets. Recent studies in
Economics and Psychology have focused on the reasons which lead people to lie.
Lying behavior has been studied extensively using the die-roll paradigm introduced by Fis-
chbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013). In their design, subjects privately observe the outcome of
a die-roll and are asked to make a report that will determine individual monetary payoffs. Fis-
chbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013), as well as Gächter and Schulz (2016) and Gneezy et al. (2018)
find that people lie but often the do not lie maximally. Perfectly rational payoff maximizer indi-
viduals should not refrain from lying to the maximum extent. Hence, the existence of partial lying
(i.e. lying without making the payoff maximizing report) suggests that lying gives rise to moral or
psychological costs. Lying may also generate social image lying costs: Abeler et al. (2019) show
that people lie less if the true state is observable (i.g. by the experimenter) compared to when it is
not. They also investigate whether beliefs on others behavior affect lying and find no effect. On
the contrary, Abeler et al. (2014) find that lying increases when people expect others to lie while
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Rauhut (2013) shows that learning about lying increases dishonesty when people underestimate the
extent of lying and decreases when they overestimate it.
Lying behavior has also been investigated under different types of strategic interactions, such as
deception games and coordination games. In deception games, subjects strategically choose to lie
taking into consideration not only their own gains but also the possibility to favor or damage others
with their choice (Gneezy (2005), Erat and Gneezy (2012), Gneezy et al. (2013)). In coordination
games, people strategically lie more if the monetary benefits of lying are equally shared with others
i.e. there is payoff commonality and reports happen simultaneously (Barr and Michailidou (2017))
or sequentially (Weisel and Shalvi (2015)). In coordination games where the benefits of lying are
not equally shared, Lauer and Untertrifaller (2019) find that one third of the subjects engage in
strategic lying if and only if one or more group members lie. Also, Kocher et al. (2016) find that
communication increases lying regardless of payoff commonality.
Finally, Diekmann et al. (2015) study the impact of observing lying in absence of strategic
interactions by asking participants to report twice, once without information and a second time
after observing the distribution of reports in the first round of the experiment or the distribution
of reports from a similar Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) die-rolling experiment. They show
that observing the distribution of reports, both in the first round or in a similar experiment, increases
lying.
Related to lying behavior and dishonesty, a rich literature studies conditional social norm viola-
tion i.e the fact that subjects are more likely to break a rule when they observe others’ misbehavior.
Keizer et al. (2008) find empirical evidence for the fact that being aware of others misconduct
triggers more misconduct (for instance, observing illegal parking causes illegal trespassing) while
Cialdini et al. (1990) show that people are more prone to litter when they observe others littering.
Finally, Gino et al. (2009) find that people are more likely to misbehave when they observe an
in-group breaking a rule but are more likely to adhere to such a rule when it is an out-group that
breaks the rule.
We are interested in understanding what determines lying behavior in absence of strategic lying
confounds, communication and when group members can precisely observe each others lies. Such
a framework allows us to isolate social image cost of lying from other lying motives. In particular,
we investigate whether the presence of another group member who can also lie and/or whether
observing a group member lying reduces social image costs of lying. We expect the reduction in
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social image costs of lying to induce, in turn, an increase in lying behavior. We also want to know
if subjects who expect others to lie lie more than subjects who expect truth telling and whether
being surprised by lying behavior reduces social image costs of lying and thus increases lying.
We use a laboratory experiment to answer these questions. We implement a variation of the
die-roll paradigm in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) in which subjects are randomly matched
into pairs and each pair observes a single die-roll outcome. Subjects are then asked to make a
report that will determine individual monetary payoffs. To minimize inequality aversion and social
comparisons confounds, the two subjects in each pair observe the same die-roll outcome. We use
a between-subjects design composed by three treatments, baseline, simultaneous and sequential.
In the baseline treatment, one subject makes a report while the other subject is a passive observer.
In the simultaneous treatment, subjects report simultaneously. In the sequential treatment, subjects
report in a sequential order. Comparing the baseline to the simultaneous treatment allows us to
investigate whether lying differs when there is a passive or an active partner who can also lie.
Comparing the simultaneous to the sequential treatment allows us to investigate whether observing
someone lying increases lying.
In order to rule out differences in social image costs of lying across treatments, our design
makes the die-roll outcome and individual reports observable to the experimenter and to the partner
in all treatments. In particular, while observability by the experimenter is constant across treatment,
we introduce a passive observer who does not engage into reporting in the baseline treatment to
avoid a social image cost confound among active reporters in the baseline treatment and subjects
in the simultaneous and sequential treatment.
We measure lying as the choice to lie or not to lie (i.e. lying in the extensive margin) and as the
size of the lie of subjects who lie (i.e. lying in the intensive margin). In addition to studying how
being exposed to dishonesty affects lying, we investigate whether subjects anticipate dishonesty
and how subjects’ beliefs influence lying in the extensive and intensive margins. For this purpose,
we elicit subjects beliefs regarding their partner’s report.
Our main results are as follows. Lying in the baseline does not differ from lying in the simul-
taneous treatment, neither in the extensive nor in the intensive margins. In contrast, lying in the
extensive margin is higher in the sequential treatment than in the simultaneous treatment. This is
driven by second movers lying more often than subjects in the simultaneous treatment and suggests
that second movers are conditional liars. We also find that observing lying affects lying in the in-
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tensive margin but not in the extensive margin. In other words, larger lies by first movers result in
larger lies by second movers whereas the extensive margin of observed behavior (to lie or not to
lie) is not predictive for the extensive margin.
Belief elicitation also allows us to show that subjects overestimate lying in the extensive margin.
Similarly to lying behavior, beliefs of subjects in the baseline and simultaneous treatment, as well as
beliefs of first movers, do not differ. Second movers, instead, are the ones who expect their partner
to be the most likely to lie. Finally, we find that second movers shift their behavior towards lying
when they expect first movers to tell the truth and observe first movers lying instead. However,
second movers do not shift their behavior towards truth telling when they expect first movers to lie
and observe first movers telling the truth instead.
We contribute to the literature on lying behavior. Researchers have shown that lying increases
when there is payoff commonality (Barr and Michailidou (2017), Weisel and Shalvi (2015)) and
when subjects can communicate (Kocher et al. (2016)). Moreover, Lauer and Untertrifaller (2019)
find evidence for a category of subjects who lie when one or more group members lie. These studies
include strategic interactions among subjects and/or the possibility to communicate. We find that
observing lying increases lying even in absence of strategic interactions and communication.
The study closest to our is Diekmann et al. (2015). They show that subjects are more likely
to lie when they are aware that others lied, in absence of strategic interactions. In their study,
subjects are asked to make two reports. After making the first report, they are informed of the
distribution of reports in the first round or in a similar Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) die-
rolling experiment. Next, they proceed with the second report. Thus, in Diekmann et al. (2015),
subjects can estimate the extent to which people lie but do not have information about individual
behavior. In our design instead, not only we are able to exclude strategic interactions but also
second movers know precisely whether and to which extent the first movers they are paired with
lied. In this context, we find that the propensity to lie is higher when reports happen sequentially
due to the high percentage of second movers lying and that the size of the lie increases when second
movers observe first movers’ lies. This implies that observing group members’ lies diminishes the
social image costs associated with lying and thus increases lying.
More generally, we contribute to the rich literature on conditional social norm violation i.e the
fact that subjects are more likely to break a rule when they observe others’ misbehavior. Empirical
evidence shows that when being aware of others misconduct increases misconduct (Keizer et al.
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(2008)). For instance, Cialdini et al. (1990) show that people are more prone to litter when they
observe others littering and Carrell et al. (2008) find evidence for the contagiousness of cheating
in academic environment. Gino et al. (2009) find that people are more likely to cheat when they
observe an in-group cheating yet are reluctant to cheat if it is an out-group who cheats. In their
design, subjects are asked to perform a real effort task. During the experiment, an in-group or
an out-group would leave the room ostensibly early given the difficulty of the task, making it
clear that misreporting own performance in the task was a possibility. Differently from Gino et
al. (2009), in our design subjects do not perform a real effort task but perform a die-rolling task.
We believe that misreporting one’s performance in a real effort task may trigger different dynamics
than misreporting the outcome of a die-roll.1 Moreover, while in Gino et al. (2009) it is clear
that one participant to the same experimental session lied, in our design subjects are informed
about their each others behavior, whether they lied or not and to which extent. This is particularly
relevant in the sequential treatment in which second movers observe first movers’ reports and then
proceed with reporting. In this context, we find that observing lying increases lying. Finally,
Dimant (2019) shows that anti-social behavior is more contagious than pro-social behavior in a
give-or-take donation game. In their experiment, participants can give money to a charity or keep it
for themselves. Similarly, Brunner and Ostermaier (2019) show that peer influence on managerial
behavior is more remarkable when managers over-report their expenses to obtain higher budgets
compared to honest reporting. In our study, we exclude inequality aversion or altruism confounds
and implement a more straight forward task (reporting the outcome of a die-roll). We show that
lying is more contagious than truth telling: when subjects expect truth telling but observe lying,
lying increases. However, when subjects expect lying but observe truth telling, lying does not
decrease.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our experimental
design; section 3 presents the hypotheses we will test; section 4 discusses our results and section 5
concludes.
1Biases such as overconfidence or optimism may induce subjects to make biased reports about their own performance
in a real effort task.
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3.2 Experimental Design
We implement three treatments: baseline, simultaneous and sequential. In the baseline treatment,
subjects are paired and are assigned the role of player A or B. Player Bs are passive observers i.e.
they are not engaged in reporting. Although both Player A and Player B in each pair observe the
single die-roll outcome, only Player A makes a report and his/her report will determine his/her
payoff. Once Player A reports, Player B is asked to make a guess regarding A’s report and next will
observe Player A’s report.
Player B’s payoff is determined as follows. Before subjects are paired and learn about their
tasks, we describe them the simultaneous treatment (in non-indicative language) which we call
“Experiment 1” for convenience. We explain that some students, in the same laboratory as them-
selves, had already participated in a pilot (“Experiment 1”) and that we have kept their reports.
Then, we explain that Player B’s payoff would be determined by picking one of the reports of the
participants in “Experiment 1” who had observed the same die-roll outcome as the one observed
by them and Player A in the current session. For example, if a pair in the baseline observes a 3,
Player A receives a payoff equal to his/her report, and Player B receives a payoff randomly drawn
among the reports of Player Bs who participated in “Experiment 1” and had observed a die-roll of
3. 2
At the end of the experiment, Player As are asked to guess the randomly drawn report for Player
B of “Experiment 1”.
In the simultaneous treatment, subjects in a pair observe the outcome of a die-roll and are asked
to make a report simultaneously. After subjects make their own reports, they are asked to guess
each others report. After subjects have entered their guesses, they receive information about each
others report.
In the sequential treatment, all conditions are identical to the simultaneous treatment except the
2The computer randomly draws from the data base one of the reports of the subjects in “Experiment 1” who observed
the same die-roll as player B observes during the current session. Data were collected during a pilot session of the
simultaneous treatment that is “Experiment 1”. We do not inform subjects about each report draw probability for player
B to avoid any confounds (such as hinting that subjects in “Experiment 1” lied). Moreover, the choice to assign a random
draw from the distribution of reports in another session has the objective to render treatments comparable. Indeed, in the
sequential and simultaneous treatments subjects’ partners may lie. In the baseline, active player As make their choice
knowing that passive player Bs may be assigned the report of someone who lied. If this was not the case, confounds
may arise (e.g. inequality aversion).
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sequence of reporting and the disclosure of players’ reports to each other. In particular, after the
pair observes the common die-roll, the first mover (Player A) goes first to report and then to guess
the second mover (Player B)’s report while the second mover is waiting. Then, the second mover
is asked to guess the first mover’s report. Afterwards, the second mover learns the first mover’s
report and is asked to proceed with his/her own report. Then, the second mover’s report is revealed
to the first mover.
To investigate whether lying with a passive partner differs from lying with an active one, we
compare subjects’ behavior among the baseline treatment and the simultaneous treatment. To in-
vestigate whether reporting simultaneously or sequentially has an impact on lying, we compare the
simultaneous treatment with the sequential treatment. Moreover, comparing the behavior of first
and second movers in the sequential treatment allows us to investigate whether observing lying
increases lying.
Our design builds on the standard die-rolling paradigm by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013).
In Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013), subjects privately observe the outcome of a random vari-
able (a six sided die) and are asked to report the outcome they observed. Monetary payoffs are pro-
portional to individual reports, independently from the die-roll outcome observed. More precisely,
in their design, monetary payoff are equal to reports for any report from 1 to 5 while reporting a 6
yields a null payoff.
We differ from Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) in three respects. First, in our variant of
the die-roll paradigm subjects are randomly matched into pairs. This allows us to study what de-
termines lying behavior when individuals are in groups and lying is observable by group members.
In order to minimize inequality aversion and social comparisons concerns, each subject in a pair
observes the same die-roll outcome i.e. xi = xj = x ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} for a randomly matched
pair (i, j). We inform subjects that the other person in their pair observes the same realization as
they do. Each die realization is equally likely, i.e. px = 1/6, and this is common knowledge.
Second, individual monetary payoffs are equal to subjects’ reports, for any report from 1 to 6:
CHF 1 if r = 1, CHF 2 if r = 2 and so on. Importantly, each subject’s payoff is independent
from their partner’s report and subjects cannot communicate. In this way we are able to study lying
behavior in absence of strategic interactions (such as payoff commonality Barr and Michailidou
(2017), Weisel and Shalvi (2015)) and communication (Kocher et al. (2016)).
Third, we implement random draws on computers and thus are able to recover the true state.
107
Thus the experimenter has full observability and we can measure lying at the individual level. It is
is common knowledge that the experimenter can observe the die realization. Abeler et al. (2019)
show that the possibility of being detected, for instance by the experimenter, reduces lying while
Gneezy et al. (2018) suggest that verifiability of outcomes influences lying in the intensive margin
(maximal lying increases and partial lying decreases). Importantly, in our design, observability
from the experimenter is a common feature across all the experimental conditions hence we do
not think it compromises in any way our treatment comparisons. However, in the simultaneous
and sequential treatments subjects in a pair observe report. Being observed by group members
may give rise to a different type of social image effects, or make the existing social image effects
more salient. To control for social image effects across treatments, we introduced the presence of
a passive observer in the baseline treatment.
A full anonymity protocol is applied in all treatments. When subjects enter the lab they are
seated in individual, panel divided experimental booths. They individually read instructions and
these are common knowledge. For clarity, Table 3.1 reports the timing of the experimental design.
Experimental instructions are provided in Appendix C while screen shots and documents relative to
experimental procedures are reported in Appendix C.4 . Section 3.2.1 describes belief elicitation.
3.2.1 Belief elicitation
We elicit beliefs about partners’ reports to assess whether subjects anticipate dishonest behavior
and whether this affects lying.
In the baseline, Player B is asked to guess Player A’s report while Player A is asked to make a
guess on the report that will be randomly drawn for Player B. In the simultaneous and sequential
treatments subjects are asked to guess their partner’s report before this is revealed. Subjects receive
1 CHF if their guess is correct and zero otherwise.
In the first set of experimental instructions we inform subjects that they will be asked to make
a guess but we do not disclose in advance what this guess is about. We tell participants that the
content of the guess will become clear during the experiment. We proceed in this manner since
subjects may modify their behavior as a consequence of being asked to form expectations and we
want to avoid confounds and strategic behavior.3
3For instance, subjects may try to coordinate knowing that they have to anticipate their partners behavior.
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Table 3.1: Timing of the experiment
Instructions
Random matching of subjects into pairs, role of A and B assignment
A and B observe the die-roll outcome
Baseline Simultaneous Sequential
A reports, B guesses A’s
report
A and B report A reports, B guesses A’s
report
B observes A’s report, A
guesses the randomly drawn
report for B
A and B guess each others
report
B observes A’s report
A and B observe the
randomly drawn report for B
A and B observe each others
report
B reports, A guesses B’s
report




In this section we discuss the hypotheses that we will test in our experiment.
The literature on lying has shown that subjects seem to face psychological costs when lying
(Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013), Gächter and Schulz (2016)). Gneezy et al. (2018) present
a theory model in which subjects derive utility from monetary gains but face a cost when lying
that also depends on the possibility of being detected. In other words, full observability induces
a social image lying cost. The latter increases remarkably in the choice to lie or not while it does
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not depend on the extent to which a subject lies. Related to Gneezy et al. (2018), Abeler et al.
(2019) find evidence for the existence of social image lying costs. When subjects derive utility
from having a positive social image, being seen as a liar can generate a cost. We believe that when
subjects derive utility from a positive social image, lying costs will not only increase when subjects
decide to lie but also to with the extent to which a subject lies.
In our design, subjects are matched into pairs: they face social image costs when lying, not just
because of their own behavior, but also depending on their partners’. Social image lying costs in-
crease when the partner tells the truth and decrease when the partner lies. We expect subjects to lie
more in the simultaneous treatment compared to the baseline treatment. The reason is as follows.
In the baseline treatment, passive observers do not engage in reporting and thus cannot lie. The
fact that their partner cannot lie increases the social image cost of lying of active reporters. In the
simultaneous treatment instead, both partners can lie: if subjects anticipate that their partner is fac-
ing the same choice and social image costs of lying, the fact that each others partner can lie as well
reduces social image costs of lying. This in turn implies that lying increases in the simultaneous
treatment. One could argue that in the baseline treatment, as well as in the simultaneous treatment,
subjects are aware that some participants to the experiment may lie. However, in the simultaneous
treatment, partners’ opportunity to lie is more salient and thus the impact on social image cost of
lying is more remarkable.
Hypothesis 1: Subjects lie more in the simultaneous treatment compared to the baseline treatment.
In the simultaneous treatment, partners observe each other’ reports after reporting simultane-
ously. In the sequential treatment, second movers observe first movers’ reports before making their
reports. We expect subjects to lie more in the sequential treatment compared to the simultaneous
treatment for two reasons. First, the literature on conditional social norm violation shows that vi-
olations of a social norm trigger more violations. In particular, Diekmann et al. (2015) show that
when subjects are asked to report twice and are informed about the distribution of reports in the
first round or in a similar Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) die-rolling experiment, being aware
that other people lied increases lying in the second round. Hence we expect second movers who
observe first movers lying to lie as well. Second, if first movers anticipate that second movers will
lie when they observe first movers who lie, first movers’ social image cost of lying is reduced and
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this in turn increases lying. However, we expect the effect to be stronger for second movers com-
pared to first movers, since second movers have the possibility to observe first movers’ behavior
before making their own report.
Hypothesis 2: In the sequential treatment,
(i) subjects lie more compared to the simultaneous treatment,
(ii) due to the fact that second movers lie more than subjects in the simultaneous treatment.
Related to the literature on conditional norm violation, Lauer and Untertrifaller (2019) find ev-
idence for conditional dishonesty i.e. the fact that group members lie if they observe one or more
group members lying. In particular, they identify a category of subjects that would not lie unless
they are aware of the dishonesty of one or more group members. They call this subjects “condi-
tional liars”. Conditional liars are to be distinguished from subjects who would lie regardless of
others’ behavior (“always liars”) since their behavior depends on the honesty or dishonesty of other
group members. Moreover, conditional liars are to be distinguished from “never liars” i.e. subjects
who never lie regardless of others’ behavior. In Lauer and Untertrifaller (2019), individual mone-
tary payoffs depend on the reports of all group members. We rule out this possibility to be able to
isolate the effect of being in a group from payoff interdependence and expect second movers to be
conditional liars. In other words, we expect second movers in the sequential treatment to lie more
when they observe first movers lying.
Hypothesis 3: In the sequential treatment, second movers who observe a first mover who lies, lie
more than second movers who observe a first mover who tells the truth.
In our experiment, we elicit subjects’ beliefs about partners’ reports. In this way, we are able to
investigate whether subjects expect their partners to lie and to which extent, comparing actual and
expected reports. This allows us to observe whether subject overestimate or underestimate lying.
Similarly to the results in Abeler et al. (2014), we expect subjects to overestimate lying.
Hypothesis 4: Subjects overestimate lying.
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Regarding the impact of beliefs on subjects’ behavior, the literature finds mixed results. While
Abeler et al. (2019) show that beliefs do not have an impact, Abeler et al. (2014) find that subjects
who expect other people to lie, lie more and that, overall, subjects overestimate lying. Abeler et al.
(2019) and Abeler et al. (2014) elicit subjects’ beliefs after they have made their reports. Rauhut
(2013) instead, analyses subjects’ behavior before and after belief elicitation using an experiment
in which subjects engage in a die-rolling task twice. After the first round, subjects are asked to
estimate the frequency of reports of other participants; next, they are informed about the actual
distribution of reports of other participants before the second round. Rauhut (2013) shows that
lying increases when subjects underestimated lying while it decreases when subjects overestimated
lying.
In the sequential treatment, second movers are asked to form beliefs about first movers, then
they are informed about first movers’ report and finally are asked to make their own report. This
implies that second movers’ beliefs can be confirmed or not when observing the report of first
movers. Differently from Rauhut (2013), second movers are not informed about the distribution of
reports but they are told exactly which report first movers made. Hence, second movers are aware,
without the need to make any inference, whether their partner lied or not and to which extent.
We expect belief updating to be relevant in the case of second movers. Second movers holding
different priors about others’ lying behavior may suffer different lying costs. Those who anticipate
lying but observe truth telling may face a higher cost than those who anticipate lying and observe
lying; those who anticipate truth telling but observe lying may face a lower cost than those who
anticipate and observe truth telling. As a consequence, we expect to find an effect when second
movers are surprised by the behavior of first movers i.e. when they observe the contrary of what
they anticipated. Precisely, we expect second movers who expect lying but observe truth telling
to lie less than second movers who expect and observe lying. On the contrary, we expect second
movers who expect truth telling and observe lying to lie more than second movers who expect and
observe truth telling.
Hypothesis 5 In the sequential treatment,
(i) second movers who expect lying but observe truth telling lie less than second movers who expect
and observe lying;
(ii) second movers who expect truth telling but observe lying lie more than second movers who
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expect and observe truth telling.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Subjects, Procedures and Payment
We conducted all experimental sessions at the LABEX (HEC, University of Lausanne) during
November 2017 and September 2018. All subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner (2015))
and the experiment was programmed in zTree (Fischbacher (2007)).
Instructions were presented in oral and in written form, in French language. Subjects’ under-
standing was tested with a series questions prior to the experimental task, and their demographic
characteristics were collected with a post-task questionnaire.
Each subject took part in one session only. We had on average 24 participants per session.4 In
total, 404 subjects participated to the experiment: 138 subjects in the baseline, 100 in the simulta-
neous and 166 in the sequential treatment.
Sessions lasted 30 minutes on average. Each subject received 10 CHF as a show up fee, and
total earnings varied between 11 and 17 CHF. The average payment was equal to 15.09 CHF.
Payments were carried via payment-sheets which subjects took outside the lab and were cashed
by an experimenter who was not present during the experiment and could not identify individuals’
experimental behavior. Payment receipts could not be linked to individuals’ experimental behavior.
Full anonymity applied throughout all sessions.
Finally, to exclude systematic differences in the allocation of subjects across treatments we
conduct a demographics randomization check, reported in appendix A.
3.4.2 Lying across treatments
Figure 3.1 displays the distribution of die-roll outcomes and reports across treatments and distin-
guishing among first and second movers in the sequential treatment. The wider empty bars depict
the frequency of occurrence of each outcome, while thin blue bars depict the frequency with which
each of the die-roll outcomes was reported. Figure 3.1 shows that the frequency at which a 6 is re-
ported is higher than the frequency at which a 6 is observed. The frequency at which a 5 is reported
4The minimum number of subjects per session was 22 and the maximum was 26.
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is similar to the frequency at which a 5 is observed. On the contrary, the frequency at which 1, 2
or 3 are reported is lower than the frequency at which 1, 2 or 3 are observed. This indicates that
subjects over-report in all treatments.
Figure 3.2 displays subjects’ reports given the die-roll outcome observed across treatments and
distinguishing among first and second movers in the sequential treatment. In Figure 3.2 each dot
represents a subject. All dots that lay on the red line represent subjects who reported truthfully (in-
tuitively, the red line corresponds to the bisector on which reports and die-roll outcomes coincide).
All dots that lay above the red line represent subjects that lied i.e. subjects that reported a higher
outcome with respect to the observed die-roll outcome.
Figure 3.1: Distribution of die-roll outcomes and subjects’ reports
Notes: histograms of the frequency of die-roll outcomes (wider empty bars) and of reports (thin blue bars).
Histograms, from left to right, refer to baseline, simultaneous and sequential treatment and to first and second
mover in the sequential treatment. In the baseline, Player Bs are passive observers who are not asked to make
a report while Player As are active and engage in reporting. Hence, we only consider observations relative
to Player As in the Baseline.
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Similarly to Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2 shows that many of subjects’ reports are higher than the
die-roll outcome observed in all the treatments.
Among all subjects who lied we can distinguish two types of liars: (i) “maximal liars” and (ii)
“partial liars”. Maximal liars are subjects who lied and reported the payoff maximizing outcome i.e.
subjects who reported a 6 and are on the top of each graph in Figure 3.2. Among the subjects who
lied, 65% are maximal liars in the baseline, 74% in the simultaneous and 70% in the sequential
treatment (71% of first movers and 69% of second movers are maximal liars). Partial liars, are
subjects who lied and reported a die-roll outcome that is higher than the one observed but lower
than the payoff maximizing outcome. Partial liars lay in the triangular area above the bisector but
below a report of 6 in each graph of Figure 3.2. Among the subjects who lied, 35% are partial liars
in the baseline, 26% in the simultaneous and 30% in the sequential treatment (29% of first movers
and 31% of second movers are partial liars). There is a consistent pattern of more maximal liars
and fewer partial liars across all treatments while the percentage of maximal and partial liars does
not vary across treatments. A more exhaustive analysis of maximal liars and partial liars is reported
in Appendix B.
A few subjects have lied down-wards, i.e. their reports are lower than the observed die-roll
outcome; in Figure 3.2 they are represented from the dots that lay below the red line. When
subjects lie downwards they implicitly choose to have a lower payoff lying, over having a higher
payoff reporting truthfully. Overall, 6 subjects lied down-wards. In the following analysis, we
exclude down-ward lies. Moreover, we exclude from the following analysis subjects that “could
not lie” i.e. those subjects who observed a 6. Finally, since Player Bs in the baseline do not
engage in reporting, we also exclude them from our analysis. We thus have 62 observations in the
baseline treatment (Player As), 90 observations in the simultaneous treatment and 141 observations
in the sequential treatment (divided into 70 first movers and 71 second movers). We have 293
observations in total.
In what follows we study lying in the extensive and intensive margins across treatments. To
study lying in the extensive margin we use the dummy variable ”liars”, equal to 1 if a subject
makes a report that is higher than the observed die-roll outcome and 0 otherwise. To study lying in
the intensive margin, we define the variable ”size of the lie”, li, equal to the difference among the
observed die-roll outcome and the report made (i.e. li = ri − xi) taking into considerations only
subjects who lie.
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of die-roll outcomes and subjects’ reports
Notes: each dot refers to individual reports given a certain die-roll outcome. Histograms on the top panel,
from left to right, refer to baseline, simultaneous and sequential treatment. Histogram on the bottom panel,
refer to first (left) and second movers (right) in the sequential treatment. In the baseline, Player Bs are
passive observers who are not asked to make a report while Player As are active and engage in reporting.
Hence, we only consider observations relative to Player As in the Baseline. Dots are jittered to highlight the
number of subjects making a certain report.
The first row of Table 3.2 reports the percentages of liars while the second row shows the mean
of size of the lie across treatments.
The percentage of liars among the baseline and the simultaneous treatment is not significantly
different (p= 0.39, one-sided test of proportions; p=0.78 one-sided Kruskal-Wallis test). In contrast,
significantly more people lied in the sequential treatment compared to the baseline (p=0.04, one-
sided tests of proportions; p-value=0.08, one-sided Kruskal-Wallis test) and to the simultaneous
treatment (p=0.01, one-sided tests of proportions; p-value=0.02, one-sided Kruskal-Wallis test).
The average size of the lie is equal to 2.61 in the baseline, to 2.97 in the simultaneous and
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Table 3.2: Lying in the extensive and intensive margins
Baseline Simultaneous Sequential First M. Second M.
liars 50% 48% 63% 58% 69%
obs. (62) (90) (141) (71) (70)
size of the lie 2.61 2.97 2.67 2.68 2.67
obs. (31) (43) (89) (41) (48)
2.67 in the sequential treatment. One-sided T-tests of means and one-sided Kruskal-Wallis tests of
distributions show that lying in the intensive margin does not differ across treatments.
We expected to observe more lying in the simultaneous treatment than in the baseline (Hypoth-
esis 1). Nevertheless, these tests suggest that lying in the extensive and in the intensive margins
does not vary among baseline and simultaneous treatment.
Result 1: When lies are observable, having a passive or an active partner does not affect lying in
either the extensive or intensive margins.
However, we find evidence supporting Hypothesis 2: the sequential treatment differs from
the simultaneous treatment in the extensive margin. Hypothesis 2 also conjectures that lying is
higher in the sequential treatment due to lying of second movers. Hence, we now proceed to
analyze whether there are differences in behavior among first and second movers in the sequential
treatment. Moreover, we compare first and second movers with subjects in the baseline and in the
simultaneous treatment.
The percentage of liars among first and second mover do not differ significantly (p= 0.09, one-
sided tests of proportions; p=0.18 one-sided Kruskal-Wallis test). However, the percentage of liars
among second movers in the sequential treatment is significantly higher than the percentage of
liars in the baseline and in simultaneous treatments (p=0.015 and p < 0.01 respectively, one-sided
tests of proportions; p=0.03 and p < 0.01 respectively, one-sided Kruskal-Wallis test). The same
does not hold for the percentage of liars among first movers in the sequential treatment which
does not differ significantly neither from the baseline nor from the simultaneous treatment (p=0.18
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and p=0.10 respectively, one-sided tests of proportions; p=0.37 and p=0.21 respectively, one-sided
Kruskal-Wallis test).
One-sided T-test of means and one-sided Kruskal-Wallis test suggest that there are no signifi-
cant differences in the size of the lie among first and second movers. Moreover, we find no signifi-
cant differences when we compare the first and second movers, respectively, with the baseline and
the simultaneous treatment.
To summarize, we have found that subjects in the sequential treatment are more likely to lie
than subjects in the simultaneous treatment. Comparing the behavior of first and second movers,
we also find that the high percentage of liars in the sequential treatment is due to the high percent-
age of second movers who lie. This confirms our second hypothesis, that subjects lie more in the
sequential treatment and that this is driven by the behavior of second movers.
Result 2: When lies are observable and reports happen sequentially, lying in the extensive margin
(i) is significantly higher in the sequential treatment than in the simultaneous treatment;
(ii) is significantly higher for second movers than subjects who report simultaneously.
Result 2 indicates that second movers in the sequential treatment are conditional liars.
In what follows, we test whether second movers lie more when they observe first movers lying
(Hypothesis 3).
Table 3.3 reports the percentages of second movers who lie or tell the truth, conditional on the
behavior of first movers, in the sequential treatment.
Table 3.3: Second movers’ behavior conditional on first movers’ behavior.
Sequential Treatment
Second M.
lies tells truth obs
First M.
lies 73% 27% (41)
tells truth 62% 38% (29)
Table 3.3 shows that being paired with a liar seems to increase the likelihood of lying. The
73% of second movers who are paired with a first mover who lies, lies; the 62% of second movers
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who are paired with a first mover who tells the truth, lies. However, one-sided test of proportions
and one-sided Kruskal-Wallis test of distributions show that there are no differences in subjects’
behavior conditional on the behavior of their partners.5 This suggests that lying of first movers
does not affect lying of second movers in the extensive margin.
To complete the assessment of the impact of a partner’s behavior on lying in the extensive
margin, Table 3.4 reports a logit regression of Liars Second Movers (liars among second movers)
on Liars First Movers (liars among first movers) in the sequential treatment treatment. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the pair level and demographic controls are included. 6
The coefficient for Liars of First Movers in the third column of Table 3.4 indicates a positive
correlation among the behavior of second movers and the behavior of first movers. However, the
coefficient is not significant. Hence, we can conclude that the behavior of partners does not impact
lying in the extensive margin.
Table 3.5 reports the average size of the lie, conditional on the behavior of one’s partner, in the
sequential treatment.
Table 3.5: Size of the lie conditional on partner’s behavior in the Sequential treatment.
Sequential
Second M.





Table 3.5 shows that in the sequential treatment, being paired with a liar seems to increase the
size of the lie while being paired with a truth-teller seems to decrease it. The average size of the lie
for second movers who observed a first mover that lied is 2.87 while the average size of the lie for
5p=0.47 one-sided Kruskal-Wallis test; p=0.32, one-sided tests of proportions.
6Demographic controls are: Gender (dummy equal to 1 if male), Swiss Nationality (dummy equal to 1 if Swiss),
Unil (dummy equal to 1 if student and affiliated to UNIL), Age, Grades (average grade, from 1 to 6), Bachelor (dummy
equal to 1 if bachelor student, 0 if master or other), Grad. Parents (dummy equal to 1 if both parents hold a university
degree), Only Child (dummy equal to 1 if only child), Big Town (dummy equal to 1 if resident in a big town), People
Known (number of participants known during the lab section). A randomization check is presented in Appendix A.
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Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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second movers who observed a first mover who reported truthfully is 2.33. However, one-sided T-
tests of means and one-sided Kruskal-Wallis tests of distributions show that there are no significant
differences in the size of the lie conditional on the behavior of their partners.7 This implies that the
fact that a first mover lies or tells the truth does not affect lying of second movers in the intensive
margin.
To further investigate whether observing lying increases lying, we analyze how the size of the
lie of first movers influences the size of the lie of second movers.
Table 3.6 reports a linear regression of the size of the lie of second movers on the size of the lie
of first movers. Robust standard errors are clustered at the pair level and demographic controls are
included.8
As shown in Table 3.6, the coefficient for the size of the lie of first mover is positive and very
significant. This implies that observing the size of the lie of first movers increases the size of the lie
of second movers in the sequential treatment. In particular, out of the 48 second movers who lied,
30 lied given that the first mover they were matched with lied. Out of this 30, 14 second movers
made exactly the same report as the first mover (and the report was equal to 6 in all cases), 9 made
a higher report (8 reported a 6, 1 reported a 5) and finally 7 made a lower report (1 reported a 3
instead of a 5, 1 reported a 4 instead of a 6 and 5 a 5 instead of a 6).
Result 3: When lies are observable and reports happen sequentially, observing lying increases
lying in the intensive margin.
Result 3 is in line with our third hypothesis, that second movers who observe first movers that
lie, lie more than second movers who observe first movers that report truthfully.
7The size of the lie of first and second movers differs weakly in means (p=0.10, one-sided T-test of means) but not
in distributions(p=0.24 one-sided Kruskal-Wallis test.)
8Demographic controls are: Gender (dummy equal to 1 if male), Swiss Nationality (dummy equal to 1 if Swiss),
Unil (dummy equal to 1 if student and affiliated to UNIL), Age, Grades (average grade, from 1 to 6), Bachelor (dummy
equal to 1 if bachelor student, 0 if master or other), Grad. Parents (dummy equal to 1 if both parents hold a university
degree), Only Child (dummy equal to 1 if only child), Big Town (dummy equal to 1 if resident in a big town), People
Known (number of participants known during the lab section). A randomization check is presented in Appendix A.
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Table 3.6: Size of the lie in the Sequential treatment, linear regression
Sequential
Size of Lie Second M.
(30)



























Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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3.4.3 Expectations about Lying Behavior
As mentioned, we elicit individual beliefs regarding their partners’ reports. In this section we
analyze how accurately subjects anticipate lying behavior. 9
To analyze subjects’ beliefs in the extensive margin we introduce the dummy variable “expected
liars”, equal to 1 if subjects expect their partner to lie and equal to zero if they expect their partner
to report truthfully. To analyze subjects’ beliefs in the intensive margin we define the variable
“expected size of the lie” as the difference among the die-roll outcome observed and the expected
partner’s report (i.e. xi,j − Ei [rj ]) considering only subjects who expect their partner to lie.10
Table 3.7 shows the percentage of expected liars (first row), the percentage of actual liars (sec-
ond row), the mean size of the lie (third row) and the mean expected size of the lie (last row) in
the baseline, simultaneous and sequential treatments and distinguishing among first and second
movers in the sequential treatment. 11
9Similarly to the previous analysis, we exclude subjects whose partner could not lie, i.e. who observed a 6, since we
are not able to disentangle whether a subject would expect their partner to report truthfully or not when they have the
possibility to make the payoff maximising report truthfully. In addition, we drop subjects who expect their partner to lie
downwards. In total, 7 subjects expect their partner to lie downwards. Subjects who expect their partner to lie downwards
do not coincide with subjects who lie downwards. Differently from above instead, we do not take into consideration
Player As in the baseline. Indeed Player As in the baseline are asked to guess the randomly drawn outcome for a passive
Player B. This guess is not of interest and was implemented for consistency across treatments and subjects. Player Bs in
the baseline instead are asked to guess the A’s report. We are interested in knowing whether Player Bs anticipate lying
behavior of Player As as passive observers.
10In the Baseline, expect lying is equal to the difference among the die-roll for Player A and the report that Player B
expects Player A to make.
11Importantly, the percentage of liars and the actual size of the lie are marginally different from Table 3.2. Indeed,
when analyzing beliefs, we not only drop observations of subject who observed a 6 or lied downwards, but also ob-
servations of subjects who expect their partner to lie downwards. Thus we refer to a reduced number of observations
with respect to Table 3.2. Moreover, it is worth noting that, in order to be able to compare the expected and actual size
of the lie, we only refer to subjects who expect their partner to lie and whose partner lied. Hence the number of the
observations we have for the size of the lie may be lower than the percentage of the subjects who expected their partner
to lie.
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Table 3.7: Expected liars and expected size of the lie
Baseline Simultaneous Sequential First Mover Second Mover
exp. liars 61% 59% 71% 63% 79%
liars 48% 48% 64% 59% 70%
obs. (31) (90) (139) (70) (69)
exp. s. lie 2.45 3.10 2.69 2.61 2.76
size of lie 3.09 2.97 2.78 2.77 2.79
obs. (11) (39) (78) (36) (42)
The first row of Table 3.7 shows that a very high percentage of subjects (71%) expected their
partner to lie in the sequential treatment. This percentage is remarkably high for second movers
in the sequential treatment (79%). The percentage of expected liars for second movers in the
sequential treatment differs significantly in means and weakly in distributions from the baseline
(p=0.03, one-sided test of proportions; p=0.06 one-sided Kruskal-Wallis test) and the simultane-
ous treatment (p=0.03, one-sided test of proportions; p=0.05 one-sided Kruskal-Wallis test) and
differs significantly both in means and distributions from the percentage of expected liars for first
movers (p=0.02, one-sided test of proportions; p=0.04 one-sided Kruskal-Wallis test). Thus, sec-
ond movers in the sequential treatment are the subjects who expect their partner to be the most
likely to lie.
The first and second rows of Table 3.7 show that subjects overestimate lying in the extensive
margin i.e. the percentage of expected liars is significantly higher than the percentage of liars
(p < 0.01, one-sided test of proportions; p < 0.01, one-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). 12 This
result confirms our fourth hypothesis.
The fourth row of Table 3.7 shows that the average expected size of the lie is higher in the
simultaneous treatment. However, we only find weakly significant differences in means among
the simultaneous treatment and the sequential treatment (p=0.06, one-sided T-test) and among the
12If we take into consideration each treatment and first and second movers in the sequential treatment separately, the
differences in distributions highlighted in the whole data set hold (in all cases, p < 0.01, one-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test). However, this is not always the case when we consider the differences in proportions.We find a weakly significant
difference in proportions among expected liars and actual liars only in the simultaneous and sequential treatment (p=0.07
and p=0.10, respectively, one-sided test of proportions).
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simultaneous treatment and second movers in the sequential treatment (p=0.06, one-sided T-test)
and these differences are not significant in distributions.
The fourth and fifth rows of Table 3.7 show that in all cases but in the simultaneous treatment,
the expected size of the lie is lower than the actual size of the lie. However, overall, the difference
among the expected and the actual size of the lie is significant in distributions (p < 0.01, one-
sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov test) but not in means (p = 0.44, one-sided T-test). Hence, we cannot
conclude that subjects underestimate lying in the intensive margin.13
To conclude, we find that subjects overestimate lying in the extensive margin and this in line
with our forth hypothesis. Moreover, the expected percentage of liars is the highest for second
movers in the sequential treatment.
Result 4: In the extensive margin:
(i) subjects overestimate the incidence of lying across all treatments;
(ii) second movers in the sequential treatment are the ones who expect their partners to be the
most likely to lie compared to first movers in the sequential and to the baseline and simultaneous
treatment.
3.4.4 Conditional lying and expectations about lying behavior
Belief elicitation allows us to investigate whether subjects anticipate lying and how this affects
individual lying behavior.
In the sequential treatment, second movers form expectations about first movers’ behavior, next
they are informed about first movers’ reports and then they make their own reports. This implies
that second movers have the chance to have their beliefs proven right or wrong before reporting.
In what follows, we investigate whether being surprised or not by first movers’ behavior affects
second movers’ reports.
Table 3.8 compares the proportions of second movers who lie (i.e. percentage of liars), among
13If we take into consideration each treatment and first and second movers in the sequential treatment separately,
we find a very significant difference in means among expected size of the lie and actual size for second movers in
the sequential treatment (p = 0.05, one-sided T-test) and weakly significant differences in the baseline and in the
simultaneous treatment (p=0.10 and p=0.08, respectively, one-sided T-test).
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Table 3.8: % of second movers who lies, given first movers’ behavior and expectations about it
Second Mover
expects truth-telling expects lying
First Mover
tells truth 12.5% 85%
obs. (8) (20)
lies 71 % 73.5%
obs. (7) (34)
those second movers that (i) observe a first mover who tells the truth or lies and (ii) expected the
first mover to tell the truth or lie.14
The first column of Table 3.8 shows the percentage of second movers who lies, conditional on
expecting the first mover to tell the truth while the second column shows the percentage of second
movers who lies, conditional on expecting the first movers to lie. Focusing on the first column,
we find that the proportion of second movers who expect truth telling but observe lying and lies
(71%) is remarkably higher than the proportion of second movers who expect and observe truth
telling and lies (12.5%).15 The difference is highly significant both in proportions and distributions
(p = 0.01, one-sided test of proportions, p = 0.02 one-sided Kruskal-Wallis test). Focusing on the
second column instead, a one-sided test of proportions and a one-sided Kruskal-Wallis test show no
significant differences, that is, the behavior of second movers who expect truth telling but observe
lying does not differ from the behavior of second movers who expect and observe lying.
The first row of Table 3.8 shows the percentage of second movers who lies, conditional on
observing a first mover who tells the truth while the second row shows the percentage of second
movers who lies, conditional on observing a first movers who lies. Focusing on the first row,
we find that the proportion of second movers who expect lying but observe truth telling and lies
14For this part of the analysis we dropped subjects who observed 6, subjects who lied downwards and subjects who
expect their partners to lie downwards. We thus have 69 observations.
15Importantly, percentages reported in cells do not sum to 100%. Cells have to be read as the percentage of second
movers who lied, among all second movers who observe a certain behavior conditional on expecting that behavior or
not. For instance, in the top-left cell we find the percentage of second movers that lied among all second movers who
expect truth telling and observe truth telling: 8 second movers expect and observe truth telling, the 12.5% of them lies
and the remaining tells the truth.
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(85%) is remarkably higher than the proportion of second movers who expect and observe truth
telling and lies (12.5%). The difference is highly significant both in proportions and distributions
(p < 0.01, one-sided test of proportions, p < 0.01 one-sided Kruskal-Wallis test). Focusing on the
second row instead, a one-sided test of proportions and a one-sided Kruskal-Wallis test show no
significant differences, that is, the proportion of second movers who expect lying but observe truth
telling and lie does not differ from the proportion of second movers who expect and observe lying
and lie.
To summarize, we find that second movers who expect first movers to tell the truth but are
surprised by first movers’ lies are more likely to lie compared to second movers who expect and
observe first movers who tell the truth. However, second movers who expect first movers to lie but
are surprised by a first mover who tells the truth are more likely to lie than second movers who
expect a first mover to tell the truth and observe a first mover who tells the truth.
Result 5: When lies are observable and reports happen sequentially
(i) second movers who expect truth telling but are surprised by lying are more likely to lie than
second movers who expect and observe truth telling;
(ii) second movers who expect lying but are surprised by truth telling are more likely to lie than
second movers who expect and observe truth telling.
Result 5 partially confirms our fifth hypothesis: on the one hand, second movers who expect
truth telling but are surprised by lying are more likely to lie. On the other hand, we do not find
evidence for the opposite surprise effect i.e. that second movers who expect lying but observe truth
telling are less likely to lie than second movers who expect and observe lying. 16
3.5 Conclusion
We study lying behavior when there are no strategic interactions and lies are observable. We are
interested in investigating whether observing lying increases lying and whether expecting others to
lie increases lying.
16We do not investigate lying in the intensive margin, conditional on what second movers expect and observe, due to
the very little number of observation we have at disposal once we refer to the size of the lie.
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We find that when there are no strategic interactions and lies are observable, lying in the base-
line does not differ from lying in the simultaneous treatment. Subjects in the sequential treatment
instead are more likely to lie than subjects in the simultaneous treatment. This is due to second
movers who lie significantly more than subjects in the simultaneous treatment in the extensive
margin. This suggests that second movers are conditional liars. Moreover, the size of the lie of
second movers increases with the observed size of the lie of first movers. In other words, observing
lying increases lying in the intensive margin.
Finally, we show that subjects overestimate lying in the extensive margin; among treatments,
second movers are the ones who expect their partner to be the most likely to lie. Interestingly,
we find that second movers shift their behavior towards lying when they expect truth telling and
observe lying instead.
The literature on lying behavior has shown that lying increases in presence of strategic in-
teractions and/or communication (Barr and Michailidou (2017), Kocher et al. (2016), Lauer and
Untertrifaller (2019)). Diekmann et al. (2015) show that observing the distribution of reports in-
creases lying even in absence of strategic interactions. However, in their design, subjects are only
informed about aggregate reports and can only estimate individual lying behavior. Here, we study
lying when subjects have full information about their partners’ behavior. In our design, we not
only exclude strategic lying but also allow second movers to precisely observe first movers’ lies.
We find that second movers in the sequential treatment lie more than subjects who report simul-
taneously. Moreover we find that observing the lies of first movers increases the size of the lie of
second movers. We conclude that the motives of lying behavior when lies are observable are not
only monetary but also related to social image costs of lying. The fact that second movers lie to a
greater extent when they observe first movers lying, in absence of strategic interactions, suggests
that observing other group members’ lying decreases individual social image costs of lying.
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Appendix
A. Demographics and Randomization of Subjects among Treatments
At the end of each experimental session, participants fill in a demographic questionnaire. Demo-
graphic variables include Gender (dummy equal to 1 if male), Swiss Nationality (dummy equal
to 1 if Swiss), Unil (dummy equal to 1 if student and affiliated to UNIL), Age, Grades (average
grade, from 1 to 6), Bachelor (dummy equal to 1 if bachelor student, 0 if master or other), Grad.
Parents (dummy equal to 1 if both parents hold a university degree), Only Child (dummy equal to
1 if only child), Big Town (dummy equal to 1 if resident in a big town), People Known (number of
participants known during the lab section).
To make sure that the randomization of subjects across treatments was successful, we run a
multinomial logit regression. Consistently with the rest of our analysis, we drop observations of
subject who lied downwards, subjects who observed a 6 and passive Player Bs in the baseline
treatment. We compare active reporters in the baseline, subjects in the simultaneous treatment
and first and second movers in the sequential treatment, choosing first movers in the sequential
treatment as a benchmark. The multinomial logit regression is reported in Table 3.9.
Table 3.9 shows that the coefficients of Unil, Gender, Bachelor and People Known are signifi-
cant. To make sure that our results are not due to a randomization fail, we not only use demographic
controls in our regressions but also check if there are differences in extensive and intensive margins
due to Unil affiliation, Gender, Bachelor and People Known in the room.
A.1 Unil
Table 3.10 reports the percentages of liars among Unil and non Unil subjects as well as the average
size of the lie across treatments. The last two columns of the Table shows the p-value of one sided
t-tests and one-sided Kruskal-Wallis tests.
As shown in Table 3.10, overall subjects who are not affiliated to Unil lie significantly more
than subjects who are affiliated to Unil both to the intensive and extensive margin. On average the
size of the lie is equal to 1.32 and 1.98 for Unil and non Unil respectively while on average the
50% of Unil and the 68% of non Unil subjects lies. A possible explanation is that Unil students are
reluctant to lie since the lab we run the experiment at is the one of the University they are affiliated
to.
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Table 3.9: Mlogit of demographics, First M. in Sequential as benchmark
Baseline Simultaneous Second M.
Gender 0.130 0.683∗ 0.141
(0.356) (0.338) (0.353)
Swiss Nat. 0.324 -0.162 0.103
(0.428) (0.395) (0.415)
Unil -0.356 0.198 -0.953∗
(0.437) (0.444) (0.434)
Age -0.0460 0.0570 0.0759
(0.0721) (0.0599) (0.0628)
Grades -0.101 0.127 -0.170
(0.295) (0.295) (0.306)
Bachelor 0.402 1.080∗ 0.199
(0.475) (0.462) (0.424)
Grad. Parents -0.305 -0.253 -0.360
(0.383) (0.355) (0.384)
Only Child 0.593 0.990 0.0653
(0.728) (0.622) (0.787)
Big Town -0.169 -0.126 -0.264
(0.437) (0.399) (0.418)
People Known -0.516 -0.562∗ 0.0800
(0.329) (0.264) (0.209)





Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
only those who could lie, no lie down, no B in baseline
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The differences in intensive and extensive margins hold with significance in the baseline, se-
quential treatment and for second movers in the sequential treatment.
A.2 Gender
Table 3.11 reports the percentages of liars among males and females as well as the average size
of the lie across treatments and distinguishing among first and second movers in the sequential
treatment. The last two columns of the Table shows the p-value of one sided t-tests and one-sided
Kruskal-Wallis tests.
In line with the finding of Abeler et al. (2019), on average male lie more than female both on
the intensive (the average size of the lie is 1.70 for male and 1.36 for female) and extensive margin
(61% of male lies and 51% of female lies). This difference holds in all treatments. However, it
is significant only if we consider the overall data set and the baseline treatment, as well as for the
percentage of liars among first movers in the sequential treatment.
A.3 Bachelor
Table 3.12 reports the percentages of liars among bachelor and non bachelor students as well as the
average size of the lie across treatments and distinguishing among second movers in the sequential
treatment. The last two columns of the Table shows the p-value of one sided t-tests and one-sided
Kruskal-Wallis tests.
Although it seems that bachelor student lie more than non bachelor students both to the inten-
sive and extensive margin (the size of the lie and the percentage of liars are equal to 1.49 and 53%
and to 1.60 and 62% respectively), we do not find significant differences.
A.4 People Known
People known is a variable that indicates the number of participants a subject knows during a
session. We introduced this variable to make sure that participating in the experiment with one
or more colleagues or friends would not play a role, even if this should not be the case given the
impossibility to communicate and the anonymity protocol we apply.
To make sure that this is not the case, we run linear regressions of lying and liars respectively
on the variable ”People Known” (in each regression we employ robust standard errors). Table 3.13
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reports coefficients and p-values of such regressions across treatments and distinguishing among
first and second movers in the sequential treatment.
Table 3.10: UNIL in Treatments





Size of Lie 1.32 1.98 0.011 0.002
Liars 50% 68.5% 0.002 0.003
Baseline A 70% 30%
Size of Lie .86 2.3 0.001 0.009
Liars 42% 68% 0.026 0.056
Simultaneous 77% 23%
Size of Lie 1.30 1.81 0.123 0.344
Liars 46% 52% 0.314 0.631
Sequential 65% 35%
Size of Lie 1.55 1.94 0.101 0.112
Liars 56.5% 75.5% 0.013 0.0266
First M. 73% 27%
Size of Lie 1.61 1.37 0.295 0.812
Liars 56% 63% 0.288 0.579
Second M. 57% 43%
Size of Lie 1.47 2.3 0.022 0.030
Liars 57.5% 83.3% 0.010 0.022
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Table 3.11: Gender in Treatments





Size of Lie 1.70 1.36 0.045 0.075
Liars 61% 51% 0.037 0.075
Baseline A 45% 55%
Size of Lie 1.75 .94 0.033 0.069
Liars 61% 41% 0.062 0.130
Simultaneous 57% 43%
Size of Lie 1.51 1.31 0.290 0.530
Liars 51% 43.5% 0.240 0.490
Sequential 44% 56%
Size of Lie 1.83 1.57 0.176 0.285
Liars 69% 58% 0.087 0.175
First M. 41% 59%
Size of Lie 1.79 1.38 0.159 0.233
Liars 69% 50% 0.055 0.114
Second M. 47% 53%
Size of Lie 1.87 1.78 0.408 0.804
Liars 70% 67.5% 0.424 0.849
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Table 3.12: Bachelor in Treatments





Size of Lie 1.49 1.60 0.310 0.414
Liars 53% 62% 0.090 0.181
Baseline A 70% 23%
Size of Lie 1.25 1.50 0.319 0.324
Liars 46% 64% 0.112 0.228
Simultaneous 80% 20%
Size of Lie 1.37 1.61 0.304 0.555
Liars 46% 55% 0.230 0.462
Sequential 67% 33%
Size of Lie 1.71 1.64 0.403 0.856
Liars 62.7% 63.8% 0.450 0.902
First M. 67% 33%
Size of Lie 1.62 1.39 0.295 0.571
Liars 60% 52% 0.255 0.513
Second M. 66% 34%
Size of Lie 1.80 1.87 0.435 0.795
Liars 65% 75% 0.402 0.406
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Table 3.13: People Known: Regressions
Size of Lie Coeff P-value
Overall 0.25 0.032
Baseline A 0.56 0.049
Simultaneous 0.34 0.272
Sequential 0.16 0.421
Sequential A 0.36 0.201
Sequential B -0.06 0.809
Liars Coeff P-value
Overall 0.038 0.216
Baseline A 0.055 0.485
Simultaneous 0.13 0.092
Sequential .003 0.950
First M. 0.057 0.425
Second M. -0.57 0.439
Table 3.13 shows that while coefficients for size of the lie are positive in all cases (with the
exception of second movers for which the coefficient is very small). However, the coefficient is
significant only if we consider the whole data set and not when we consider treatments separately.
Finally, coefficients for liars are positive in all cases (but for second movers) but not significant.
Hence we can conclude that knowing more people does not affect lying in the extensive margin.
B. Lying to the extensive margin: type of liars
As mention in section 3.4.2, all dots lying above the red line in each graph of Figure 3.2 represent
liars. In what follows, we distinguish two types of liars: (i) “maximal liars” and (ii) “partial liars”.
Table 3.14 shows the percentage of liars, maximal liars and partial liars among those who lied
in the three treatments and for second movers in the sequential treatment.
In all treatments, the percentage of maximal liars is significantly higher than the percentage of
partial liars (p<0.01 one-sided test of proportions, p<0.01 one-sided Kruskal-Wallis test).
When comparing the proportion of partial liars or maximal liars across treatments (and dis-
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Table 3.14: Extensive margin - liars and type of liars
Baseline Simultaneous Sequential First M. Second M.
Obs. (62) (90) (141) (71) (70)
liars 50% 48% 63% 58% 69%
Among liars
Obs. (31) (43) (89) (41) (48)
partial liars 35% 26% 30% 29% 31%
max liars 65% 74% 70% 71% 69%
tinguishing among second movers in the sequential treatment), one-sided tests of proportions and
one-sided Kruskal-Wallis test of distributions suggest no significant difference between these pro-
portions (in all cases, p-values are above 0.178).
Hence we find that (i) the percentage of maximal liars is remarkably higher than the percentage
of partial liars and that (ii) the percentage of maximal liars and partial liars does not differ across
treatments.
The theory predictions from Gneezy et al. (2018) indicate that subjects lie maximally when
lying can be detected. In our case we observe remarkably more maximal liars than partial liars,
most likely due to the effect of die-roll verifiablity from the experimenter. However, Gneezy et al.
(2018) theory also suggests that there should be no partial lying with full observability. This is not
confirmed neither in their nor in our experimental data: a (small) percentage of liars lies partially
even if most liars lie maximally.
For completeness, Table 3.15 reports the mentioned distinctions for the whole data set without
excluding subjects who could not lie and subjects who lied downwards.
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Table 3.15: Extensive margin - liars and type of liars, all observations included
Baseline Simultaneous Sequential First M. Second M.
Obs (69) (100) (166) (83) (83)
liars
44.93% 44% 56.63% 51.81% 61.45%
(31) (44) (94) (43) (51)
partial-liars 15.94% 12% 19.28% 16.87% 21.96%
(among liars) (11) (12) (32) (14) (18)
max-liars 28.99% 32% 37.35% 34.94% 39.76%
(among liars) (20) (32) (62) (29) (33)
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C. Experimental Instructions
Hereafter we report the English translation of the experimental instructions. The reader will first
find the introduction to each section in (C.0) and then the part of experimental instructions that are
peculiar to each treatment, baseline (C.1), simultaneous (C.2) and sequential (C.3). Finally, section
C.4 explains in details the experimental procedures reporting screen-shots of a simulation of an
experimental session.
C.0 Introduction
You are about to participate in an economic experiment. The experiment is conducted by the
Department of Economics of the University of Lausanne.
For your participation in the experiment you will earn a payment of CHF 10 for sure. The
experiment allows you to earn additional money. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid
CHF 10 and any additional money you earned during the experiment. It is to your own benefit to
read these explanations carefully.
You can perform the experiment at your own speed.
It is prohibited to communicate with the other participants during the whole course of the
experiment. If you do not abide by this rule you will be excluded from the experiment and
all payments. However, if you have questions you can always ask one of the experimenters by
raising your hand.
You can abort the experiment anytime you wish without giving any reasons. To do so, please
raise your hand and tell the experimenters that you wish to abort the experiment. One experimenter
will then guide you outside the laboratory. You are not eligible to any payments in case you abort
the experiment.
Your anonymity is guaranteed.
At the end of the experiment, one experimenter will give you a payment sheet with the amount
you will be paid. You will need to carry the payment sheet with you and present it to an exper-
imenter outside the LABEX. The experimenter outside the LABEX does not know about any of
the decisions you made during the experiment. This experimenter will then pay you according to
your payment sheet. After that you will sign a form stating that you received the payment. Since
the form you sign does not contain your participant number, there is no way any experimenter can
determine your identity.
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If you have any questions right now, please raise your hand. Otherwise, you can now proceed
with the detailed explanations of the experiment.
Thank you very much for your participation!
C.1 Baseline
We are now going to explain the task you will perform. For this task you are randomly and anony-
mously paired with another participant in this room. One participant is randomly assigned to the
role of Person A and the other participant to the role of Person B. You will learn whether you have
been assigned to the role of Person A or Person B in the end of these instructions.
During this experiment Person A will be asked to complete a task and Person B will be a passive
observer.
Person A will observe the outcome of an electronic six sided die-roll. The experimenter will
also observe the outcome of Person A’s die-roll. Person A’s die-roll has six possible outcomes: 1,
2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Each outcome is realized with a probability of 1/6. The table below summarizes
Person A’s die-roll outcomes and their associated probabilities:
Outcome of the die-roll 1 2 3 4 5 6
Probability 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6
The task of person A is to report the outcome of his/her die-roll. The monetary payment of
Person A is determined by the number reported by Person A. If Person A reports number 1, then
Person A is paid CHF 1, if Person A reports number 2, then Person A is paid CHF 2, etc. Here is a
table of how the report of Person A is associated with the monetary payment of Person A:
Report of Person A 1 2 3 4 5 6
Monetary payment of Person A in CHF 1 2 3 4 5 6
Here is how Person B will get paid. A previous experiment took place here involving 24
participants recruited in the same way you were recruited. We call this experiment, “Experiment
1.” The experiment you are participating now is not the same as “Experiment 1,” however, you
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need to know about “Experiment 1” because what people did in that experiment is relevant for
determining Person’s B monetary payment today.
In “Experiment 1” participants were randomly and anonymously paired. In each pair there was
a Person A and a Person B. The task of Person A and Person B was to observe the outcome of a
die-roll and report this outcome. What Person A and Person B reported determined their monetary
payments. For example, if Person A reported a 2, Person A received a monetary payment of CHF
2. If Person B, reported a 4, Person B received a monetary payment of CHF 4. Each of the 24
reports of “Experiment 1” has been recorded in a database.
Person B’s monetary payment will be determined as follows. The computer will randomly draw
from the database one of the reports of participants in “Experiment 1” who observed the same die-roll
as Person A has observed today. It is this randomly drawn report that will determine Person B’s
monetary payment. For example, if Person A here today observed a die-roll of 2, the computer will
randomly draw a report from all the participants in “Experiment 1” who observed a die-roll of 2.
If the randomly drawn report is a 2, Person B will be paid CHF 2. If the randomly drawn report is
a 3, Person B will be paid CHF 3, etc. Note that Person B does not make a report; the monetary
payment of Person B depends only on the randomly drawn report from “Experiment 1.” Here is
a table of how the randomly drawn report from “Experiment 1” is associated with the monetary
payment of Person B:
Randomly drawn report 1 2 3 4 5 6
Monetary payment of Person B in CHF 1 2 3 4 5 6
After Person A has observed the outcome of his/her die-roll and made his/her report, Person
B observes the outcome of the die-roll of Person A and Person A’s report, and Person A and B
observe the outcome of randomly drawn report from “Experiment 1.”
During the experiment Person A and Person B will also be asked to make a guess. This will
become clear during the experiment. If Person A’s guess is correct, Person A will be paid an
additional CHF 1. If Person B’s guess is correct, Person B will be paid an additional CHF 1.
Therefore, the sequence of this experiment is as follows:
• Person A:
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1. Person A observes the outcome of his/her die-roll
2. Person A makes a report
3. Person A makes a guess
4. Person A observes Person B’s randomly drawn report from “Experiment 1”
5. Person A is paid his/her report
• Person B:
1. Person B observes the outcome of the die-roll of Person A
2. Person B makes a guess
3. Person B observes the report of Person A
4. Person B observes the randomly drawn report from “Experiment 1”
5. Person B is paid the randomly drawn report from “Experiment 1”
The three examples that follow should make it clear how Person A’s report and Person B’s ran-
domly drawn report from “Experiment 1” are related to the monetary payments in this experiment.
Example 1: Assume the outcome of Person A’s die-roll is 4, Person A reports 5, and Person B’s
randomly drawn report from “Experiment 1” is 4. In this example, Person A is paid CHF 5 and
Person B is paid CHF 4. Example 2: Assume the outcome of Person A’s die-roll is 2, Person A
reports 4, and Person B’s randomly drawn report from “Experiment 1” is 5. In this example, Person
A is paid CHF 4 and Person B is paid CHF 5. Example 3: Assume the outcome of Person A’s
die-roll is 3, Person A reports 3, and Person B’s randomly drawn report from “Experiment 1” is 3.
In this example, Person A is paid CHF 3 and Person B is paid CHF 3.
It is important that you have a good understanding of the experimental instructions. To check
that the instructions are clear to you we now ask you to answer a few questions. Your answers
to these questions do not have any influence on the experiment itself or on the payment you will
receive at the end of the experiment. The experiment will start once you and the person you are
paired with have answered the questions correctly.
Questions to check your understanding:17
17Questions were shown on the experiment active screen before participants were assigned their roles of Person A or
Person B
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1. If Person A reports 5, how much is Person A paid?
2. If the outcome of the die-roll of Person A is 3 and Person A reports 2, how much is Person
A paid?
3. If Person B’s randomly drawn report from “Experiment 1” is 5, how much is Person B paid?
4. If the outcome of the die-roll of Person A is 4, Person B’s randomly drawn report from
“Experiment 1” is 3, and Person A reports 5, how much is Person B paid?
5. Does the report of Person A influence the monetary payment of Person B? Yes or No?
C.2 Simultaneous
We are now going to explain the task you will perform. For this task you are randomly and anony-
mously paired with another participant in this room. One participant is randomly assigned to the
role of Person A and the other participant to the role of Person B. You will learn whether you have
been assigned to the role of Person A or Person B in the end of these instructions.
Person A and Person B will observe the outcome of an electronic six sided die-roll. Both
Person A and Person B will observe the same outcome of this die-roll. The experimenter will also
observe the outcome of this die-roll. This die-roll has six possible outcomes: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.
Each outcome can be realized with a probability of 1/6. The table below summarizes the die-roll
outcomes and their associated probabilities.
Outcome of the die-roll 1 2 3 4 5 6
Probability 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6
Your task, and the other person’s task, is the same: to report the outcome of the die-roll. Each
person’s monetary payment is only determined by his/her report. In other words, Person A’s mon-
etary payment is only determined by Person A’s report and Person B’s monetary payment is only
determined by Person B’s report.
If you report number 1, then you are paid CHF 1, if you report number 2, then you are paid CHF
2, etc. Here is a table of how your report is associated with your monetary payment:
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Your report 1 2 3 4 5 6
Monetary payment in CHF 1 2 3 4 5 6
Once Person A and Person B have made their reports, each will be asked to make a guess. This
will become clear during the experiment. If Person A’s guess is correct, Person A will be paid an
additional CHF 1. If Person B’s guess is correct, Person B will be paid an additional CHF 1.
Finally, Person A observes the report of Person B and Person B observes the report of Person
A.
Therefore, the sequence of this experiment is as follows:
1. Person A and Person B observe the outcome of the die-roll
2. Person A and Person B make their reports
3. Person A and Person B make their guesses
4. Person A and Person B observe each other’s reports
5. Person A is paid his/her report and Person B is paid his/her report
The three examples that follow should make it clear how Person A’s report and Person B’s report
are related to the monetary payments in this experiment.
Example 1: Assume the outcome of the die-roll is 4, Person A reports 5, and Person B reports
4. In this example, Person A is paid CHF 5 and Person B is paid CHF 4.
Example 2: Assume the outcome of the die-roll is 2, Person A reports 4, and Person B reports
5. In this example, Person A is paid CHF 4 and Person B is paid CHF 5.
Example 3: Assume the outcome of the die-roll is 3, Person A reports 3, and Person B reports
3. In this example, Person A is paid CHF 3 and Person B is paid CHF 3.
It is important that you have a good understanding of the experimental instructions. To check
that the instructions are clear to you we now ask you to answer a few questions. Your answers
to these questions do not have any influence on the experiment itself or on the payment you will
receive at the end of the experiment. The experiment will start once you and the person you are
paired with have answered the questions correctly.
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Questions to check your understanding:18
1. If you report 5, how much are you paid?
2. If the outcome of the die-roll is 3 and you report 2, how much are you paid?
3. Does Person A observe a different outcome of the die-roll than Person B? Yes or No?
4. If the outcome of the die-roll is 2 and the person you are paired with reports 3, how much is
the person you are paired with paid?
5. Does the report of one person influence the monetary payment of the other person? Yes or
No?
C.3 Sequential
We are now going to explain the task you will perform. For this task you are randomly and anony-
mously paired with another participant in this room. One participant is randomly assigned to the
role of Person A and the other participant to the role of Person B. You will learn whether you have
been assigned to the role of Person A or Person B in the end of these instructions.
Person A and Person B will observe the outcome of an electronic six sided die-roll. Both
Person A and Person B will observe the same outcome of this die-roll. The experimenter will also
observe the outcome of this die-roll. This die-roll has six possible outcomes: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.
Each outcome can be realized with a probability of 1/6. The table below summarizes the die-roll
outcomes and their associated probabilities.
Outcome of the die-roll 1 2 3 4 5 6
Probability 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6
Your task, and the other person’s task, is the same: to report the outcome of the die-roll.
Each person’s monetary payment is only determined by his/her report. In other words, Person
A’s monetary payment is only determined by Person A’s report and Person B’s monetary payment
is only determined by Person B’s report. If you report number 1, then you are paid CHF 1, if you
18Questions were shown on the experiment active screen before participants were assigned their roles of Person A or
Person B
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report number 2, then you are paid CHF 2, etc. Here is a table of how your report is associated
with your monetary payment:
Your report 1 2 3 4 5 6
Monetary payment in CHF 1 2 3 4 5 6
Once Person A and Person B have observed the outcome of the die-roll, Person A makes
his/her report. After this, Person B observes Person A’s report. Then, Person B makes his/her
report. Finally, Person A observes Person B’s report.
During the experiment Person A and Person B will also be asked to make a guess. This will
become clear during the experiment. If Person A’s guess is correct, Person A will be paid an
additional CHF 1. If Person B’s guess is correct, Person B will be paid an additional CHF 1.
Therefore, the sequence of this experiment is as follows:
1. Person A and Person B observe the outcome of the die-roll
2. Person A makes his/her report
3. Person A and Person B make their guesses
4. Person B observes Person A’s report
5. Person B makes his/her report
6. Person A observes Person B’s report
7. Person A is paid his/her report and Person B is paid his/her report
The three examples that follow should make it clear how Person A’s report and Person B’s
report are related to the monetary payments in this experiment.
Example 1: Assume the outcome of the die-roll is 4, Person A reports 5, and Person B, after
having observed Person A’s report, reports 4. In this example, Person A is paid CHF 5 and Person
B is paid CHF 4.
Example 2: Assume the outcome of the die-roll is 2, Person A reports 4, and Person B, after
having observed Person A’s report, reports 5. In this example, Person A is paid CHF 4 and Person
B is paid CHF 5.
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Example 3: Assume the outcome of the die-roll is 3, Person A reports 3, and Person B, after
having observed Person A’s report, reports 3. In this example, Person A is paid CHF 3 and Person
B is paid CHF 3.
It is important that you have a good understanding of the experimental instructions. To check
that the instructions are clear to you we now ask you to answer a few questions. Your answers
to these questions do not have any influence on the experiment itself or on the payment you will
receive at the end of the experiment. The experiment will start once you and the person you are
paired with have answered the questions correctly.
Questions to check your understanding:19
1. If you report 5, how much are you paid?
2. If the outcome of the die-roll is 3 and you report 2, how much are you paid?
3. Does Person A observe a different outcome of the die-roll than Person B? Yes or No?
4. Who is the first person to report the outcome of the die-roll? Person A or Person B?
5. Does the report of one person influence the monetary payment of the other person? Yes or
No?
C.4 Experimental Procedure
In this section we take the reader throughout the core parts of the lab experiment. We report an
example of the screenshots seen from player i20 and player j in their French version (an English
translation is available in each image caption).
In this example the die-roll is equal to 2, player i reports a 2 and guesses that j reported a 4
while player j reports a 4 and guesses that i reported a 6. Having guessed the partner’s report,
player i gets 1 CHF on top of the 10 CHF show up fee and the 2 CHF payment for her report.
Player j instead did not guess: she will then receive 4 CHF for her report and the 10 CHF show up
fee without any additional payment. This is shown in Figures from (3.3) to (3.15).
19Questions were shown on the experiment active screen before participants were assigned their roles of Person A or
Person B
20Recall that during lab sessions we called “player i” “Person A” and “player j” “Person B”.
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Furthermore, we report the initial and final message of the questionnaire (Figures (3.16) and
(3.17)) for a better understanding of the anonimous payment process. Finally we include the file -
payment sheet for clarity.
Figure 3.3: “Welcome to our experiment. The next screen will show you the role you have been
assigned.”
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Figure 3.4: “You have been assigned the role of Person A.”
Figure 3.5: “You have been assigned the role of Person B.”
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Figure 3.6: “The outcome of the die-roll is 2.”
Figure 3.7: “Please report the outcome of the die-roll” - Person A reports 2.
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Figure 3.8: “Please report the outcome of the die-roll” - Person B reports 4.
Figure 3.9: “Please guess the report of Person B” - Person A guesses that Person B reported a 4
-“Recall that if your guess is correct you will receive 1 CHF in addition.”
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Figure 3.10: “Please guess the report of Person A” - Person B guesses that Person A reported a 6 -
“Recall that if your guess is correct you will receive 1 CHF in addition.”
Figure 3.11: “Person B reported “ - 4 - “ You have guessed!”
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Figure 3.12: “Person A reported “ - 2 - “ You have not guessed!”
Figure 3.13: “You have gained “ - 2 - “Additional amount for your guess” -1- “Your payment is” -
13
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Figure 3.14: “You have gained “ - 2- “Additional amount for your guess” -1 - “Your payment is” -
13
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Figure 3.15: ”The experiment is now over. We will soon give you your payment. Before giving
you your payment, we kindly ask you to fill in the following questionnaire.”
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Figure 3.16: “Questionnaire - The experiment is almost over. We kindly ask you to answer the
following questionnaire. Please answer each of the following questions as precisely as possible.
Your answers will be kept confidential. A sincere answer is of great value for our research. Thank
you in advance for your cooperation. - continue “
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Figure 3.17: “The experiment is now over. Please remain seated. We are about to distribute you
your payment sheet. Please fill the the payment receipt, without signing it nor indicating your
subject number, with your name, surname, student ID and adress. Then please take the payment
sheet and the payment receipt with you and show them to the experimenter outside of LABEX.
We will tell you when to leave the room and reach the experimenter outside of LABEX to receive
your compensation according to the payment sheet and sign the payment receipt. Please leave the
experiment material (instuctions and cubicle number cards) on your desk.”
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